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Chapter 1
General Introduction
This dissertation consists of two non-consecutive chapters which do not
follow a common theme. Instead of searching for unifying aspects, it is
more useful to highlight their differences. The first chapter focuses on a
positive question, namely How can we rationalize the debt maturity struc-
ture of the corporate non-financial sector both in the aggregate and at the
firm level? and only briefly touches upon efficiency considerations. The
second chapter poses a normative question, namely How should a macro-
prudential regulator set capital requirements for depository institutions in
the presence of an unstable shadow banking sector?, where the question
of economic efficiency is of course central. The first chapter is about the
capital structure dynamics of non-financial firms, whereas in the second
chapter, there is no capital structure of non-financial firms. Instead the se-
cond chapter includes a detailed model of the financial sector with different
types of institutions, whereas the financial sector in the first chapter is a
very stylized homogeneous financial market.
Nevertheless, commonalities do exist. Both chapters assume that agents
only have a very limited set of financial contracts at their disposal and do
not try to rationalize what determines the set of these contracts. These
financial contracts are debt and equity contracts. In both chapters, it is
the debt contracts which create externalities. I abstract however from the
many agency problems associated with equity financing discussed in the
corporate finance literature, e.g. in Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman
and Hart (1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Tirole (2006).
In the first chapter, an externality arises at the firm level, since the
owners of a firm do not care about the value of outstanding debt. In the
second chapter, an externality arises in general equilibrium, because price-
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taking banks fail to internalize the negative effects of their own borrowing
decisions on borrowing constraints of other banks and hence the financial
stability of the banking system as a whole. In both cases, these externa-
lities create a motive for the government to regulate lending. While this
is not explicitly addressed in the first chapter, the second chapter evalua-
tes various regulatory policies. In particular, we find that counter-cyclical
capital requirements on retail banks are an effective policy tool to reduce
financial instability.
Regarding the first chapter, I document that the share of long-term debt
in total debt of US non-financial firms is pro-cyclical. Furthermore, this
pro-cyclicality is more pronounced for smaller firms: the long-term debt
share of small firms has a higher standard deviation and correlation with
output than the long-term debt share of large firms. I construct a quan-
titative model in which firms optimally choose investment, leverage, debt
maturity, dividends, and default. Firms face idiosyncratic and aggregate
risk. When they choose their debt maturity, firms trade off default premia
and roll-over costs. As a result, financially constrained firms endogenously
prefer to issue short-term debt, because they face high default premia on
long-term debt. Financially unconstrained firms issue long-term debt, be-
cause it has lower roll-over costs. The model, which is parameterized to
match cross-sectional moments, can match stylized facts about the level
and dynamics of the maturity structure of debt both in the aggregate and
along the firm size distribution. Regarding the effects of outstanding debt
on investment, it is not short-term debt, but long-term debt which leads
to substantial under-investment due to a debt overhang effect.
The second chapter is joint work with Xue Zhang. We study the ma-
croeconomic effects of regulating depository institutions in an economy
with a shadow banking sector. Systemic bank runs on the shadow ban-
king sector occur occasionally and can cause large recessions. Importantly,
the probability of such runs is closely tied to economic fundamentals. A
higher bank capital requirement reduces the frequency of systemic bank
runs by increasing the fire sale price of capital. For this effect, it is crucial
that the regulators relax capital requirements during a bank run. A static
capital requirement will instead increase the frequency of banking crises.
The cost of higher capital requirements is a reduction of the aggregate ca-
pital stock due to less financial intermediation. We calibrate our model
to match stylized facts of the U.S. banking system and banking crises in
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the developed countries after World War II. Our numerical results indi-
cate that bank capital requirements for depository institutions are effective
in reducing systemic bank runs. By imposing a bank capital requirement
of 15 percent, the frequency of bank runs decreases from 2.7 to 0.8 runs
per 100 years. Meanwhile, the capital stock decreases by about 5 percent.
Despite the fact that bank capital regulation can effectively eliminate bank
runs, it is not desirable: The welfare cost of such bank capital requirements
outweighs the benefit of fewer bank runs.
Both chapters highlight the dramatic effects that financial frictions re-
lating in particular to debt contracts can have on real economic outcomes
like output and investment. They also stress the importance of the non-
linear nature of these transmission channels, in the first chapter in the
form of the default decisions of firms and in the second chapter in the form
of large, systemic bank runs. These non-linearities require the use of so-
phisticated numerical methods to characterize the results of these models,
which is a challenge in itself. The results in this dissertation square well
with the existing empirical and theoretical literature, but they also show
new channels that lead to a role for the regulation of the capital structure
of both non-financial and financial firms. These are two areas of research
which, while very active, still leave many research questions to be explored.
I hope that this dissertation will become part of a fruitful conversation in
economic research in these areas.
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Chapter 2
Corporate Debt Maturity and
Investment over the Business
Cycle
5
2.1 Introduction
Excessive reliance on short-term debt by firms has arguably contributed to
a large extent to the fall in investment during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
Short-term debt exposes firms to the risk of an unexpected decrease in cre-
dit availability, which in turn forces them to cut down investment to repay
outstanding debt. Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) report that firms with
high short-term debt restricted investment more during the financial crisis,
while firms with high long-term debt did not significantly reduce invest-
ment. Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbrenner (2012) report that
firms with a high fraction of debt maturing when the crisis hit decreased
investment substantially more firms without such a debt position.
Despite these observations, the macroeconomic literature has so far not
considered which factors determine the maturity structure of corporate
debt. Typically, macroeconomic models with financial frictions treat all
debt as short-term.1 Yet for an average publicly traded U.S. firm between
1984 and 2012, only 36.8 percent of outstanding debt matured within the
next year. In the aggregate, only 15.54 percent of corporate debt matured
within the next year for the same time period. This discrepancy between
the standard model assumption on short-term debt and the actual maturity
structure observed in the data is economically important for how corporate
debt affects corporate investment over the business cycle: Theories where
firms rely exclusively on short-term debt emphasize liquidity constraints,
such that firms reduce investment in a recession due to a high cost of refi-
nancing.2 Theories where firms will mostly use long-term debt emphasize
other frictions like the debt overhang problem first introduced by Myers
(1977). According to this theory, firms reduce investment due to the fai-
lure of shareholders to internalize the benefits of investment to holders of
outstanding debt.
In this chapter, I study the determinants of the maturity structure of
debt, both in the cross-section and over the business cycle. Importantly, I
also consider the cyclical dynamics of the maturity structure for firms of
different size. I document that in the aggregate, the share of long-term debt
in total debt is pro-cyclical. This correlation varies substantially by firm
size: For the largest 10 percent of firms as measured by assets, the share
1Examples are Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Khan and Thomas (2013), Gourio
(2013) and Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014).
2Seminal examples are Gomes (2001) and Hennessy and Whited (2007).
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of long-term debt in total debt is counter -cyclical, while it is pro-cyclical
for all other firms. In addition, large firms tend to use a larger share of
long-term debt in general. Because the firm size distribution is very right-
skewed, the behavior of large firms dominates the aggregate effect, such
that it is easy to overlook the pro-cyclical debt maturity dynamics for the
vast majority of small firms.
To propose an explanation for these debt maturity dynamics, I construct
a quantitative dynamic model that allows for a rich capital structure of
firms, firms can issue short-term debt, long-term debt and equity. They
invest in productive capital, which is illiquid due to investment adjustment
costs. Firms face both idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity risk. They
also face aggregate consumption risk which affects asset prices in two ways:
First, consumption risk creates a risk premium for assets whose returns co-
move with consumption. This is true for both equity and debt in the model,
since cash flows to equity are pro-cyclical and default rates are counter-
cyclical, lowering the payouts to creditors in recessions. Second, it creates
a time-varying term structure of risk free interest rates: short-term interest
rates are lower than long-term interest rates in a recession and higher in an
expansion. Due to limited liability, firms can default on outstanding debt.
Because default risk is endogenously pro-cyclical, bond prices reflect both
expected losses from default and a risk premium.
The key ingredients of the model are these endogenous default premia,
exogenous debt and equity issuance costs and a tax benefit of debt. Issu-
ance costs reflect costs like underwriting fees, which the corporate finance
literature considers to be important for corporate capital structure deci-
sions, see e.g. Gomes (2001), Hennessy and Whited (2007), Titman and
Tsyplakov (2007) and Eisfeldt and Muir (2016). When equity issuance costs
are higher than debt issuance costs, as they are in my parametrization of
the model, they create an incentive for low productivity firms to issue debt
to avoid having to issue equity. The tax deductibility of interest expenses
creates an incentive to issue debt for high productivity firms, which is also
widely considered to be an important determinant of the corporate capi-
tal structure, see for example Modigliani and Miller (1963), Fischer et al.
(1989) and the empirical evidence in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015).
The main trade-off between short-term debt and long-term is the fol-
lowing: On the one hand, financially unconstrained firms that want to
maintain a high leverage ratio for the tax benefit of debt want to keep the
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expected cost of rolling over debt low. They can do so by issuing long-
term debt, since long-term debt only has to be rolled over infrequently.
On the other hand, financially constrained firms that issue debt because
they lack internal funds want cheap external liquidity and hence want to
keep the default premium on newly issued debt low. They can do so by
issuing short-term debt, since the default premium on short-term debt is
endogenously lower than the default premium on long-term debt. There
are two reasons for this: First, long-term debt prices default risk over a lon-
ger time horizon and second, long-term debt creates an ex post incentive
misalignment between the firm owners and the long-term creditors that
increases the probability of default. A pecking order theory arises: Very
high productivity firms will issue long-term debt. Medium productivity
firms will rely on internal funds, as long as they have sufficient internal
liquidity. Low productivity firms will use short-term debt, since they lack
internal liquidity. Very low productivity firms will issue equity, since they
are effectively excluded from credit markets due toe prohibitively high de-
fault premia. Since productivity is positively correlated with firm size, my
model can match the stylized fact that small firms use a larger share of
long-term debt. Importantly, the model generates a inverse u-shaped rela-
tionship between the long-term debt share and firm size, since very large
firms and very small firms will not use short-term debt.
The model can also match the stylized fact that the corporate debt
maturity structure is pro-cyclical: If aggregate productivity decreases, the
productivity distribution shifts to the left, such that firms will use more
equity and short-term debt and less long-term debt. It can match the
stylized fact that the debt maturity structure of small firms is more pro-
cyclical than the debt maturity structure of large firms, because small firms
tend to be in the region of the productivity distribution where firms issue
short-term debt.
To understand the incentive misalignment between shareholders and
long-term creditors better, consider the case of a firm that has some out-
standing long-term debt and a positive default probability in the next pe-
riod. This firm has to decide how much to invest today. For simplicity,
assume that the investment is financed with internal funds. If the firm will
default in some states of the world in the next period, an investment today
hence constitutes an intertemporal transfer from the owners of the firm to
the creditors, because the firm owners carry the entire cost of the invest-
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ment today, while the benefit of the investment in default states in the next
period accrues to the creditors. The firm has therefore an incentive to un-
derinvest, if it does not care about the value of debt. For short-term debt,
this incentive to underinvest does not arise, because the effect of the inves-
tment on the value of short-term debt is internalized by the firm through
the effect on current bond issuance revenue. But for long-term debt, this
effect is not internalized, because newly issued long-term debt constitutes
only a fraction of all outstanding long-term debt. Knowing that the firm
will not act in their interest ex post, long-term creditors will hence demand
a higher default premium ex ante.
To test the quantitative importance of this theory for aggregate and
firm-level debt maturity structure dynamics, I calibrate the model to ma-
tch several cross-sectional moments, among them the average share of long-
term debt in the cross-section and the default rate. The calibrated model
captures that firms endogenously use mostly long-term debt and that lar-
ger firms use a larger share of long-term debt. While I choose the model
parameters to match cross-sectional moments, it can also match aggregate
correlations, notably the pro-cyclicality of investment, the long-term debt
share and long-term debt issuance and the counter-cyclicality of equity
issuance, leverage and the default rate.
I show that issuance costs of debt and equity are important to match
the level and dynamics of the debt maturity structure: Absent of equity
issuance costs, there is no motive to issue short-term debt, because firms
are never financially constrained: The cost of a unit of external equity is
always one. Firms will then exclusively use long-term debt, independently
of their size. Absent of debt issuance costs firms find it optimal to avoid
using long-term debt, also independently of their size. As a consequence, a
model without debt and equity issuance costs cannot explain the size he-
terogeneity in the level and dynamics of the debt maturity structure. This
results complements Crouzet (2015), who shows in a similar quantitative
model without debt issuance costs that the optimality of short-term debt
is a result of the incentive problem between the firm and the creditors.
Finally, consumption risk helps to improve the model fit for the maturity
dynamics substantially, because it leads to a counter-cyclical slope of the
term structure of risk-free interest rates over the business cycle.
I conclude by discussing the channels through which outstanding corpo-
rate debt affects investment in the model. The model nests several channels
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discussed in the literature, namely the debt overhang channel and the liqui-
dity constraints channel. These channels lead to under-investment relative
to an unlevered firm. The debt overhang channel is the incentive to under-
invest in the presence of long-term debt discussed above. The liquidity
constraints channel arises because access to external funds is costly, such
that firms will under-invest due to a higher cost of capital. I show that
the debt overhang channel is quantitatively the more important channel in
my model, and that it is primarily small firms which under-invest. Under-
investment is quantitatively large: On average, the 25 percent smallest
firms would choose an investment-capital ratio that is 37.5 percent higher
if they had no debt. The debt overhang channel contributes 94 percent of
this under-investment. Coming back to the motivation, it is exactly not
short-term debt, but long-term debt, which causes under-investment in this
model. Therefore, it is not a priori clear that a regulator should encourage
firms to use more long-term debt, unless the different channels through
which outstanding debt affects investment are well understood.
2.2 Review of the Literature
My paper primarily is related to the literature on the cyclicality of the capi-
tal structure of non-financial firms. The closest paper to mine is Jungherr
and Schott (2016). In independent and simultaneous work, they focus on
the maturity dynamics of aggregate liabilities, using aggregate data from
the financial accounts of the United States. They find the maturity dyna-
mics of aggregate liabilities to be counter -cyclical. There are two possible
reasons why their data leads them to a different conclusion: First, their
measure of short-term liabilities includes trade credit. This is important,
since it is well known that during and after the financial crisis, there has
been a collapse of trade and hence trade credit (Chor and Manova (2012)).
This would show up as an increase in the maturity structure of debt in their
data. In contrast, trade credit is a separate credit category in Compustat,
which is the data I use. Second, their measure of short-term debt includes
all loans except mortgages and excludes all bonds. In contrast, loans and
bonds in Compustat are classified according to their actual maturity. This
is also potentially an issue, because the fraction of loans in total debt finan-
cing is known to be pro-cyclical (de Fiore and Uhlig (2011)), which would
show up as an increase in the maturity structure of debt during recessions
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in their data. In terms of the theoretical analysis, my focus is more on
firm heterogeneity over the business cycle, whereas they focus on aggregate
dynamics.
Various other characteristics of the business cycle dynamics of the ca-
pital structure of non-financial firms have been studied in the literature,
for example the choice of debt vs equity in Covas and Haan (2011) and
Jermann and Quadrini (2012), of loans vs bonds in de Fiore and Uhlig
(2011), Crouzet (2016) and Xiao (2017) or the choice between unsecured
vs secured debt in Azariadis, Kaas, and Wen (2016).
My paper is also related to the literature on how financial frictions am-
plify business cycle fluctuations and hence affect the real economy. Khan
and Thomas (2013) develop a heterogeneous firm model in which firms issue
secured short-term debt if they lack internal funds for investment. They
do not consider default decisions. They propose a model which still focuses
on short-term debt, but includes endogenous default in Khan, Senga, and
Thomas (2014). Furthermore, the debt issuance motive and hence leverage
of firms in their model is negatively related to firm size.3 By allowing firms
to choose between different types of debt for different debt issuance moti-
ves, I can endogenously achieve a positive cross-sectional relation between
firm size and leverage. Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014) study uncer-
tainty shocks in a heterogeneous agent model with financial frictions and
defaultable, short-term debt. Gomes, Jermann, and Schmid (2016) develop
a heterogeneous agent model with nominal long-term debt, in which infla-
tion risk affects investment and default through a debt overhang channel.
None of these papers considers however a debt maturity choice.
There is also a literature in corporate finance which studies the maturity
structure of corporate debt, typically abstracting from aggregate dynamics.
The closest paper to mine in this literature is Crouzet (2015),which discus-
ses the determinants of the debt maturity structure in a stylized model
with frictionless investment, no equity issuance and no aggregate uncer-
tainty. He and Milbradt (2014) discuss the dynamics of debt maturity in a
continuous time model. They solve their model in closed form and provide
a theoretical discussion of the existence of various equilibria. My focus is
different: I use a quantitative model to study the dynamics of debt maturity
3Specifically, this is true for their baseline firm setup. They improve their cross-
sectional fit by adding a second type of firms to the model which instead of optimally
choosing how much debt to issue use a simple rule that relates debt issuance to the
square of the capital stock of the firm.
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in a setting with rich cross-sectional heterogeneity of firms. Importantly, I
discuss the role of aggregate uncertainty and investment for the maturity
structure of debt. The focus on investment distinguishes my paper also
from Chen, Xu, and Yang (2016), who investigate maturity choice in a He
and Milbradt (2014)-type model with illiquid bond markets and endoge-
nous default. They show that a liquidity-default spiral may lead firms to
shorten their maturity structure during recessions, despite the existence of
rollover risk. They do however not discuss the dynamics of maturity choice:
conditional on the aggregate state variable, debt maturity is static in their
model.
There is furthermore a large literature in corporate finance and asset
pricing that studies the role of macroeconomic risk for the investment and
financing decisions of firms in dynamic models, starting with Gomes (2001).
My paper builds on the model of Kuehn and Schmid (2014), study the im-
plications of endogenous investment for credit spreads in a model with only
long-term debt. Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) study leverage dyn-
amics with long-term debt and aggregate uncertainty in a continuous-time
framework and show that leverage is counter-cyclical. Bolton, Chen, and
Wang (2013) study cash holdings in a single-factor model and find that
firms issue external funds in times of low funding costs to build up pre-
cautionary cash buffers. The financing costs in their model are exogenous,
since they do not consider risky debt. In a similar framework, Eisfeldt
and Muir (2016) use an estimated model to provide evidence of a separate
financial factor for the build up of precautionary cash buffers through the
issuance of external funds. Warusawitharana and Whited (2016) have a
similar focus as Bolton et al. (2013) and Eisfeldt and Muir (2016), but
provide a behavioral foundation for their financial shock in the form of an
equity misvaluation shock. I contribute to this literature by studying the
effects of aggregate risk on the debt maturity structure of firms.
Finally, my paper is related to the literature which studies how the ma-
turity structure of debt affects investment, which starts with the seminal
paper by Myers (1977). Moyen (2007) discusses the role of different ma-
turity structures for the quantitative importance of debt overhang. There
are some differences between her framework and mine, most notably that
in her model, firms hold either only short-term debt or long-term debt and
there is no endogenous debt maturity choice. Also, the long-term debt
contract in her model is different. Diamond and He (2014) also discuss the
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effect of different maturity structures on debt overhang in a very different
class of models for an exogenously given debt maturity structure.
I proceed as follows: In section 2.3, I show the main facts about the
maturity structure of debt of U.S. firms. In section 2.4, I outline the model
of the decision problem of an equity-value maximizing firm and the bond
pricing equations. Section 2.5 illustrates the determinants of the maturity
structure of debt. Section 2.6 discusses my calibration strategy. In section
2.7, I present the numerical results for aggregate debt maturity dynamics.
Section 2.8 discusses under-investment. Section 2.9 concludes.
2.3 Stylized Facts about the Corporate Debt
Maturity Structure
In this section, I describe the main empirical facts that I want to explain
with the model. All data are from Compustat, for the time period from the
first quarter of 1984 to the last quarter of 2012. Long-term debt is defined as
all debt with a residual maturity of at least one year. Debt includes notes,
bonds, loans, credit lines and bankers acceptances. A detailed description
of the data can be found in Section 2.6.1.
2.3.1 Heterogeneity in the Level of the Debt Matu-
rity Structure
First, consider the row ”Aggregate” of Table 2.1. The first column shows
the share of long-term debt in total debt in the aggregate for the Compustat
sample. On average, 84 percent of the outstanding debt of US non-financial
firms has a residual maturity of at least one year. This is in stark contrast to
the macroeconomic literature with financial frictions, which often assumes
that the entire stock of corporate debt matures within the next quarter.
Second, consider the remaining rows of the first column of Table 2.1.
These show the distribution of the long-term debt share conditional on the
firm size distribution. A robust feature of the data is that larger firms
tend to have a higher share of long-term debt: The average share of long-
term debt of the smallest quartile of firm by assets is average only 41.9
percent, whereas the largest one percent of firms holds on average 82.3
percent of debt debt as long-term debt. The second column shows that the
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean, SD, FracAssets FracDebt
LT Share LT Share
0% to 25% 0.419 0.368 0.006 0.006
25% to 50% 0.562 0.352 0.037 0.026
50% to 75% 0.706 0.327 0.151 0.131
75% to 90% 0.799 0.274 0.287 0.297
90% to 95% 0.822 0.252 0.195 0.207
95% to 99% 0.825 0.239 0.243 0.251
99% to 100% 0.823 0.232 0.081 0.082
0% to 90% 0.608 0.364 0.481 0.460
All Firms 0.632 0.359 1.000 1.000
Aggregate 0.845 0.012
Observations 552987
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the long-term debt share, by firm size.
standard deviation of the maturity structure within a given size quantile is
monotonically decreasing in size, which is also a robust feature of the data.
Not only do larger firms have a larger share of long-term debt, but their
maturity structure is also less volatile.
In the last two columns, I show the fraction of assets and debt that firms
within a given size quantile account for, that is, the marginal distributions
of assets and debt in Compustat. These make it clear that while the dis-
tributions of debt and assets are very right-skewed, the smallest 90 percent
account nonetheless for a substantial fraction of 48 percent of assets and
46 percent of debt in the data.
2.3.2 Aggregate and Firm-Level Dynamics of the Debt
Maturity Structure
In terms of dynamics, the maturity structure of debt of non-financial US
firms varies substantially over the business cycle at the aggregate level. In
Figure 2.1, I plot the cyclical component of the share of long-term debt
in total debt for all firms in the Compustat sample, where I detrend the
series using a simple linear-quadratic trend. It is evident that the share of
long-term debt decreases during recessions and increases during expansions.
For example, the long-term debt share during the financial crisis decreased
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(1) (2) (3)
GDP(t-1) GDP(t) GDP(t+1)
0% to 25% 0.288∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗
25% to 50% 0.265∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗
50% to 75% 0.621∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗
75% to 90% 0.398∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗
90% to 95% 0.135 0.227∗ 0.286∗∗
95% to 99% −0.324∗∗∗ −0.229∗ −0.155
99% to 100% −0.140 −0.0633 −0.006 32
0% to 90% 0.467∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
All Firms 0.227∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗
Observations 116
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.2: Correlations of the detrended long-term debt share with detren-
ded log real corporate sales, by firm size.
from 88.75 percent in the first quarter of 2007 to 84.97 percent in the last
quarter of 2008.
In Table 2.2, I report the correlation coefficients between real corporate
log sales and the share of long-term debt in total debt. Aggregate sales
is my preferred measure of output, since it is the closest equivalent to
output measured in my model and since it reflects cyclical fluctuations
in the corporate sector better than real GDP. I present the correlations
computed using real GDP or real corporate log profits in Appendix 2.A. In
the aggregate, the debt maturity structure is pro-cylical, with a correlation
of 0.396 for all firms, which increases to 0.613 for the smallest 90 percent
of firms. This means that the fraction of due payments on outstanding
debt increases exactly when internal funds are most valuable for firms, a
seemingly puzzling observation.
The maturity structure also varies widely at the firm level. In Figure 2.2,
I plot the time series for the long-term debt share of the smallest 50 percent,
the firms in the 50-75, 75-90 and 90-100 percent size quantiles. I follow
Covas and Haan (2011) in choosing these cutoffs. The time series are de-
trended using a linear quadratic trend. In the figure, they are furthermore
smoothed using a moving average filter with two lags. In Table 2.2, the
series are not smoothed. Figure 2.2 shows the long-term debt share of
small firms is pro-cyclical, while the long-term debt share of large firms is
counter-cyclical.
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Figure 2.1: Figure 2.1 shows the cyclical component of the aggregate share
of long-term debt in total debt for the bottom 90 % non-financial firms by
size in the Compustat Quarterly database. The thin line is real aggregate
sales. Both series are detrended with a linear-quadratic trend. The shaded
areas indicate the NBER recession episodes.
This is confirmed by the correlations I report in Table 2.2: The long-
term debt share of the firms up to the 90 percent size quantile is pro-
cyclical, while for the largest 10 percent of firms, the long-term debt share
is countercyclical. There is also an inverse u-shaped relationship between
firm size and the correlation of the long-term debt share with aggregate
output: For very small and very large firms, this correlation is lower than
for medium-sized firms. These differences are large: For the 50 percent
to 75 percent quantile, the contemporaneous correlation between the long-
term debt share and real output is 0.7222 and is significantly different from
zero at the 0.1 percent level. For the 95 to 99 percent size quantile, the
contemporaneous correlation is -0.229 and is significantly different from
zero at the 1 percent level.
Explaining these patterns of the debt maturity structure is interesting
for two reasons: First, they provide additional evidence about which fi-
nancial frictions determine the capital structure decisions of non-financial
firms both at the micro-economic and macro-economic level. If firms pre-
dominantly rely on long-term debt, rollover costs are more important to
the firms, if they use mostly short-term debt, default premia and default
incentives are more important. Second, the maturity structure itself is a
factor that determines through which channels outstanding debt affects
the investment decisions of firms. Specifically, an important question that
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Figure 2.2: Figure 2.2 shows the cyclical component of the aggregate share
of long-term debt for non-financial firms in the Compustat Quarterly data-
base for different size bins. All series are detrended with a linear-quadratic
trend. For better visibility, all series for this figure are smoothed using a
moving average filter with two lags. The shaded areas indicate the NBER
recession episodes.
arises is whether rollover costs or debt overhang are more important for
the investment behavior of financially constrained firms. Answering this
question crucially depends on understanding the optimal maturity choices
of firms, because firms take the effect of their current debt maturity choices
on future investment decisions into account.
2.4 Model
The model consists of many firms i, a competitive bond market for short-
term debt and long-term debt, which specifies the menu of bond prices
which is idiosyncratic to each firm and a representative household which
owns all firms and holds all debt in the economy. Time is discrete: t =
0, 1, . . . ,∞. The unit of time is a quarter.
Each firm i uses capital Ki,t to produce output, subject to aggregate
and idiosyncratic productivity risk. At each time t, firms decide how much
to invest in capital, Ki,t+1, how much short-term debt B
S
i,t+1 and long-term
debt BLi,t+1 to issue, how much dividend Di,t to pay and whether to default.
There are two types of debt contracts, short-term debt and long-term
debt which I model as bonds. Their prices are determined on a competitive
market, which prices default risk at the firm level. More precisely, creditors
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take into account that firms might default at any point in time in the future
and they form expectations over the uncertain recovery value of a bond
in default. Aggregate consumption risk yields a stochastic discount factor
which generates an additional risk premium for both equity and risky debt.
In section 2.4.1, I present the firm problem. In section 2.4.2, I lay
out how the bond prices are determined. I derive the stochastic discount
factor from an exogenous consumption process and household preferences
in section 2.4.3.
2.4.1 Firm Problem
Objective Function
The objective function of the firm is the present value of equity payouts.
The dividend payout of firm i in period t is denoted by Di,t. EIC(D) is
an equity issuance cost which is zero when dividends are non-negative and
positive when dividends are negative. Future cash flows are discounted
with a stochastic discount factor Λ(Ct, Cs), where Ct denotes aggregate
consumption at time t. The present value of dividends at time t is given
by
Et
[
T∑
s=t
Λ(Ct, Cs) (Di,s − EIC(Di,s))
]
. (2.4.1)
T denotes the period in which it is optimal for the firm to default. In what
follows, I will write the model in recursive form, using the notation that
Xt = X and Xt+1 = X
′ for any variable X.
Technology
The profit function of the firm is given by
Π(Ki, A˜i, Z) = A˜iZK
α
i − ψ, (2.4.2)
where α < 1 describes returns to scale at the firm level. A˜i is the idiosyn-
cratic productivity of the firm, which evolves according to
ln A˜′i = ρ ln A˜i + σ
AεAi , (2.4.3)
εAi ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1).
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The idiosyncratic productivity shocks εAi are uncorrelated over time and
across firms. Z is the aggregate productivity, common to all firms in the
economy, which also follows a first-order autoregressive process:
lnZ ′ = ρ lnZ + σZεZ , (2.4.4)
εZ ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1).
In addition, firms have to pay a fixed cost of operation ψ. This cost arises
only if the firm continues to operate, independently of whether the firm
produces or not. It can be interpreted for example as a maintenance cost or
as the sum of administrative expenses. In the corporate finance literature,
such a fixed production cost is used, for example, in Gomes (2001).
Since idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity have the same persis-
tence, they can be collapsed into the state variable Ai = A˜iZ, which evolves
according to
lnA′i = ρ lnAi + σ
AεAi + σ
ZεZ . (2.4.5)
The conditional density function of A′i is denoted by f(A
′
i|Ai).
Investment
Capital follows the standard law of motion:
K ′i = (1− δ)Ki + Ii, (2.4.6)
where δ is the depreciation rate and Ii is investment. When installing
new capital or selling old capital, the firm has to incur a quadratic capital
adjustment cost with functional form
AC(Ki, K
′
i) =
θ
2
(
K ′i
Ki
− 1 + δ
)2
Ki. (2.4.7)
With these capital adjustment costs, I capture in a simple way that capital
is illiquid. This form of capital adjustment costs is common in the inves-
tment literature, see for example Hayashi (1982). It is widely used in the
corporate finance literature, for example in Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013)
and Eisfeldt and Muir (2016). Furthermore, Bloom (2009) reports that at
the firm level, quadratic capital adjustment costs yield a good description
of firm level investment behavior, even if the capital adjustment costs are
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non-convex at the plant level.
Debt Financing
The firm can issue short-term debt BS,i and long-term debt, BL,i. Short-
term debt takes the form of a one-period contract. Long-term debt takes
the form of a contract with stochastic maturity µ.4 This formulation is
a common way to model long-term debt without introducing too many
state variables in the model. It is for example used in the corporate fi-
nance literature in Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) and Kuehn and
Schmid (2014), but also in the literature on sovereign debt, for example
in Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012)
or Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012). The level of long-term debt therefore
evolves according to
B′L,i = (1− µ)BL,i + JL,i, (2.4.8)
where JL,i denotes long-term debt issuance. Long-term debt cannot be
repaid early: JL,i ≥ 0. Leary and Roberts (2005) report that firms adjust
their leverage only slowly towards a target leverage, which is consistent with
a transaction cost for repurchases or, similarly, a repurchase constraint.
Both short-term debt and long-term debt pay a coupon c.
Debt is risky, because firms can default. Issuance occurs at state-
contingent prices QS and QL for short-term debt and long-term debt re-
spectively. I will explain how these bond prices are determined in equili-
brium in section 2.4.2.
There is a linear issuance cost ξ for debt. Debt issuance costs are equal
for short-term debt issuance and long-term debt issuance. The functional
form for debt issuance costs is given by
DIC(B′S,i, JL,i) = ξ
(|B′S,i|+ |JL,i|) . (2.4.9)
These issuance costs can be interpreted as flotation fees for new bond is-
sues or bank fees for new loans. Such costs can arise in addition to the
endogenous default premium. Typically, the literature considers either a
combination of fixed and linear debt issuance costs or one of the two. An
4Each unit of debt is infinitely divisible, such that a fraction µ will come due every
period, while the remaining fraction 1− µ is rolled over into the next period.
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example for the former is Kuehn and Schmid (2014). A model which uses
a purely linear issuance cost is Titman and Tsyplakov (2007).
Corporate Income Tax
There is a proportional corporate income tax τ . Consistent with the U.S.
tax code, taxable income is calculated as income less operating costs, de-
preciation and interest expense. This implies there is a tax benefit for
investment as well as debt issuance. As a consequence, from the per-
spective of the shareholder, debt issuance is cheaper than equity issuance,
because a fraction of interest expense is implicitly rebated by the govern-
ment. There is therefore an incentive for the firm to increase leverage up
to the point where the marginal cost of debt in the form of issuance costs
and the change in the default premium equal the marginal tax benefit of
debt. This trade-off between the tax shield and the default premium is an
important determinant of leverage, see for example Kraus and Litzenberger
(1973) or Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989). Effectively, it lowers the
required return on equity relative to the required return on debt, making
the creditors of the firm more patient than it’s shareholders. In this model,
it is the reason why large, financially unconstrained firms issue debt.
Dividends and Equity Financing
For convenience, I use the total amount of outstanding debt, Bi = BS,i +
BL,i and the fraction of long-term debt, Mi = BL,i/Bi, as state varia-
bles. I collect the endogenous state variables of firm i in the tuple Si =
(Ki, Bi,Mi). Ki is the capital stock of the firm, Bi is the total amount
of outstanding debt, and Mi is the fraction of outstanding debt that was
issued in the form of long-term debt.
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Dividends are given residually by the budget constraint of the firm,
Di = (1− τ) [Π(Ki, Ai)− δKi − ψ − cBi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Taxable Income
− ((1−Mi) + µMi)Bi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Principal Repayment
+ Ki −K ′i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gross Investment
−AC(Ki, K ′i)
+ QS(1−M ′i)B′i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from ST Debt Issuance
+QL(M
′
iB
′
i − (1− µ)MiBi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from LT Debt Issuance
−DIC((1−Mi)Bi,M ′iB′i − (1− µ)MiBi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt Issuance Cost
. (2.4.10)
Dividends can be negative. In this case, the firm issues seasoned equity
and has to pay an equity issuance cost.5 These costs are meant to capture
monetary costs, such as underwriting fees, but also non-monetary costs
like managerial effort and signaling costs conveyed through the issues.6
The equity issuance cost consists of a fixed component φ0 and a linear
component φ1, such that average cost of issuing equity is decreasing in the
size of the issue. The functional form is
EIC(Di) = (φ0 + φ1|Di|)1(Di<0). (2.4.11)
This functional form is consistent for large firm with the empirical evidence
in Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) and the structural estimation results in
Hennessy and Whited (2007).7 It is for example used in Gomes (2001),
Cooper and Ejarque (2003), Gomes and Schmid (2010) and Kuehn and
Schmid (2014).
Firm Problem and Default
If the firm decides not to default, its problem is then to maximize the
present value of dividends by choosing the capital stock K ′i, debt B
′
i, the
fraction of long-term debt M ′i , and dividends Di. The value function of a
5Seasoned equity meaning that it is an issue by an already publicly traded firm.
6An example of a model in which equity issuance is associated with higher signalling
costs than debt issuance is Myers and Majluf (1984).
7Although the main point of Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) is exactly that this for-
mulation is not appropriate for smaller firms.
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continuing firm i can be summarized as
V C(Si, Ai, C) = max
K′i,B
′
i,M
′
i ,Di
{Di − EIC(Di)
+E
[
Λ(C,C ′)
∫ ∞
−∞
V (S ′i, A′i, C ′)f(A′i|Ai)dA′i|C
]}
, (2.4.12)
subject to the budget constraint 2.4.10 and the constraints K ′i ≥ 0, B′i ≥
(1−µ)MiBi and (1−µ)MiBi/B′i ≤M ′i ≤ 1. The last two constraints arise
due to the assumption that long-term debt cannot be repurchased.
Default occurs if the firm does not repay its debt, either for strategic
reasons or because the firm cannot raise sufficient funds to repay outstan-
ding liabilities. Since shareholders can simply walk away if the value of
owning the firm becomes negative, the value of the firm to shareholders is
bounded below by 0. The total value of equity is then
V (Si, Ai, C) = max
{
V C(Si, Ai, C), 0
}
. (2.4.13)
2.4.2 Bond Markets
Payouts to Creditors
The bond market is competitive. Bonds are discounted with the same
discount factor as equity. Both bonds pay a fixed coupon. Coupons are
calculated according to
c = cS = cL =
1
β
− 1. (2.4.14)
That is, coupons are chosen such that the values of risk-free bond prices in
the absence of aggregate risk are both equal to 1.
If the firm does not default, the payment to the short-term creditors is
1 + c. The payment to the long-term creditors is µ + c. The outstanding
fraction (1−µ) of long-term debt is valued by creditors at the end-of period
bond price Q′L, such that the value of owning one unit of a long-term bond
that is not in default is given by µ+ c+ (1− µ)Q′L.
If the firm decides to default on its outstanding debt, the firm is liqui-
dated after production has taken place.8 There is a cross-default clause: a
8Corbae and D’Erasmo (2017) report that liquidations according to Chapter 7 of
the US bankruptcy code account for about 20 percent of all US defaults. The rest are
reorganizations following Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy code. While allowing for
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default on short-term debt triggers a default on long-term debt and vice
versa. In addition, there is a pari passu clause: bond holders have equal
claims on the liquidation value of the firm, independent of the maturity of
their bond. The liquidation value consists of the profits plus the deprecia-
ted capital stock. Consistent with the U.S. tax code, it is not possible to
deduct interest expense from taxable income in default.
A complication of my model with quadratic capital adjustment costs is
that capital is illiquid. I interpret the capital adjustment cost as a primitive
of the model that also has to be paid if the firm is liquidated. Therefore, it is
not optimal to uninstall the entire capital stock of the firm, because below
some optimal disinvestment I∗ < 0, the marginal adjustment cost from
disinvesting an additional unit of the capital stock outweighs the marginal
benefit. This optimal level of disinvestment is the solution to
max
I≤0
= −I − θ
2
(
I
K
)2
K.
The solution is given by I∗ = −K
θ
. With this disinvestment, the adjustment
cost is given by K
2θ
, such that creditors receive I∗ − K
2θ
from the liquidation
of the capital stock in the current period. The recovery value per unit of
the bond is therefore
R(Si, Ai) = χmax
(
(1− τ)(Π(Ki, Ai)− ψ − δKi)− I∗ − K2θ
Bi
, 0
)
.
(2.4.15)
Note that the model has an endogenous liquidation loss on capital due to
the capital adjustment cost. Hennessy and Whited (2007) and Kuehn and
Schmid (2014) assume instead that a fixed fraction of the firm value or the
firm’s assets is lost in liquidation.
Bond Pricing Equations
It is useful to define a default threshold set for productivity. The default
threshold set is implicitly defined by
a∗(Si, C) =
{
A ∈ A : V C(Si, A, C) = 0
}
. (2.4.16)
reorganizations would change the recovery value in default, it would not change the
model mechanism substantially otherwise.
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Suppose that the continuation value function V C is strictly increasing in
idiosyncratic productivity. Then, for each (Si, C), the default threshold
is unique and equation 2.4.16 defines a function for the default threshold
productivity: For A ≤ a∗(Si, C), the firm will default, for A > a∗(Si, C),
the firm will continue.
The bond price functions are then
qS(S ′i, Ai, C) = E
[
Λ(C,C ′)
(∫ ∞
a∗(S′i,C′)
(1 + c)f(A′i|Ai)dA′i+∫ a∗(S′i,C′)
−∞
R(S ′i, A′i)f(A′i|Ai)dA′i
)
|C
]
, (2.4.17)
and
qL(S ′i, Ai, C) = E
[
Λ(C,C ′)
(∫ ∞
a∗(S′i,C′)
(µ+ c+ (1− µ)Q′L)f(A′i|Ai)dA′i
+
∫ a∗(S′i,C′)
−∞
R(S ′i, A′i)f(A′i|Ai)dA′i
)
|C
]
, (2.4.18)
Q′L = qL(S ′′i , A′i, C ′).
That is, bond prices reflect the future default probabilities and the value
of the firm in default. Future cash flows are discounted at the stochastic
discount factor. Notably, while the short-term bond price only reflects
the next period default probability, the long-term bond price captures the
entire future path of default probabilities through its recursive dependence
on Q′L. In what follows, I will call the next-period default probability short-
run default risk and the default probability after the next period long-run
default risk.
2.4.3 Stochastic Discount Factor
Equity and debt payouts are discounted with the stochastic discount factor
Λ(C,C ′) = β
(
C ′
C
)−σ
. (2.4.19)
This discount factor is derived from a household whose consumption process
co-moves with the aggregate productivity process: Household preferences
are time-separable with discount factor β. The period felicity function has
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a constant relative risk aversion σ. The utility function therefore takes the
recursive form
U(C) =
C1−σ − 1
1− σ + βEC′ [U(C
′)|C] (2.4.20)
The consumption process is driven by aggregate productivity and a process
C˜ that is uncorrelated with aggregate productivity. C˜ represents cyclical
movements in aggregate consumption that are unrelated to productivity,
for example due to other economic shocks. It also follows a first order
autoregressive process:
ln C˜ ′ = ρ ln C˜ + σCεC . (2.4.21)
Aggregate consumption depends on productivity Z with weight λ1 and on
C˜ with weight λ2:
lnC = λ0 + λ1 lnZ + λ2 ln C˜. (2.4.22)
Combining equations 2.4.19 and 2.4.22 yields the stochastic discount
factor Λ(C,C ′). This discount factor leads to a risk premium in the model,
which has been established to be an important component of bond yields.9
While the risk premium in the model is exogenous, default premia do reflect
the endogenous default decisions of firms in the model, and are therefore
endogenously determined as well.
Aggregate consumption is exogenous, which by itself is not central for
the main results. It implies that the term structure of risk free interest
rates is exogenous. Note however that I allow for correlation between ag-
gregate productivity and aggregate consumption. The exogeneity of the
term structure of risk-free interest rates is plausible, since I only model the
markets for risky non-financial corporate debt and equity. The markets for
government debt or household debt, for example, are outside the model.
According to the Financial Accounts of the US, corporate business debt
constituted only 17.9 percent of all outstanding debt in 2015. The market
value of equity of non-financial domestic corporations constituted about
27.2 percent of the net wealth of the US for the same year. In addition, the
assumption of an exogenous aggregate consumption or an exogenous sto-
chastic discount factor is common in the asset pricing and corporate finance
9See for example Chen (2010) or Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010)
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literature. It is for example used in Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
2.4.4 Equilibrium
The recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy is given by a set
of policy functions h : S × A × C → S for capital, debt, and the share of
long-term debt; a default policy function d : S × A × C → {0, 1}, value
functions VC : S × A × C → R and V : S × A × C → R; and bond price
functions qS : S×A×C→ R and qL : S×A×C→ R, such that for every
firm i:
• for any (Si, Ai, C) ∈ S× A× C, given qS and qL, h (Si, Ai, C), maxi-
mizes the continuation problem 2.4.12, with the solution to the firm
problem given by VC (Si, Ai, C).
• for any (Si, Ai, C) ∈ S × A × C, given qS and qL, the firm chooses a
default policy d such that
d (Si, Ai, C) =
{
0 if V C (Si, Ai, C) > 0
1 if V C (Si, Ai, C) ≤ 0
.
The value function V is given by
V (Si, Ai, C) = V C (Si, Ai, C) (1− d (Si, Ai, C))
• for any (S ′i, Ai, C) ∈ S×A×C, given h, d, VC and V , qS (S ′i, Ai, C) and
qL (S ′i, Ai, C) are the solutions to the bond pricing equations 2.4.17
and 2.4.18.
The first equilibrium condition states that the firm makes optimal inves-
tment and debt issuance decisions, taking the bond prices as given, the
second states that the firm makes an optimal default decision, taking the
bond prices as given, and the third condition states that bond price schedu-
les incorporate the true default probability of the firm, taking firm policies
as given.
2.5 The Determinants of Debt Maturity
In this section, I will outline the determinants of the maturity structure
of a single firm and how it varies with productivity. First, I will explain
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the different channels that determine the maturity structure of the firm.
Then, I will discuss how aggregate consumption shocks affect the optimal
maturity choice.
I will denote QL = qL(S ′i, Ai, C), QS = qS(S ′i, Ai, C), and, with some
abuse of notation, V = V (Si, Ai, C) and V C = V C(Si, Ai, C) to increase
readability.
Throughout this section, I assume that the value function V is once
differentiable in K, B, M and A and the bond price functions QS and QL
are differentiable in K ′, B′, M ′ and A. I further assume that the short-
term and long-term bond prices are weakly increasing in A, i.e. ∂QS
∂A
≥ 0
and ∂QL
∂A
≥ 0. I do not make these assumptions when I solve the model
numerically later on.
2.5.1 The General Case
The optimal maturity choice is given by the first order condition with
respect to M ′ in the continuation problem of the firm presented in equation
2.4.12. I denote as λD the contemporaneous shadow cost of internal funds.
λD is positive if the firm has to issue costly equity to avoid bankruptcy.10
Further, I denote as λM,0 and λM,1 the multipliers for the constraints M
′ ≥
(1− µ)MB/B′ and M ′ ≤ 1, respectively.11
The first order condition for M ′ in the Lagrangian to problem 2.4.12 is
∂V C
∂M ′
=
[
(QL −QS)B′+
∂QS
∂M ′
(1−M ′)B′ + ∂QL
∂M ′
(M ′B′ − (1− µ)MB)
]
(1 + λD)+
E
[
Λ(C,C ′)
∂V ′
∂M ′
|A,C
]
= λM,1 − λM,0. (2.5.1)
10The non-convex issuance costs for debt and equity require the introduction of this
additional multiplier. With respect to equity issuance, the firm problem can be split into
three sub-problems: In problem (1) the firm pays dividends. Then, λD = 0. In problem
(2), the firm does not pay dividends, but also does not issue equity. Then, Di = 0
becomes one of the equilibrium conditions of the model and λD is found residually
from the first-order condition for investment. Finally, in problem (3), the firm issues
equity. In that case, λD = φ1. The value function V
C is the envelope of these three
subproblems.
11The lower bound on M ′ arises from the assumption of no debt repurchases.
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Differentiating equation 2.4.10, the envelope condition yields
∂V
∂M
=
∂D
∂M
= (µ+ (1− µ)QL − 1 + (1− µ)ξ)B(1 + λD)
= (1− µ)(QL − 1 + ξ)B(1 + λD). (2.5.2)
if the firm is in a no default state. Otherwise, the ∂V/∂M = 0, that is, the
value of equity in default is insensitive to the state of the firm. Combining
2.5.1 and 2.5.2, we get
∂V C
∂M ′
=
[
(QL −QS)B′+
∂QS
∂M ′
(1−M ′)B′ + ∂QL
∂M ′
(M ′B′ − (1− µ)MB)
]
(1 + λD)+
E
[
Λ(C,C ′)(1− µ)(Q′L − 1 + ξ)B′(1 + λ′D)1(V ′>0)|A,C
]
= λM,1 − λM,0.
(2.5.3)
The interpretation of this first order condition is that the benefit and the
cost of marginally increasing the share of long-term debt must be equal.
This decision concerns only the maturity structure of debt in the next
period, but not the leverage. The total amount of debt issuance and hence
the leverage choice is given by the first-order condition for total debt, B′.
The choice of M ′ is a portfolio choice how to allocate borrowing among
different types of debt for a given amount of total debt B′. The cost of
issuing marginally more long-term debt is here the opportunity cost of
issuing marginally less short-term debt.12
2.5.2 Optimal Maturity Choice without Consump-
tion Risk
First, I will focus on the main trade-off between short-term debt and long-
term debt in a setup without consumption risk. That is, λ1 = λ2 = 0. In
this case, the discount factor Λ(1, 1) equals β and the risk-free bond prices
for short-term debt and long-term debt are both equal to 1.
The first order condition contains many different terms, so I will consi-
der three different types of firms: In the first case, I discuss the case of a
firm which never defaults. This is the case of a low leverage, high producti-
vity firm. For such a firm, neither short-term debt nor long-term debt are
12Of course, B′ and M ′ are in the end jointly determined.
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risky. In the second case, the firm may default only after the next period.
The firm hence has no short-run default risk, but some long-run default
risk. Then, short-term debt is risk-free while long-term debt is risky. In
the third case, the firm also has some short-run default risk, such that both
short-term debt and long-term debt are risky.
In this way, I can introduce the channels that affect maturity choice one
by one. I will first focus on the main trade-off between rollover costs and
default risk and then add other channels.
Case I: No Default Risk
In the case of no default risk and no consumption risk, bond prices do not
include a default premium: QS = QL = 1. In addition, bond prices are
insensitive to changes in the maturity structure of the firm: ∂QS/∂M
′ =
∂QL/∂M
′ = 0. The first order condition 2.5.3 reduces to
∂V C
∂M ′
= β(1− µ)ξB′E [(1 + λ′D)|Y ] = λM,1 > 0.
This optimality condition states that the benefit of increasing the long-
term debt share is that the firm has to pay less rollover costs, ξ, in the next
period if it uses relatively more long-term debt. Consequently, a firm that
can issue debt without risk wants to set the long-term debt share as high
as possible: M ′ = 1, which implies a positive multiplier λM,1 > 0.
Case II: Risk-Free Short-Term Debt, Risky Long-Term Debt
If the firm has no short-run default risk, but some long-run default risk,
the short-term bond price does not include a default premium, while the
long-term bond price does: QS = 1, QL < 1. The short-term bond price
remains insensitive to the maturity structure of the firm: ∂QS/∂M
′ = 0.
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The first-order condition for the long-term debt share becomes13
∂V C
∂M ′
=
 (QL − 1)B′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change, Marginal Revenue
+
∂QL
∂M ′
(M ′B′ − (1− µ)MB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change, Intramarginal LT Revenue
 (1 + λD)+
βE
(1− µ)( 1−Q′L︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change, Endogenous
Rollover Cost
+ ξ︸︷︷︸
Change, Exogenous
Rollover Cost
)B′(1 + λ′D)|Ai

= 0.
There are four important terms: The first two terms describe the change in
the revenue from issuing new bonds if the firm decides to issue long-term
bonds instead of short-term bonds. These are the costs of issuing a higher
share of long-term debt. The last two terms describe the change in future
rollover costs if the firm issues marginally more long-term debt. These are
the benefits of issuing a higher share of long-term debt. Relative to case I in
Section 2.5.2, the first three terms are new, whereas the exogenous rollover
cost also arises in a situation with risk-free short-term and long-term debt.
The first term is the change in the marginal revenue of debt issuance:
If the firm issues marginally more debt as risky long-term debt instead of
risk-free short-term debt, it has to incur a default premium, captured by
the term (QL − 1). If this default premium is high, the firm prefers to issue
short-term debt by setting a low M ′.
The second term captures how a marginally larger long-term debt share
affects the intramarginal revenue from long-term debt issuance. This effect
arises, since a higher share of long-term debt today adversely affects firm
policies in the future: The derivative ∂QL
∂M ′ is given by differentiating equa-
tion 2.4.18 with respect to M ′:
∂QL
∂M ′
= β(1− µ)E
[
∂Q′L
∂K ′′
∂K ′′
∂M ′
+
∂Q′L
∂B′′
∂B′′
∂M ′
+
∂Q′L
∂M ′′
∂M ′′
∂M ′
|Ai
]
.
Since the envelope theorem does not apply to the bond price, the effects of
current choices on future choices enter the current bond price.14 It is not
13From this section onward, I focus on the case of an interior solution, so λM,1 =
λM,0 = 0.
14The reason for why the envelope theorem does not apply to the bond prices is that
firms do maximize over the market value of equity, but not over the market value of
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possible to find analytic expressions for ∂K
′
∂M
, ∂B
′
∂M
and ∂M
′
∂M
. In the numerical
solution to my model, the policy function for the next period capital stock
K ′′ is decreasing in M ′, while the policy function for the next period level
of debt B′′ is increasing in M ′. The former is the debt overhang, the latter
the debt dilution channel. Both of these channels are discussed in detail
in Jungherr and Schott (2017). This is because the firm acts only in the
interest of the shareholder and does therefore not internalize the effect of
its decisions of the value of debt in default states. Since the benefits of
investment and the costs of debt issuance arise in the future, the larger
the share of firm value that accrues to long-term debt, the lower will be
investment and the higher debt issuance. As a consequence, a higher share
of long-term debt will in general increase long-run default risk, by adversely
affecting future firm policies, which drives down the price of long-term debt
today. In this case, ∂QL
∂M ′ < 0.
The third term is the endogenous rollover cost. If the firm issues short-
term debt, it has to repay the entire amount at the face value in the next
period. If the firm instead issues long-term debt, it can roll over a fraction
1 − µ of debt at the market value. The market value of long-term debt is
below its face value because of long-run default risk. Therefore, being able
to roll over long-term debt at the market value leads to lower rollover costs
for the firm.
In addition, since the market value of long-term debt is low whenever
cash flows to equity are low, long-term debt creates a hedging benefit to
shareholders. However, this hedging benefit is quantitatively not that im-
portant since in the region of the state space where firms issue long-term
debt, the equity value is almost linear, since the firm is far away from being
liquidity constrained. Therefore shareholders are almost risk-neutral and
do not value the hedging benefit highly.
In this case, the firm trades off roll-over costs of short-term debt against
the long-term default premium and the negative incentive effect of long-
term debt issuance. This is the main trade-off I consider and therefore
deserves to be discussed in more detail. Consider the case of a firm with
low productivity and a low capital stock. This firm issues debt due to a
high value of internal funds, that is, since λD is high. It will have a low
probability of long-term survival, and hence face a high long-term default
premium on long-term debt. This is captured by the term QL − 1 <
debt.
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0. Furthermore, by issuing long-term debt, such a firm would decrease
the incentive for future investment, since a part of that investment would
essentially be an intertemporal transfer of current shareholder funds to
future bondholder funds. This is captured by the term ∂QL
∂M ′ < 0. If these
effects outweigh the rollover costs, such a liquidity-constrained firm will
choose to mostly issue short-term debt.
Now consider a firm with a high capital stock and a high productivity.
The motive for such a firm to issue debt is not a high value of λD, but the
tax benefit of debt. Such a firm has a low long-term default probability, and
hence QL− 1 and ∂QL∂M ′ will be close to 0. Therefore, such a firm will mostly
be concerned about the rollover costs of debt and will issue long-term debt,
as described in case I.
In this model, firms endogenously use different types of debt for diffe-
rent motives: Liquidity constrained firms use short-term debt, while firms
which care mostly about the tax benefit of debt use long-term debt. These
two motives will later on give rise to the cyclical dynamics of debt maturity:
Intuitively, the fraction of firms which issues short-term debt due to liqui-
dity constraints increases in a recession, while the fraction of firms which
issues long-term debt due to the tax benefit decreases. The motive to issue
debt due to a liquidity shortfall is counter-cyclical, while the tax benefit
of debt net of the default premium is pro-cyclical. As a consequence, the
aggregate long-term debt share in the model will be pro-cyclical.
Case III: Risky Short-Term Debt and Long-Term Debt
If short-term debt is also risky, the first order condition for M ′ is
∂V C
∂M ′
=
[
(QL −QS)B′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change, Marginal Revenue
+
∂QS
∂M ′
(1−M ′)B′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change, Intramarginal ST Revenue
+
∂QL
∂M ′
(M ′B′ − (1− µ)MB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change, Intramarginal LT Revenue
 (1 + λD)+
βE
[
(1− µ)(1−Q′L + ξ)B′(1 + λ′D)1(V ′>0)|Ai
]
= 0.
In this case, there are two new terms relative to the case in which only
long-term debt is risky: First, the short-term bond price and the long-term
bond price also incorporate a premium for short-run default risk. The
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long-term bond price can be written as
QL = QS + (1− µ)βE
[
(Q′L − 1)1(V ′>0)|Ai
]
.
Hence, QL−QS = (1−µ)βE
[
(Q′L − 1)1(A′>a∗)|Ai
]
. Note that lengthening
the maturity structure of debt does not change the default premium that
the firm has to pay for short-run default risk, since both long-term debt
and short-term debt price short-run default risk. The premium long-run
default risk is the only change in the marginal revenue that arises when the
firm increases the long-term debt share.
Second, if short-term debt is risky, the short-term bond price is also
sensitive to the maturity structure of the firm. What matters for the short-
term bond price is how a change in the maturity structure of debt affects
short-run default risk of the firm: The derivatives of the short-term and
long-term bond prices in the case of risky short-term debt and long-term
debt are given by:
∂QS
∂M ′
= [1 + c−R(K,B, a∗, 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Repayment
∂V ′
∂M ′
∂V ′
∂A′
f(a∗|A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Next Period
Default Probability
> 0,
∂QL
∂M ′
= [µ+ c+ (1− µ)Q′L −R(K,B, a∗, 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Repayment
∂V ′
∂M ′
∂V ′
∂A′
f(a∗|A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Next Period
Default Probability
+ β(1− µ)
∫ ∞
a∗
(
∂Q′L
∂K ′′
∂K ′′
∂M ′
+
∂Q′L
∂B′′
∂B′′
∂M ′
+
∂Q′L
∂M ′′
∂M ′′
∂M ′
)
f(A′|A)dA︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Long-Term Repayment and Default Probability
.
Interestingly, increasing the long-term debt share can have opposite
effects on the bond prices: A higher long-term debt share increases the
price of short-term debt, because it reduces the short-run default risk.
However, a higher long-term share also reduces investment in the next
period and increases debt issuance in the next period, such that long-run
default risk increases. In the quantitative version of my model, the latter
effect dominates for the long-term bond price, such that lengthening the
maturity structure increases the short-term bond price and decreases the
long-term bond price.
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Figure 2.3: Bond prices as a function of the long-term debt share choice
M ′. The left panel depicts a situation with high debt and high next period
default risk, the right panel depicts a situation with low debt and low next
period default risk. Capital, productivity and the aggregate state are the
same in the left and the right panel.
In Figure 2.3, I depict the bond price as a function of the long-term
share for two different levels of debt. All other variables are chosen to
be the same. The parameters are from my baseline calibration. In the left
panel, the level of debt chosen is high and as a consequence, the next period
default probability is high. The long-term bond price and the short-term
bond price both increase for the most part in response to an increase in
the long-term debt share. This is because such an increase lowers the next
period default probability, which is here the dominant effect.
In the right panel, the level of debt is low and therefore the next period
default probability is low. The long-term bond price decreases mostly if
the long-term debt share increases. This is because a higher long-term
debt share in this case leads to a higher long-term probability of default.
In contrast to that, the short-term bond price increases, as in the left panel,
monotonically with a higher long-term debt share.
In summary, if short-term debt and long-term debt are risky, the trade-
off is fundamentally the same as in the case of risk-free short-term debt and
35
risky long-term debt. Relative to the case with risk-free short-term debt,
there is an additional benefit of issuing long-term debt, since a higher long-
term debt share reduces the short-run default probability. However, in the
quantitative model, firms will still prefer to issue short-term debt if they
are liquidity constrained.
2.5.3 The Effect of Consumption Risk on the Optimal
Maturity Structure
In the presence of consumption risk, the difference in bond prices can be
decomposed into two terms:
QL −QS = QRFL −QRFS︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk-Free Term Spread
+ (QL −QRFL )− (QS −QRFS )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Long-Term Default Premium
.
The new first term is the difference in risk-free bond prices. The second
term is the long-term default premium. Bonds yield a fixed stream of
income which is 1+c for short-term bonds and µ+c per period for long-term
bonds. In the presence of aggregate risk, a marginal unit of consumption
more in a recession is more valuable than a marginal unit of consumption
in an expansion. Hence, conditional on being in a recession, the fact that
consumption is mean-reverting implies that consumption in the next period
will be higher than in the current period and hence that risk-free bond
prices in a recession are lower than in an expansion. Further, the positive
autocorrelation of the shocks implies that the risk-free long-term bond price
in the recession is lower than the risk-free short-term bond price, since the
short-term bond will repay more in periods closer to the present, where
consumption is lower.
With this decomposition, the first order condition for the long-term
debt share can be rewritten as
∂V C
∂M ′
=
[ (
(QRFL −QRFS ) + (QL −QRFL −QS +QRFS )
)
B′+
∂QS
∂M ′
(1−M ′)B′ + ∂QL
∂M ′
(M ′B′ − (1− µ)MB)
]
(1 + λD)+
E
[
Λ(C,C ′)
∂V ′
∂M ′
|Ai
]
= 0.
Consumption risk is important for two reasons. First, the risk-free
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short-term bond price is higher than the risk-free long-term bond price in
a recession and lower in expansions, as described above. In other words, the
term structure of risk-free bond yields is downward sloping in expansions
and upward sloping in recessions. Without the shadow cost of internal
funds, λD, this would not matter, since firms would then discount future
cash-flows at the same discount factor as creditors. However, a firm that
places a high value of internal funds today versus tomorrow, i.e. with
λD > λ
′
D, will be myopic and hence prefer short-term debt relative to
long-term debt more in a recession.
Second, as outlined in Chen (2010) and Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev
(2010), in the presence of aggregate risk, the bond yield contains a risk-
premium in addition to the risk-neutral default premium if the default
probability is higher in recessions. This is because in that case, cash-flows
from the firms to creditors are low exactly when creditors value cash flows
highly.
In summary, consumption risk introduces a new channel for the deter-
mination of the maturity structure through the time variation in the term
structure of risk-free rates and emphasizes the importance of the default
channel relative to the rollover channel by increasing default premia. The
fact that the short-term bond price is higher than the long-term bond price
in recessions makes short-term debt even more attractive if the firm issues
debt due to liquidity constraints in a recession. This channel amplifies the
counter-cyclicality of short-term debt issuance. In addition, the higher and
more cyclical default premia reduce the net tax benefit of long-term debt,
particularly in recessions. This effect should amplify the pro-cyclicality of
long-term debt issuance.
2.6 Mapping the Model to the Data
In this section, I will describe the data and the selection of parameters. I
divide the set of parameters into three subsets: I take the first set from
the literature. I estimate the second set of parameters directly from aggre-
gate data. The third set of parameters is chosen to match cross-sectional
data moments in simulations of the model. I solve the model using value
function iteration. The interested reader will find a detailed description of
the solution algorithm in Appendix 2.C.
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2.6.1 Data
Cross-Sectional Data
Firm data are from the merged CRSP Compustat Quarterly North America
database. I focus on US firms. The observation unit is a firm-quarter. I
include data from the first quarter of 1984 to the last quarter of 2012.15
I exclude regulated firms (SIC code 4900-4999), financial firms (SIC code
6000-6999) and non-profit firms (SIC code 9000-9999) from my sample,
since the model is not appropriate for such firms. Furthermore, I exclude
those observations which do not report total assets or those which report
either negative assets or a negative net capital stock.
I calculate all flow variables from the cash flow statements of firms. In-
vestment is capital expenditures minus sales of property, plant and equip-
ment. Short-term debt issuance is defined as change in current debt. Long-
term debt issuance is long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt re-
duction. Equity issuance is sale of common and preferred stock minus
purchase of common and preferred stock minus dividends. All flows are
normalized by lagged total assets. I calculate the share of long-term debt
to total debt as long-term debt divided by long-term debt plus current
debt. I follow Whited (1992) to calculate market leverage: It is defined
as the book value of short-term debt plus the market value of long-term
debt divided by the sum of the book market of short-term debt, the mar-
ket value of long-term debt and the market value of equity. To calculate
the market value of long-term debt, I use the method by Bernanke et al.
(1988). The market value of common stock is defined as the share price
times the number of shares. The market value of preferred stock is defined
by the current dividend for preferred stock divided by the current federal
funds rate.
The data for the default rate is taken from Ou et al. (2011). I use the
default rate for the largest sample, namely all firms from 1920 to 2011,
which corresponds to 1.1 percent.
Aggregate Data
I use the productivity time series from Fernald (2014) to compute producti-
vity shocks and real personal consumption expenditure from the Bureau of
15Data are in principle available since the first quarter of 1976, but before 1984, the
sample composition in Compustat changed markedly from quarter to quarter.
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Name Value Role Reference
Parameters from the Literature
β 1.04−1/4 Discount Factor 4% Annual Risk Free Rate
σ 2 Utility Curvature Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
µ 0.05 Long-Term Debt Repayment Rate 5 Year Maturity
τ 0.14 Corporate Income Tax Rate Graham (2000)
χ 0.8 Recovery Rate Kuehn and Schmid (2014)
θ 4 Capital Adjustment Cost Warusawitharana and Whited (2016)
α 0.35 Prod Function Curvature Moyen (2007)
ρA 0.95 Persistence, Idiosyncratic Productivity Katagiri (2014)
σA 0.1 Volatility, Idiosyncratic Productivity Katagiri (2014)
Calibrated Parameters
ξ 0.0025 Linear Debt Issuance Cost Average Long-Term Debt Share
φ0 0.1 Fixed Equity Issuance Cost Size, Equity Issuance
φ1 0.04 Linear Equity Issuance Cost Frequency, Equity Issuance
ψ 1.8 Fixed Production Cost Annual Default Rate
Estimated Parameters
σZ 0.0071 Volatility, Aggregate Productivity
σC 0.0058 Volatility, Consumption
λ1 0.113 Productivity Coefficient in Consumption
λ2 1 Consumption Coefficient
Table 2.3: Parameter Choices. This table shows all model parameters,
grouped into three categories: The first category shows parameters cho-
sen from the literature, the second category shows parameters from the
literature, the third category shows parameters taken from a production
function estimation using a dynamic panel data estimator.
Economic Analysis (BEA) to compute the stochastic progress for consump-
tion. For real GDP, I either use real GDP from the BEA or aggregate real
sales from Compustat. To compute real sales, I deflate nominal sales with
a four quarter moving average of the consumer price index. All series are
detrended with a quadratic trend, as are the other time series I aggregate
from Compustat data.
2.6.2 Parameter Choices
Parameters from the Literature
For the preferences of the representative household, I use a time preference
rate, 1
β
− 1, of 4 percent per year and a utility curvature coefficient σ of 2,
which is the value used in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). In the baseline
calibration, I set the maturity of long-term debt to 5 years. This implies a
quarterly repayment rate µ of 5 percent. Following Graham (2000), I set
the corporate income tax rate τ to 14 percent. This is substantially lower
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(1) (2)
ln(Z) ln(C)
L.ln(Z) 0.9662∗∗∗ -0.0263
(34.14) (-0.32)
ln(Z) 0.1128
(1.44)
L.ln(C) 0.9172∗∗∗
(29.37)
Observations 115 115
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.4: Estimation of aggregate processes.
than the true marginal US corporate income tax rate, but corresponds to
about the actual average tax rate of firms in the US. I set the recovery rate
in default to 0.8 as in Kuehn and Schmid (2014). I set the autocorrelation of
the productivity shock to 0.95 and the standard deviation of idiosyncratic
productivity to 0.1, which is similar to Katagiri (2014). I use α = 0.35 for
the production function curvature. I set the capital adjustment cost θ to 4.
Warusawitharana and Whited (2016) estimate an adjustment cost between
4 and 6 for large firms in Compustat. Bloom (2009) estimates an adjus-
tment cost of 4.8 on Compustat data in his purely quadratic adjustment
cost specification.
Estimated Parameters
There are three parameters that govern aggregate uncertainty in the model:
The volatility σZ of the aggregate productivity shock, the volatility σC of
the consumption shock and the coefficient of productivity in consumption,
λ1. I set, without loss of generality, λ2 = 1. The persistence of both
aggregate shocks is equal to the persistence of the idiosyncratic shocks
to keep the state space tractable. I estimate the followings regression on
detrended productivity and consumption data:
lnZt = ρ
Z lnZt−1 + ηZt
lnCt = λ1ρ
Z lnZt−1 + λ1(lnZt − ρZ lnZt−1) + ρC lnCt−1 + ηCt
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The results are in Table 2.4. The standard deviation of ηZt is 0.0071, the
standard deviation of ηCt 0.0058. Hence, I set λ1 = 0.113, σ
Z = 0.0071, and
σC = 0.0058. The regression further shows that setting ρZ = ρC = 0.95 is
well within the range of plausible parameters.
Parameters Set to Match Cross-Sectional Moments
I choose the debt issuance cost parameter ξ, the equity issuance cost pa-
rameters φ0 and φ1 and the fixed production cost ψ to match a set of
cross-sectional moments. I choose to match the average share of long-term
debt, the average size and frequency of equity issuance, the cumulative one
year default rate and the cross-sectional standard deviation of the invest-
ment capital ratio.
The average share of long-term debt is informative about the linear debt
issuance cost ξ: the higher is the debt issuance cost ξ, the less attractive is
short-term debt relative to long-term debt for the purpose of the tax benefit,
and the higher is the share of long-term debt. The size and frequency of
equity issuance are informative about the equity issuance costs φ0 and φ1:
A higher φ0 leads to a larger conditional size of equity issuance and a lower
frequency of equity issuance. A higher φ1 leads to a smaller conditional size
of equity issuance, and a lower frequency of equity issuance. The default
rate helps to identify the fixed cost ψ: A higher value for ψ implies a higher
default rate.
Table 2.3 shows the parameters resulting from the moment matching
exercise. The fixed cost ψ corresponds to 10.54% of the steady state capital
stock of the model. Kuehn and Schmid (2014) use a linear production cost
that corresponds to 4% of the lagged capital stock.
Model Data
Long-Term Debt Share, Mean 76.894 63.200
Equity Issuance, Size 7.549 12.200
Equity Issuance, Frequency 24.068 10.100
Def Rate 0.776 1.146
Table 2.5: Model fit.
Table 2.5 reports targeted moments from a numerical simulation. The
model matches the average long-term debt share well. The default rate in
the model is close to the default rate in the data of about 1.1 percent. The
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model can also match the size and frequency of equity issuance. Overall,
while the match between the model and the data is by no means perfect,
it delivers plausible numbers for all targeted moments.
2.6.3 Simulation Procedure
I simulate a panel of 5000 firms for 2000 quarters. I use a burn-in period of
1000 quarters. Defaulted firms are replaced with new firms which draw a
new productivity from the unconditional productivity distribution. Chan-
ging these values does not affect the results. These firms start out with
zero debt and a very small capital stock.
In the data, short-term debt is defined as debt with a maturity of less
than 1 year. This definition includes long-term debt with a residual matu-
rity of less than 1 year. In the model, debt with a maturity of less than 1
year is given by
(1−Mi,t)Bi,t + (1− (1− µ)4)Mi,tBi,t. (2.6.1)
Therefore, the share of long-term debt in total debt at the firm level is
given by
Bi,t − (1−Mi,t)Bi,t − (1− (1− µ)4)Mi,tBi,t
Bi,t
= (1− µ)4Mi,t. (2.6.2)
Market leverage at the firm level is calculated as the market value of debt
divided by the market value of debt plus the ex dividend value of equity:
QS,i,tBS,i,t+1 +QL,i,tBL,i,t+1
Vi,t −Di,t − EIC(Di,t) +QS,i,tBS,i,t+1 +QL,i,tBL,i,t+1 . (2.6.3)
Book leverage is given by
BS,i,t+1 +BL,i,t+1
Ki,t+1
. (2.6.4)
Finally, the Market-to-Book ratio is
Vi,t −Di,t − EIC(Di,t) +QS,i,tBS,i,t+1 +QL,i,tBL,i,t+1
Ki,t+1
. (2.6.5)
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2.7 Results
2.7.1 Aggregate Results
In this section, I report the implications of the model for the dynamics
of the aggregate maturity structure. The aim of this section is to show
that the model, which is parameterized to match firm-level moments, can
also match aggregate dynamics. First, I will report aggregate means and
correlations. Second, I consider how well the model fits the cross-sectional
distributions of leverage and the debt maturity structure in the data and
third how well it replicates the dynamics of the debt maturity structure
across the size distribution of firms. Explaining the heterogeneity in the
level and dynamics of the maturity structure for firms of different size
classes is a key contribution of the paper relative to the existing literature.
Aggregate First Moments
Data Model
Long-Term Debt Share, Mean 0.845 0.763
Long-Term Debt Share, StDev 0.012 0.014
Book Leverage, Mean 0.433 0.525
Book Leverage, StDev 0.033 0.032
Market Leverage, Mean 0.228 0.199
Market Leverage, StDev 0.040 0.011
Investment/Capital, Mean 0.032 0.037
Investment/Capital, StDev 0.005 0.003
Table 2.6: Aggregate summary statistics
In Table 2.6, I report aggregate summary statistics. I report moments
for the aggregate long-term debt share, which is the key variable the model
should explain, as well as book and market leverage, which together with
the long-term debt share fully characterize the capital structure of the firms
in the model. Since investment is a key reason why firms want to issue debt
in this model, I also report moments for aggregate investment.
The mean and standard deviation of the aggregate long-term debt share
are well matched by the model. As in the data, the aggregate fraction
of debt maturing within the next year is relatively low. The standard
deviation of the long-term debt share in the model is similar to the data.
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Overall, despite the fact that that the model only has two contracts with
different debt maturity, compared to the limitless contracting options in
the data, it explains the aggregate maturity structure in the data well.
Aggregate book leverage in the model is much higher than in the data,
but the volatility is similar. Book leverage is of separate interest, since it is
much easier to measure in the data than market leverage. This is because
it does not depend on prices and hence expectations. It is however market
leverage which is relevant for corporate decisions, since market leverage
reflects expectations about the fraction of future cash flows accruing to
the creditors of the firm. The model can also match the aggregate market
leverage, but the volatility of market leverage is too low. This is because
market leverage is calculated using stock prices in the data, and the model
does not generate sufficient stock price volatility.
The model can also match the mean and standard deviation of the
aggregate investment to capital ratio well. The mean of the investment
to capital ratio is by construction equal to the deprecation rate, which
corresponds surprisingly well to the average aggregate investment to ca-
pital ratio. The volatility of investment in the data is higher than in the
model. Arguably, the model misses many important drivers of aggregate
investment like uncertainty shocks (see for example Bloom (2009) and Ba-
chmann and Bayer (2014)) or investment-specific technology shocks (see
for example Fisher (2006) and Justiniano et al. (2011)).
Aggregate Correlations
Data Model
Long-Term Debt Share 0.386 0.324
Book Leverage −0.099 −0.400
Market Leverage −0.277 −0.551
Short-Term Debt Issuance/Capital 0.179 −0.295
Long Term Debt Issuance/Capital 0.510 0.222
Debt Issuance/Capital 0.383 −0.256
Equity Issuance/Capital −0.390 −0.510
Investment/Capital 0.390 0.670
Table 2.7: Aggregate correlations with log(output).
In Table 2.7, I report the correlations of the aggregate time series of the
model with my preferred measure of output, aggregate sales. This is the
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better measure of corporate cash flows than real GDP and is also strongly
pro-cyclical and hence a good proxy variable for the business cycle.
The model matches the signs of the correlations of the long-term debt
share, book leverage and market leverage with output. In terms of flows, it
matches the signs of investment, long-term debt issuance, equity issuance
and the default rate with output.
Importantly, the long-term debt share in the model is pro-cyclical. The
model matches the correlation in the data quantitatively well.
Both book leverage and market leverage in the model are counter-
cyclical. Market leverage has a more negative correlation with output than
book leverage, because the market value of equity is more volatile than
the market value of debt. This is also true in the data, although the mo-
del overstates the cyclicality of market leverage in the data. A negative
correlation between market leverage and output implies that the fraction
of cash flows accruing to creditors increases in a recession, which increases
debt overhang problems in recessions and leads to a counter-cyclical default
rate.
Short-term debt issuance is counter-cyclical in the baseline model, in
contrast to the data. The main motive for short-term debt issuance are
financial constraints in the form of a positive shadow cost of internal funds
λD. As financial constraints are more severe in recessions, short-term debt
issuance is higher during recessions. My measure of short-term debt issu-
ance in the model is also not perfect, since I only observe the change in
current debt, which also includes maturing long-term debt. Since I do not
observe long-term debt maturing and repurchased separately, this problem
cannot be easily remedied.
In line with the data, long-term debt issuance is pro-cyclical, since long-
term debt is issued by unconstrained firms due to the tax benefit of debt.
In a recession, default premia increase, while the tax benefit is constant.
As a consequence, firms will issue less long-term debt.
Total debt issuance is counter-cyclical in the baseline model, also in con-
trast with the data. The reason for this is that counter-cyclical short-term
debt issuance is too high relative to pro-cyclical long-term debt issuance.
A model in which the maturity of long-term debt µ is also a choice variable
could potentially better match both the dynamics of the long-term debt
share and debt issuance.
Equity issuance is counter-cyclical in the baseline model as well as in
45
the data. Financially constrained firms which cannot or do not want to
issue debt will issue equity instead. This result is in line with the results
in Jermann and Quadrini (2012), who also report counter-cyclical equity
issuance. I interpret equity issuance strictly as liquidity injections due to
a lack of internal funds, and measure it in the data accordingly. Other
motives for equity issuance outlined in Fama and French (2005) exist, but
those are not captured by this model. This is of relevance, since Covas
and Haan (2011) document that other measures, which include for exam-
ple stock compensation for employees or equity swaps during mergers are
actually pro-cyclical.
Finally, the investment-capital ratio in the model is pro-cyclical, as it
is in the data. The relatively weak pro-cyclicality is surprising. This is
due to the fact that I scale investment by the last period capital stock,
which is also pro-cyclical. This mutes the pro-cyclicality of the investment
to capital ratio relative to the level of investment.
Overall, while the model predicts a too high counter-cyclicality of short-
term debt issuance and hence total debt issuance, it replicates aggregate
dynamics in the data well. In particular, it matches the main fact that the
aggregate maturity structure of debt is pro-cyclical.
2.7.2 The Cross-Section over the Cycle
Data Model
0% to 25% 0.333 0.541
25% to 50% 0.473 0.204
50% to 75% 0.658 0.123
75% to 90% 0.519 0.227
90% to 95% 0.269 0.100
95% to 99% −0.214 0.053
99% to 100% −0.086 0.027
Table 2.8: Correlations between the long-term debt share and log(output)
across the firm size distribution.
To investigate how firms adjust their issuance in response to macroe-
conomic shocks, I group the firms from the simulated panel into 7 size
quantiles and compute the correlation of the long-term debt share with
output within each of these size quantiles.
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As in the data, the cyclicality of the long-term debt shares varies sub-
stantially by firm size. Both in the model and in the data, it is the medium
sized firms for which the long-term debt share is the most sensitive to
cyclical fluctuations. Small firms in the model are constrained and use pre-
dominantly short-term debt even during expansions, while medium sized
firms are unconstrained during expansions, but constrained during reces-
sions. The larger the firms, the less likely it is that they are financially
constrained during a recession, and the lower is their need to issue short-
term debt.
These results support the hypothesis that the main driver of short-term
debt issuance and hence a short maturity structure are liquidity constraints.
In addition, the model also lends support to the theory that the fraction
of liquidity constrained firms increases during a recession.
Note also that for the largest firms, the maturity structure is basically
acylical both in the model and in the data. The puzzling firms, from the
perspective of the model, are the firms in the 95 to 99 percent size quantile
for which the maturity structure of debt is counter -cyclical. Jungherr and
Schott (2016) construct a model in which the share of long-term debt is
counter-cylical due to debt dilution: As firms in their model issue more
debt, they shorten the maturity structure of debt because newly issued
debt constitutes a very large share of newly issued debt, which aligns in-
centives between firm owners and creditors. Creditors prefer short-term
debt because long-term debt creates debt dilution issues. The distinction
between their model and my model is that my model has a clear pecking
order in which short-term and long-term debt are issued for different rea-
sons, whereas in their model, short-term debt and long-term debt are to
some extent substitutes.
One possible way to reconcile these results is if fixed costs constitutes a
large share of debt issuance costs, such that it is beneficial for large firms
to also issue short-term debt due to the tax benefit. However, in such a
model, large firms would choose a short debt maturity structure, which
runs counter to the observation that the debt maturity structure is strictly
increasing in firm size in the data.
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Long-Term Debt Share Market Leverage
Data Model Data Model
Mean 63.210 76.896 22.862 24.472
StDev 35.914 8.186 26.292 16.830
Correlation with Size 0.414 0.635 0.068 −0.647
Correlation with Market To Book −0.190 0.059 −0.236 −0.295
Correlation with Book Leverage −0.030 −0.508 0.413 0.903
Table 2.9: Cross-sectional summary statistics.
2.7.3 Untargeted Cross-Sectional Moments
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.9, I show moments of the cross-sectional
distribution of the long-term debt share of the model. I report the mean and
standard deviation, as well as correlations with firm size and the market to
book ratio, which are important determinants of leverage in the corporate
finance literature, as well as the correlation with book leverage. Size is an
important proxy variable for financial constraints, while the market to book
ratio of the firm measures its growth opportunities and is highly correlated
with its productivity. Note that I only target the mean for the long-term
debt share. All numbers report percentages.
The model can accurately capture the mean for the long-term share,
which is a targeted moment. The standard deviation of the long-term debt
share is too low relative to the data. One reason is that in the data, there
is a non-negligible fraction of firms which uses exclusively short-term debt.
The model can also correctly account for the positive correlation bet-
ween the share of long-term debt and firm size, which is crucial to match
aggregate moments. The correlation with the market to book ratio is low,
as in the data. However, the correlation with the market to book ratio is
too weak in the model. The correlation with book leverage is too high. One
issue is that the motive to use leverage in the model is too weak for large
firms, such that small firms will simultaneously have a high book leverage
and a short debt maturity structure, which leads to this strong negative
correlation.
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.9, I show the distribution of market
leverage. The model can match the average market leverage as well as
the standard deviation of the market leverage well. However, the model
predicts a strong negative correlation between market leverage and firm
size, while this correlation is weakly pro-cyclical in the data. The reason
48
is that due to the fixed production cost, it is mostly small firms which
issue debt because they are liquidity constrained. Firms in which growth
options constitute a large fraction of the firm value use less leverage, as
shown by the negative correlation between the market-to-book ratio and
market leverage. As expected, the correlation between book leverage and
market leverage is positive both in the model and the data.
2.7.4 Robustness
In this section, I want to further illustrate the importance of issuance costs
for the main results. In addition, I investigate the role of consumption risk
in the model.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Data Baseline No DIC No EIC σ = 0
Long-Term Debt Share, Mean 0.845 0.763 0.620 0.681 0.561
Long-Term Debt Share, StDev 0.012 0.014 0.058 0.050 0.009
Book Leverage, Mean 0.433 0.525 0.547 1.169 0.515
Book Leverage, StDev 0.033 0.032 0.024 0.191 0.010
Market Leverage, Mean 0.228 0.199 0.221 0.438 0.213
Market Leverage, StDev 0.040 0.011 0.013 0.068 0.004
Investment/Capital, Mean 0.032 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
Investment/Capital, StDev 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.001
Table 2.10: Aggregate moments, alternative models. ”No DIC” refers to
the model without debt issuance costs, ”No EIC” to the model without
equity issuance costs and σ = 0 to the model with a risk neutral represen-
tative household.
Table 2.10 shows aggregate moments for alternative model specificati-
ons. In the first alternative model in column (3), I eliminate debt issuance
costs. Specifically, I set ξ to zero. In this case, the exogenous component of
the debt rollover costs in the first order condition 2.5.3 is zero. Hence, this
model substantially reduces rollover costs. In the absence of debt issuance
costs, firms prefer to mostly issue short-term debt to attain the tax benefit
of debt. Short-term debt avoids the problem of the incentive misalignment
between shareholders and creditors with respect to future investment and
debt issuance decisions. As a consequence, short-term debt can be issued
at lower default risk premia and hence at lower costs. The model without
issuance costs is at odds with the data, because it predicts a very low
long-term debt share.
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The second alternative model in column (4) has no equity issuance costs.
I set φ0 and φ1 equal to zero. Without equity issuance costs, firms can
issue equity at all time at the price of one. This shuts down the variation
in the shadow cost of internal funds λD over time. As a consequence, the
motive to issue short-term debt decreases in this model. Firms also issue a
substantially higher amount of debt than in the baseline model: Leverage
is about twice as high as in the baseline model.
For the third alternative model version in column (5), I consider the
case of a risk-neutral representative household. I set the risk aversion pa-
rameter σ in this model to zero. Without risk-aversion, the household’s
consumption risk is irrelevant for firm decisions. In particular, there is
no term structure of risk-free interest rates and default risk is priced at
the risk-neutral default probability. In terms of aggregate first moments,
eliminating the risk aversion of the representative household substantially
reduces the long-term debt share and the volatility of all aggregate varia-
bles.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Data Baseline No DIC No EIC σ = 0
Long-Term Debt Share 0.386 0.324 0.346 0.475 0.463
Book Leverage -0.099 -0.400 -0.531 -0.578 -0.129
Market Leverage -0.277 -0.551 -0.635 -0.598 -0.615
Short-Term Debt Issuance/Capital 0.179 -0.295 -0.308 -0.441 -0.145
Long Term Debt Issuance/Capital 0.510 0.222 0.231 -0.123 0.708
Debt Issuance/Capital 0.383 -0.256 -0.297 -0.436 -0.039
Equity Issuance/Capital -0.390 -0.510 -0.403 -0.248 -0.747
Investment/Capital 0.390 0.670 0.648 0.566 0.875
Table 2.11: Aggregate correlations, alternative models. ”No DIC” refers
to the model without debt issuance costs, ”No EIC” to the model without
equity issuance costs and σ = 0 to the model with a risk neutral represen-
tative household.
Table 2.11 shows aggregate correlations for alternative model specifi-
cations. The model without debt issuance costs overall matches the signs
of the correlations in the data well. However, in contrast to the data, the
correlation of short-term debt issuance with output and total debt issuance
with output are negative. In addition, even with a small issuance cost, the
correlation of leverage with output is much lower. In addition, the correla-
tion of equity issuance with output is lower. The small debt issuance cost
however does not substantially affect the correlation between output and
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investment.
The model without equity issuance costs predicts a much lower cor-
relation between total debt issuance and output. In particular, even the
correlation between long-term debt issuance and output becomes negative.
A potential explanation is that debt dilution is much more prominent in
this model, since leverage is almost twice as high. The incentive to di-
lute debt is stronger in recessions. The correlation between equity issuance
and output is much more negative in this model. Finally, market leverage
is strongly counter-cyclical and the long-term debt share in this model is
very pro-cyclical. This shows that variation in the shadow cost of internal
funds λD is an important driver of aggregate debt maturity dynamics in
this model.
The model with a risk-neutral representative household generates in
general much stronger correlations, since the aggregate productivity shock
is now the only shock which drives aggregate dynamics. The counter-
cyclicality of equity issuance increases dramatically, while the counter-
cyclicality of short-term debt issuance decreases. The pro-cyclicality of
long-term debt issuance increases. This shows that the term structure im-
plied by the stochastic discount factor of the representative investor matters
both for the optimal long-term leverage and the choice between equity and
short-term debt when the firm is liquidity constrained.
2.8 Debt Maturity, Leverage and Investment
2.8.1 Debt Overhang or Liquidity Constraints?
I now discuss how debt overhang affects investment and debt issuance de-
cisions in the model, and how the maturity structure of debt affects the
severity of debt overhang. In the model, high leverage can lead to under-
investment of a firm relative to an otherwise identical unlevered firm. I
hence define under-investment I− as the difference between the investment
decision of an unlevered and a levered firm which are otherwise identical.
Let I∗(K,B,M,A,C) denote the optimal investment policy of the levered
firm. Then, under-investment I− can be computed as
I−(K,B,M,A,C) = I∗(K, 0,M,A,C)− I∗(K,B,M,A,C). (2.8.1)
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Figure 2.4: Policy functions for capital and debt as a function of debt state
variable for three different values of the long-term debt share state variable.
The capital stock and idiosyncratic productivity are held constant at the
mean level., Aggregate consumption is set at the lower level.
Under-investment can arise for two reasons: First, a high level of debt ma-
turing in the current period reduces the amount of internal funds available
to the firm, such that the firm has to access some costly external funding.
Due to the higher cost of capital compared to the case with internal fun-
ding, the firm will choose a lower level of investment. Second, if the firm
has a high level of long-term debt outstanding, it will under-invest due to
the debt overhang effect.
In Figure 2.4, I plot the policy functions as a function of outstanding
debt for three different values of the maturity of outstanding debt. The
solid line is for a firm with only short-term debt outstanding, the dotted
line for a firm with an intermediate maturity structure and the dashed line
for a firm with only long-term debt outstanding. The other state variables
are held constant at the mean level.
For firm with only short-term debt, a higher level of debt reduces inves-
tment due to a higher cost of capital if the firm has to issue external funds.
Since the firm in the figure is always constrained, the level of investment
is insensitive to further increases in the level of debt. For a longer matu-
rity structure of debt, the reduction in investment is more dramatic. The
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reason for this is that a higher capital stock is costly to the shareholders
today. However, a large part of its future benefit accrues to the creditors
instead of the shareholders, either through a lower default risk or through
a higher recovery value in default. As a consequence, investment constitu-
tes a costly transfer from shareholders to creditors. With only short-term
debt, this transfer is priced into the bond price of newly issued debt. Since
with short-term debt, all future outstanding debt is issued in the current
period, the value of this transfer is fully internalized by the shareholder.
With long-term debt, however, the effect on the value of outstanding debt
carried over from the last period is not internalized by the shareholder to-
day, and as such the firm will use a lower capital stock than an unlevered,
otherwise identical firm.
2.8.2 Measuring Under-Investment
Actual Investment Under-investment, Underinvestment, Underinvestment,
Rate Total Due to Lack of Internal Funds Due to Debt Overhang
0% to 25% 0.047 0.018 0.001 0.017
25% to 50% 0.037 0.006 -0.002 0.007
50% to 75% 0.037 0.007 -0.000 0.007
75% to 90% 0.038 0.001 0.000 0.000
90% to 95% 0.038 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
95% to 99% 0.038 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
99% to 100% 0.039 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
All Firms 0.040 0.008 -0.000 0.008
Table 2.12: Underinvestment, total and decomposition.
To investigate whether under-investment is quantitatively important in
the model and whether this under-investment arises due to costly external
funding or debt overhang, I conduct the following decomposition: Consider
a firm with states (K,B,M,A,C) and another firm that has the same
amount of debt coming due in the current period as the original firm, but
no further debt. This latter firm is described by the states (K, (µM + (1−
M))B, 0, A, C). The latter firm has the same net worth as the original firm,
but it does not have a debt overhang problem, since it has no outstanding
long-term debt that is rolled over into the next period. Then, the part of
under-investment that is due to costly external funds is given by
I−,CF (K,B,M,A,C) = I∗(K, 0,M,A,C)−I∗(K, (µM+(1−M))B, 0, A, C).
(2.8.2)
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The part of under-investment due to debt overhang is then given by
I−,DO(K,B,M,A,C) = I−(K,B,M,A,C)− I−,CF (K,B,M,A,C).
(2.8.3)
I report the average under-investment and the decomposition for different
firm size classes in Table 2.12. I normalize under-investment by the capital
stock of the respective firm. Overall, the average firm under-invests about
0.8 percent relative to the capital stock compared to a firm without any
debt. Most of that under-investment is driven by the debt overhang effect.
In addition, smaller firms under-invest more: the smallest 25 percent of
firms by size under-invest about 1.8 percent relative to the capital stock,
which corresponds to an investment rate which is 38 percent too low, while
the largest 25 percent of firms basically do not under-invest. Most of the
under-investment is driven by the debt overhang effect, while the lack of
internal funds plays a negligible role.
In summary, in contrast to many macroeconomic models with only
short-term debt, debt overhang is the most important driver of under-
investment in this model. This often overlooked channel can have a quan-
titatively large impact on investment behavior, in particular for small firms.
2.9 Conclusion
I study the determinants of aggregate and firm-level corporate debt ma-
turity dynamics in a quantitative model with rich cross-sectional hetero-
geneity. In the model, firms prefer to issue long-term debt if they are
financially unconstrained, because debt issuance costs imply that the tax
advantage of long-term debt is much bigger than the tax advantage of
short-term debt. Maturity dynamics are driven by liquidity constrained
firms issuing short-term debt to cover liquidity shortfalls.
The model can match levels and dynamics of the debt maturity struc-
ture both at the firm level and in the aggregate, and is consistent with other
established facts about the dynamics of corporate financing and investment
decisions.
The question of regulation arises naturally, given the incentive misalig-
nment between shareholders and long-term creditors present in the model.
Can and should regulatory authorities develop rules such that the prefe-
rences of bondholders are better reflected in the decisions of firms? The
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results in this paper suggest that such rules can lead to higher investment
rates.
Some interesting extensions of the model are left for future research.
For example, I abstract from cash holdings and credit lines, which are
additional sources of funds firms can use to reduce the incidence of liquidity
shortfalls. Further, there are no labor market frictions in the model, which
might be another important reason to issue short-term debt through a
working capital requirement as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
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2.A Other Measures of Corporate Cash Flows
In this section, I describe how using other measures of corporate cash flows
affects the main empirical facts.
(1) (2) (3)
GDP(t-1) GDP(t) GDP(t+1)
0% to 25% 0.176 0.202∗ 0.195∗
25% to 50% −0.0398 0.0518 0.101
50% to 75% 0.569∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗
75% to 90% 0.127 0.233∗ 0.311∗∗∗
90% to 95% −0.256∗∗ −0.205∗ −0.157
95% to 99% −0.488∗∗∗ −0.444∗∗∗ −0.373∗∗∗
99% to 100% −0.302∗∗ −0.234∗ −0.170
0% to 90% 0.158 0.256∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
All Firms −0.114 0.0001 0.101
Observations 116 116 116
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.13: Correlations of the Detrended Long-Term Debt Share with
Detrended Logged real GDP, by Firm Size.
In Table 2.13, I report the correlation between the long-term debt share
and real GDP. The upside of using real GDP is that it is conventionally
used in the business cycle literature to compute the cyclicality of other vari-
ables. The downside is that it is only imperfectly related to corporate cash
flows. This is problematic from a theoretical and empirical perspective:
The mapping to the model counterpart, namely real aggregate corporate
cash flow, is imperfect. For example, real GDP might include shocks to
other sectors of the economy which are uncorrelated with cash flow in the
corporate sector. For example, a sharp decrease in added value from the
financial sector or the public sector would not be contemporaneously re-
flected in corporate cash flow.
Indeed, using real GDP instead of real aggregate sales changes the cor-
relations substantially: The correlation between the long-term debt share
of all firms and real GDP is zero, and the correlation between the long-term
debt share and the bottom 90 percent of firms by size is only one third as
high compared to the correlation when using sales.
In Table 2.14, I report the correlations of the long-term debt share
with aggregate log real corporate profits. Using profits instead of sales is a
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(1) (2) (3)
GDP(t-1) GDP(t) GDP(t+1)
0% to 25% 0.248∗∗ 0.274∗∗ 0.137
25% to 50% 0.311∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
50% to 75% 0.589∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗
75% to 90% 0.405∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗
90% to 95% 0.231∗ 0.300∗∗ 0.297∗∗
95% to 99% −0.162 −0.0648 0.0110
99% to 100% −0.176 −0.0592 0.0191
0% to 90% 0.530∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗
All Firms 0.322∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗
Observations 116 116 116
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.14: Correlations of the Detrended Long-Term Debt Share with
Detrended Log Real Corporate Profits, by Firm Size.
better measure of corporate cash flows if there is significant cyclicality in the
operating costs of firms, such that fluctuations in revenues do not present
a full picture of the funds firms have available. However, the correlations
are broadly similar to those in Table 2.2. The biggest difference is that
with profits as measure of corporate cash flows, the maturity structure of
the largest five percent is practically acyclical.
2.B Derivation of the Derivatives in the Main
Text
As in section 2.5, I assume that the bond prices are differentiable once in
K ′, B′, M ′ and A and value function is differentiable once in K, B, M and
A. Further, I assume that the short-term and the long-term bond price are
non-decreasing in A.
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2.B.1 Value Function
The first order condition for the long-term debt share is given by
∂V
∂M ′
=
[
(QL −QS)B′+
∂QS
∂M ′
(1−M ′)B′ + ∂QL
∂M ′
(M ′B′ − (1− µ)MB)
]
(1 + λD)+
E
[
Λ(C,C ′)
∂V ′
∂M ′
|Y
]
= λM,1 − λM,0
The envelope condition yields
∂V
∂M
= (µ+ (1− µ)QL − 1 + (1− µ)ξ)B(1 + λD)
= (1− µ)(QL − 1 + ξ)B(1 + λD)
if the firm is in a no default state and
∂V
∂M
= 0
if the firm is in a default state.
The derivative of the value function with respect to A is given by
∂V
∂Ai
= (1− τ)Kα + ∂QS
∂A
(1−M ′)B′ + ∂QL
∂A
(M ′B′ − (1− µ)MB)+
E
[
Λ(C,C ′)
∫ ∞
−∞
∂V ′
∂A′i
∂A′i
∂Ai
f(A′i|Ai)dA′i|C
]
Using
∂A′i
∂Ai
= ρ
A′i
Ai
yields
∂V
∂Ai
= (1− τ)Kα + ∂QS
∂A
(1−M ′)B′ + ∂QL
∂A
(M ′B′ − (1− µ)MB)+
E
[
Λ(C,C ′)
∫ ∞
−∞
∂V ′
∂A′i
ρ
A′i
Ai
f(A′i|Ai)dA′i|C
]
in non-default states and
∂V
∂Ai
= 0
in default states.
Expanding the recursion, one can see that this value function deriva-
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tive depends on the entire future path of the derivatives of the production
function and the bond prices with respect to how the sequence of producti-
vity changes with a current change in the productivity. The production
function derivative is positive. As shown below, the short-term bond price
derivative is nonnegative. It not possible to analytically determine the sign
of these bond prices. If these derivatives are nonnegative, which I assume
and which is the case in simulations, the derivative of the value function
with respect to idiosyncratic productivity is positive, i.e. ∂V
∂Ai
> 0, if the
firm is in a non-default state.
2.B.2 Short-Term Bond Price
The sign of the short-term bond price derivative depends on how the default
cutoff varies with the share of long-term debt. The default cutoff function
a∗(Ki, Bi,Mi, C), which exists if the value function derivative with respect
to idiosyncratic is positive, i.e. ∂V
∂Ai
> 0, is implicitly defined by the equation
V (Ki, Bi,Mi, a
∗(Ki, Bi,Mi, C), C) = 0
Using the implicit function theorem, the derivative for a∗ is given by:
∂a∗
∂Mi
= −
∂V
∂Mi
∂V
∂Ai
Since ∂V
∂Mi
> 0 and ∂V
∂Ai
> 0, ∂a
∗
∂Mi
< 0, i.e. the default threshold in the next
period is decreasing in M .
With this information and using Leibniz rule, the short-term bond price
derivative with respect to the long-term debt share can be computed as
∂QS
∂M ′i
= E
[
Λ(C,C ′) (R(K ′i, B
′
i, a
∗, C ′)− (1 + c)) f(a∗|A) ∂a
∗
∂M ′i
|C
]
Since 1 + c ≥ R(K,B, a∗, C), i.e. the creditor cannot recover more than
his claim per unit of the bond in default, and ∂a
∗
∂M ′ ≤ 0, i.e. the default
cutoff for the next period is lower if the long-term share in the next period
is higher, this derivative is positive.
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2.B.3 Long-Term Bond Price
For the long-term bond price, the derivative with respect to the long-term
debt share is given by
∂QL
∂M ′
= E
[
Λ(C,C ′)
[
[R(K ′i, B
′
i, a
∗, C ′)− (µ+ c+ (1− µ)Q′L)] f(a∗|A)
∂a∗
∂M ′i
+(1− µ)
∫ ∞
a∗
(
∂Q′L
∂K ′′
∂K ′′
∂M ′
+
∂Q′L
∂B′′
∂B′′
∂M ′
+
∂Q′L
∂M ′′
∂M ′′
∂M ′
)
f(A′|A)dA
]
|C
]
It is not possible to determine the sign of this derivative, for two rea-
sons: First, it is not necessarily the case that (µ + c + (1 − µ)Q′L) >
R(K ′i, B
′
i, a
∗, C ′), since the continuation bond price Q′L = qL(S ′i, a∗, C ′),
which represents a part of the claim of the creditor to the firm, might be
low.
Second, the future bond price also changes with future firm decisions,
which depend on the policy for the long-term debt share today. Since
the policy functions are unknown, it is not possible to determine these
derivatives.
In general, the long-term bond price can therefore decrease in the long-
term debt share. This can be the case in two situations: First, if defaulting
would actually lead to a higher payoff for creditors. Second, if a higher long-
term share increases default risk after the next period through adversely
affecting the firm policies in the next period.
2.C Numerical Algorithm
My solution algorithm is a value function iteration algorithm based on
Hatchondo et al. (2016). It works as follows.
1. Start with a guess for the expected value function and bond prices.
The equilibrium for the infinite horizon model might not be unique.
I therefore follow Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) and approximate
the infinite horizon value functions by finite horizon value functions
for the first period. Therefore, the initial guesses are the terminal
value function and the terminal bond prices.
2. Compute the policy functions and value function. I approximate the
value function between grid points using linear interpolation. For
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capital and debt, I use grids with 15 points, respectively. For the
share of long-term debt, I use 5 grid points. For the idiosyncratic
productivity shock, I use 9 and for the aggregate productivity shock
5 grid points. I use a choice grid with 250 points for capital, 250
points for debt and 100 points for the long-term debt share.
3. Update the expected value function and bond prices. For the cal-
culation of expectations, I approximate the expected value function
E [V (S ′i, Ai, C)], qS(S ′i, Ai, C), and qL(S ′i, Ai, C) using linear interpo-
lation on (S ′i, Ai). I treat Ai as continuous, using Gauss-Legendre
quadrature to calculate the expectation over A′i. I compute these
expectations on a Grid with 30 points for K ′i, 30 for B
′
i and 5 for
M ′i and 9 points for Ai. I use 25 quadrature points to compute the
expectations approximating the integrals piecewise in the default and
no default regions, using the exact default cutoffs for Ai. I use three
Gauss-Hermite quadrature nodes for Z and εC . By approximating
the expectations, I only have to calculate expectations only once out-
side the maximization step instead of many times within the maxi-
mization step.
4. Repeat until the updating errors in the expected value function and
bond prices are smaller than 1e-4.
The long-term bond price function requires some smoothing to converge.
I use a smoothing weight of 0.001 on the bond price and no smoothing on
the value function, once the bond price error is sufficiently small.
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Chapter 3
Bank Capital Regulation and
Endogenous Banking Crises
with Xue Zhang
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3.1 Introduction
The 2007-09 global financial crisis revealed the fragility of the financial
sector as well as the weakness of the existing financial regulatory system.
Stringent bank regulations have been introduced globally subsequent to
the financial crisis: In 2010, Basel III was released by the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk
management of the banking sector of its member countries.1 In particular,
the committee recommends to increase the minimum capital requirement
during normal times to 10.5%. This includes a capital conservation buffer
of 2.5%, which can be lifted during periods of financial distress.
Nonetheless, there is little consensus among policymakers and resear-
chers regarding the optimal level of bank capital regulation. On the one
hand, advocates of regulation argue that higher capital requirements make
the banking system more resilient to banking panics. On the other hand,
opponents of regulation weigh in that higher capital requirements reduce
desirable financial intermediation. This leads to our research question: How
should a regulator faced with this trade-off design the regulatory policy?
We study the macroeconomic effects of regulating the depository in-
stitutions in a general equilibrium framework with two banking sectors,
namely a retail and a shadow banking sector. Taking shadow banking into
consideration is crucial for two reasons. First, it has grown tremendously
over the last decades into an essential part of the modern financial system.2
Second, it was the collapse of the shadow banking sector that led to the
financial turmoil which eventually turned into a global financial crisis. We
define shadow banks as financial institutions that (i) are outside the regula-
tory framework of banks, (ii) borrow from other financial institutions using
money market instruments, and (iii) are more efficient than retail banks
in capital investments. Examples of shadow banks by our definition in-
clude finance companies, stand-alone broker-dealers, asset-backed security
originators, and non-bank affiliated structured investment vehicles.
We embed the banking and financial crises model developed by Gertler,
1In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was
signed into federal law in the United States. In 2011, the European Commission adopted
a legislative package called Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV, which reflects the
Basel II and Basel III rules on capital measurement and capital standards.
2According to the Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2016 by the Financial
Stability Board, in 2015, shadow banking accounts for 13% of the total financial system,
and the shadow banking to GDP ratio is around 70%.
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Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016) into an otherwise standard real business
cycle model with endogenous capital accumulation. The Gertler, Kiyotaki,
and Prestipino (2016) framework features financial crises in the form of
systemic bank runs where retail banks run on shadow banks. This fra-
mework links bank capital structure to the outbreak of financial crises,
therefore enabling us to analyze how regulators can enhance financial sta-
bility through bank capital regulation. Adding endogenous capital accu-
mulation is important for evaluating the steady state effect of bank capital
regulation. Since there are business cycle fluctuations in the model, we can
compare it’s dynamics to business cycle dynamics in the data, which allows
us to compa.
Our model captures the following trade-off of bank capital requirements:
On the positive side, under a higher capital requirement, retail banks can
use their capital buffers to absorb the liquidated assets of shadow banks
during banking crises. Therefore, the liquidation price of capital is higher,
which in turn reduces the liquidation loss of the retail banks due to a run.
As the likelihood of a shadow bank run is positively related to this liquida-
tion loss, the frequency of bank runs is reduced. As a result, the financial
stability of the economy is enhanced through higher capital requirements.
We show that for this effect to work, it is crucial that capital regulation
is dynamic: In particular, the regulator should relax capital requirements
during a bank run, allowing retail banks to draw down their capital buffers.
A constant capital requirement will instead increase the frequency of bank
runs and is therefore not an effective macro-prudential policy instrument.
On the negative side, a higher capital requirement pushes up the cost of
financing for both retail and shadow banks, resulting in less financial in-
termediation, a lower aggregate capital stock, and eventually lower output
of the economy.
In addition, with higher capital requirements there is a shift of retail
banks away from direct lending towards lending to shadow banks on the
wholesale funding markets.3 This is because wholesale lending has a lower
weight in the leverage ratio of the retail banks. Consequently, the relative
share of financial intermediation conducted in the shadow banking sector
3Shin (2009) defines wholesale funding as nonretail funding that does not fall under
either covered bonds or securitized notes. He discusses the case of Northern Rock, which
used short and medium-term notes issued to institutional investors as wholesale funding
instruments. Another example for a wholesale funding market is the tri-party repo
market discussed in Martin et al. (2014).
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will increase as the capital requirement on retail banks increases.
We calibrate our model to match stylized facts about the U.S. banking
system and the length and frequency of financial crises in OECD coun-
tries after World War II. The calibrated model generates financial crises of
plausible magnitudes and business cycle co-movements between real and
financial variables similar to the U.S. data. The calibrated model suggests
that bank runs are costly in welfare terms. More specifically, assuming a
log utility function, households are willing to pay 0.2 percent in permanent
consumption equivalent units to avoid bank runs, even though bank runs
are rare events. Risk-neutral retail and shadow banks are willing to pay
1.1 and 8.5 percent in consumption equivalent units to avoid bank runs
respectively.
Using the calibrated model, we investigate the effects of different capital
requirements on financial stability and welfare. Imposing a bank capital
requirement of 15 percent leads to a decrease in the bank run frequency
from 2.7 to 0.8 runs per 100 years. However, the steady state capital
stock decreases by approximately 5 percent under this capital requirement
policy. Regarding welfare, households lose with a higher bank capital re-
quirement due to the negative steady state effect, whereas retail banks and
shadow banks benefit from it. If the retail and shadow banks are small
in consumption terms relative to households, as they are in our calibra-
tion, higher capital requirements for depository institutions tend to reduce
welfare despite effectively eliminating banking crises.
The regulator can address two inefficiencies by imposing capital requi-
rements:
First, due to a moral hazard problem, both retail and shadow banks
face endogenous leverage constraints. In particular, banks with zero net
worth cannot borrow. If a drop in the capital price reduces the value of the
shadow banks’ assets below the value of their liabilities, implying a negative
net worth, shadow banks will default and their assets will be liquidated,
further depressing the capital price. A systemic shadow bank run occurs.
Such bank runs happen in equilibrium and are anticipated. We focus on
the case that retail banks run on shadow banks and abstract from retail
bank runs.4 The regulator can improve upon the competitive equilibrium
4During the 07-09 financial crisis, many shadow banks experienced a run from their
creditors and experienced insolvency as a consequence, the most well-known cases being
the collapse of Bear Stearns Companies and the failure of Lehman Brothers. The tradi-
tional banking sector, on the other hand, was largely shielded from the financial cata-
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by imposing borrowing limits, because private agents do not internalize the
effects of their leverage decisions on the likelihood of bank runs.
Second, as price-taking agents also do not internalize the effects of their
decisions on asset prices, there is a pecuniary externality: Agents over-
borrow in expansions, tightening future leverage constraints in recessions.
By tightening lending during expansions, and relaxing it during recessions,
the policymaker can reduce cyclical fluctiations. This externality has been
discussed for example by Lorenzoni (2008) and Da´vila and Korinek (2017)
and in quantitative work by Bianchi (2011).
Capital requirements also have steady state effects on output in our
model. This is a key distinction from Gertler et al. (2016), where the capital
stock is constant. Two assumptions are crucial for these effects. First,
there are no equity markets between households and banks. Therefore,
banks can only respond to a higher capital requirement by contracting the
asset side of their balance sheet. This way, the steady state capital stock
decreases. The second assumption is the ranking of agents’ investment
efficiencies. Households are the least skilled investors and shadow banks
are the most skilled investors. The investment skills of agents are captured
by a capital holding cost, which corresponds to screening and monitoring
expenses in capital investment. Under a higher bank capital requirement,
capital reallocates from retail banks to households and shadow banks. As
a result, financial intermediation decreases.
3.2 Literature Review
This paper is related to three strands of literature. The first literature
studies the role of financial frictions as a driving force of financial cri-
ses. Early models include Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). In these papers, it is the non-financial firms rather than the
financial intermediaries which are subject to financial frictions. After the
07-09 financial crisis, the emphasis of this literature has shifted to linking
financial frictions in the banking sector to the outbreak of the worst global
financial crisis since the Great Depression.5 Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Pres-
tipino (2016) develop a canonical macroeconomic framework of financial
strophe by government interventions.
5E.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Brunnermeier and San-
nikov, 2014; Boissay, Collard, and Smets, 2016.
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crisis in the form of bank runs. They extend Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)
by including shadow banking sector, which played an important part in
the onset of the 07-09 financial crisis. In this paper, we build on their
framework by introducing capital accumulation and retail bank capital re-
gulation to analyse the welfare and financial stabilization effect of bank
capital regulation.
The second related literature studies micro- and macro-prudential opti-
mal bank capital regulation in macroeconomic models which consider dif-
ferent trade-offs for the regulation policy.
The micro-prudential literature focuses on an agency problem at the
bank level. The positive effect of bank capital regulation captured by this
literature is less risk-taking by banks (see Nguyen (2014) and Begenau
(2016)) and limiting moral hazard problems of banks (Van den Heuvel
(2008)). Regarding the cost of bank capital regulation,Van den Heuvel
(2008) argues that a tighter capital regulation reduces banks’ ability to
create liquidity. Similarly, Nguyen (2014) emphasizes that capital regula-
tions lead to less bank lending, which in turn causes lower growth of the
economy. Begenau (2016) proposes the opposite effect in bank lending as
in Van den Heuvel (2008) and Nguyen (2014). She argues that the safe and
liquid bank deposit is a desirable asset for households, and as banks face a
higher capital requirement, the supply of bank debt decreases, resulting in
a lower financing cost for the banks; therefore, bank lending increases as a
result of bank capital regulation rather than decreases.
The macro-prudential literature instead focuses on market externali-
ties.Da´vila and Korinek (2017) provide general conditions under which
price dependent borrowing constraints lead to inefficiencies and charac-
terize the optimal policy. Our model is different, because it has two nested
borrowers and we discuss regulating the intermediate borrower, whereas
they are concerned about regulating the ultimate borrower. Other impor-
tant papers in that literature model banking crises as occasionally binding
borrowing constraints, e.g. Lorenzoni (2008), Bianchi (2011) and Bianchi
and Mendoza (2015).
Our paper departs from the existing literature on optimal bank capital
regulation in two ways: First, by modelling endogenous banking crises
directly, we consider the impact of bank capital regulation on the stability
of the financial system, rather than on the risk-taking behavior of financial
institutions. Second, we explicitly model shadow banking as a part of the
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financial sector and study the implications of retail bank capital regulation
in this setup, which has not been done in these studies. Third, relative
to the existing macro-prudential literature, we consider bank runs as an
additional and severe externality which can motivate regulation.
Recently, there is a growing literature that studies the role of shadow
banking system in evaluating the bank regulation policy, such as Plantin
(2015) and Huang (2015). The way they model shadow banking corre-
sponds to the off-balance sheet shadow banking activities conducted by
traditional banks. In contrast, we consider shadow banking to be an inde-
pendent banking sector that conducts financial intermediation outside the
regulatory framework of banks. Our notion of shadow banks corresponds
to the external shadow banking sector in contrast to the off-balance-sheet
shadow banking activities carried out by traditional banks. We consider
the internal shadow banking as part of the traditional banking as bank
capital regulations (such as Basel III) are, or at least supposed to be, im-
plemented on a fully consolidated basis. In contrast to internal shadow
banking, external shadow banking is a result of gains from specialization
and vertical integration rather than a result of regulatory arbitrage as is
the internal shadow banking (Adrian and Ashcraft (2012)).
The closest paper to ours is Begenau and Landvoigt (2017), which also
studies retail bank capital requirements in an economy with an unregulated
external shadow banking sector and endogenous capital accumulation. The
key difference to their framework is the flow of funds in our economy. In
our model, households have direct access to capital markets and there is
a wholesale funding market that links the retail and the shadow banking
sector. In their model, households hold both debt and equity of retail and
shadow banks but have no access to the capital market. There is also no
interbank market between the two banking sectors. Consequently, they find
that the spillover effects of regulating retail bank capital on shadow bank
decisions are small. They also model bank runs, but the probability of a
bank run is determined exogenously and independently of the liquidation
loss in their model.
We proceed as follows: In Section 3.3, we explain the model, which we
calibrate in Section 3.4. We discuss the main mechanism in Section 3.5 and
present the welfare cost of bank runs as well as the welfare effects of bank
capital regulation in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.3 Model
We build on the infinite horizon general equilibrium model with endogenous
bank runs by Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016). A key feature of this
model is that the financial intermediation sector is subdivided into a retail
and a shadow banking sector. In their model, aggregate capital supply is
fixed and banks are unregulated. To study the welfare implications of bank
capital regulation, we extend the model to include capital accumulation and
retail bank capital regulation. Also, bank runs in our model are persistent
and can last for potentially many periods.
We consider a closed economy populated with three types of agents:
households, retail banks, and shadow banks. There is a unit mass of agents
of each type. Agents differ in their utility function, their investment effi-
ciency, and their planning horizon. In addition, retail banks and shadow
banks face an endogenous leverage constraint due to a moral hazard pro-
blem. Retail banks face an additional type capital requirement. Figure
3.1 shows an overview of the flow of funds in the no-run equilibrium in
the model: Households, retail banks and shadow banks hold capital, which
they purchase from capital producers and lend to final goods producers.
Households also lend on the deposit market to retail banks, which in turn
lend on the wholesale funding market to shadow banks. During a bank
run, it is the wholesale funding market that will break down, because the
retail banks will not roll over their lending to the shadow banks.
3.3.1 Households
Households maximize utility from consumption. Their utility function is
given by
Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
βs−t ln(cHs )
]
, (3.3.1)
where Et denotes the expectation conditional on time t information and β
is the discount factor of the household. cHt denotes household consumption
in period t. We follow the convention that lower case letters for varia-
bles denote individual variables, while upper case letters denote aggregate
variables.
Households consume, invest in capital kHt+1 and make deposits d
H
t+1 at
banks. They supply labor inelastically and receive Wt as labor income.
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Figure 3.1: Model overview.
In addition, they own the capital producers and receive the profits ΠQt .
6
Deposits yield a safe gross return RDt+1 in the subsequent period. Capital
can be sold and purchased at price Qt and yields an uncertain net return
rKt+1 in the subsequent period. It depreciates at rate δ. The remaining
fraction of the capital stock in the next period is valued at the next period
capital price, Qt+1. The net worth of the household at the beginning of
period t is given by
nHt =
[
rKt + (1− δ)Qt
]
kHt +R
D
t d
H
t +Wt + Π
Q
t . (3.3.2)
In reality, households delegate credit supply to banks, because banks
have a cost advantage at monitoring non-financial firms.7 To capture this
efficiency advantage of banks in a simplified way, we follow Gertler, Kiyo-
taki, and Prestipino (2016) and introduce a quadratic holding cost for new
6Profits are 0 in steady state, but may arise outside of the steady state due to a
quadratic capital adjustment cost.
7Diamond (1984) develops a model in which a monitoring advantage of banks arises
through diversification.
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capital. This capital holding cost takes the form
ηH
2
(
kHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt.
The capital holding cost represents the cost of screening and monitoring
investment projects for the investors.
Following Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016), we assume that
retail banks purchase capital management services from specialized com-
panies.8 Retail banks pay a linear fee fRt to these companies for each unit
of capital managed. The capital management firms, in turn, incur a qua-
dratic capital management cost. The profit of these capital management
firms is given by:
fRt K˜
R
t+1 −
ηR
2
(
K˜Rt+1
Kt
)2
Kt
where fRt is the capital management fee per unit of capital. These firms are
owned by the households, who receive their profits. The capital manage-
ment firms operate in a competitive market, which means the equilibrium
fee fRt is taken as given by them and retail banks, and is determined in
equilibrium such that capital management firms are willing to manage the
capital of the retail banks, i.e. such that K˜Rt+1 = K
R
t+1.
This assumption is important for technical reasons. It ensures that the
decision problem of the retail banks is linear in their net worth. Therefore
it is sufficient to characterize the decision problem of a representative retail
bank.
The optimization problem of the household can be summarized as
max
{cHt ,kHt+1,dHt+1,K˜Rt+1}∞t=0
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt ln
(
cHt
)]
, (3.3.3)
s.t.
cHt = n
H
t −QtkHt+1 − dHt+1 −
ηH
2
(
kHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt +
(
fRt −
ηR
2
K˜Rt+1
Kt
)
K˜Rt+1,
kHt+1, d
H
t+1, c
H
t ≥ 0,
with nHt given by Equation 3.3.2.
8Such companies are for example appraisal management companies, which determine
the value of a property, or credit bureaus, which determine the credit worthiness of a
household.
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3.3.2 Banks
There is a unit measure of both retail banks (R-banks) and shadow banks
(S-banks) in the economy. J-banks, J ∈ {R,S} can take deposits dJt+1
from households and borrow or lend on the wholesale funding market bJt+1.
In addition, they purchase capital kJt+1, which is invested into consump-
tion goods production.9 Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016) derive
conditions such that in the unregulated equilibrium, it will be optimal for
R-banks to use deposits and to lend on the wholesale funding market, while
S-banks will not use deposits and borrow on the wholesale funding market.
These conditions are identical in our model.
Banks differ in their ability to invest in capital. In particular, retail
banks pay a linear fee fRt k
R
t+1 for the capital management services provi-
ded by specialized capital management firms as described in the previous
section. There is no such fee and no capital holding cost for the shadow
banks.10
Banks have linear consumption utility. With probability σJ , banks of
type J receive an exit shock. In the case of such a shock, the banks liquidate
their assets, consume their net worth and exit the economy. To keep the
measure of banks constant over time, new banks with mass σJ enter the
economy with an exogenous endowment υJKt/σ
J .11
Both types of banks can divert a fraction of their assets after they have
made their borrowing and lending decisions. How much they can divert
depends both on the type of assets and the financing of the assets. Capital
investment is easier to divert than wholesale lending, and assets financed
through wholesale funding are harder to divert compared to those financed
by deposits or equity.12 In particular, a fraction ψ, 0 < ψ < 1, of equity
9In practice, banks’ lending to the non-financial sector is largely in the form of
debt rather than equity. In the context of our model, banks’ investment in the non-
financial sector takes the form of equity investment rather than debt. This is a common
assumption in the literature with financial intermediation for simplicity - otherwise
another layer of liability of the non-financial sector has to be added. Under the current
assumption, default on bank loans can be related to bankruptcy of the non-financial
firms.
10Adrian and Ashcraft (2012) discuss reasons for the existence of shadow bank cre-
dit intermediation in addition to retail bank credit intermediation. They argue that
securitization allowed shadow banks to reduce informational frictions in credit markets,
thereby offering loans to high-risk creditors which yield a superior return.
11We scale the endowment of newly entering banks by the capital stock to ensure
that the arguably stylized assumptions on entry do not affect the comparative statics
through changes in the relative size of the endowment.
12Diversion entails the liquidation of the banks’ assets and a subsequent default on
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or deposit financed capital investment can be diverted. A smaller fraction
γψ, 0 < γ < 1, of equity or deposit financed wholesale loans is divertible.
A fraction ωψ, 0 < ω < 1, of wholesale funding financed capital investment
can be diverted. ω captures the monitoring intensity of the creditors of
wholesale lending. Adrian and Ashcraft (2012) argue that due to deposit
insurance, depositors have a lower incentive to monitor investments of the
borrower than wholesale lenders who lend against securitized assets. For
the former, the implicit government guarantee is enough to ensure deposi-
tors that their lending is risk-free, whereas for the latter, the riskiness of
their lending depends on the diversification of the borrower. For γ < 1, the
intuition lies in the higher standardization of wholesale lending compared
to other lending activities. The collateral underlying for example a repo
contract, which is a typical wholesale lending instrument, is often a high
quality government bond, whose market value is easy to verify for creditors.
The collateral underlying a loan can for example be real estate, for which
only a rough estimate of the market value exists. Hence, the potential for
diversion is much higher for loans compared to wholesale lending.
If banks divert assets, they will not repay their liabilities. Their cre-
ditors, either the households or wholesale lenders, will force the banks to
exit the economy if they observe diversion. Because diversion occurs at
the end of the period before next period uncertainty realizes, an incentive
constraint on the banks can ensure that diversion will never occur in equi-
librium. This incentive constraint states that the benefit of diversion must
be smaller or equal to the continuation value of the bank.
Figure 3.2 displays the timing of intra-period decisions of banks. The
intra-period problem of a J-bank consists of three stages: survival, borro-
wing and investment decisions and diversion. After the productivity uncer-
tainty of the final goods producers, Zt, has realized, banks receive the exit
shock. If they exit, they consume their net worth, otherwise they make
their investment and borrowing decisions. New banks enter the economy
and also make these intertemporal decisions. Finally, after banks have deci-
ded how much to invest and how much to borrow, they can decide whether
or not to divert their assets. If they divert, they consume the gain from
diversion, default on their next period debt and exit the economy. Other-
creditors. One way to justify why equity financed assets cannot be diverted fully is
that diversion creates a loss to the diverting bank which is equal to 1 − ψ times the
diverted assets. Since banks utility is linear in consumption, such a cost may either be
a pecuniary cost in the form of a penalty or a stigmatic utility cost.
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Zt 1. Survive? 2. Choices
Capital kJt+1,
Deposits dJt+1
Wholesale Funding bJt+1
Consumption cJt
Exit
Consume
net worth nJt
Enter
Endowment
W JKt/σ
J
3. Divert?
Exit
Consume
diverted assets
Zt+1
σJ
1− σJ
σJ
No
Yes
Figure 3.2: Sequence of decisions for a bank of type J.
wise, they transition to the next period and the same intra-period problem
repeats.
Shadow Banks
If shadow banks do not exit, they consume cSt , borrow funds on the who-
lesale funding market bSt+1 and invest in capital k
S
t+1. If they do exit, they
consume their net worth nSt . The utility function of shadow banks is linear
in consumption:
Et
{ ∞∑
s=t
{[
β(1− σS)]s−t [σSnSs + (1− σS)cSs ]}
}
, (3.3.4)
where β is the time preference rate, σS is the exit shock, nS is the net worth
of the shadow bank and cS is consumption in the case that the shadow bank
does not exit. The net worth of an incumbent shadow bank in period t is
given by
nSt = R
K
t k
S
t −RBt bSt . (3.3.5)
A new shadow bank is endowed with an exogenous amount of resources
when entering the economy, which equals their net worth in period t:
n˜St =
υSKt
σS
. (3.3.6)
75
The balance sheet constraint of shadow banks requires that assets equal
liabilities plus equity:
Qtk
S
t+1 = b
S
t+1 + n
S
t − cSt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Equity
. (3.3.7)
Since shadow banks borrow exclusively from retail banks and lend only to
final goods producers, their payoff from diversion is given by
ψ
[
(nSt − cSt ) + ωbSt+1
]
.
An incentive constraint ensures that diversion never occurs in equilibrium.
It states that
ψ
[
(nSt − cSt ) + ωbSt+1
] ≤ βEt [V St+1] , (3.3.8)
where Et
[
V St+1
]
is the continuation value of the shadow bank defined below.
This constraint states that the value from continuing to operate the shadow
bank must be at least as high as the value of diverting assets.
Continuing shadow banks reinvest their entire net worth, i.e. cSt = 0.
This is an optimal choice, whenever
Qt < βEt
[
V St+1
nSt+1
RKt+1
]
.
This equation says that even if the shadow bank invests his entire net worth
in capital, the benefit of investment still exceeds the cost of investment. We
verify that this condition holds in our numerical solution.
The incentive constraint is always binding. In that case, the problem
of a shadow bank reduces to
V St = max{kSs+1,bSs+1}∞s=t
Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
(β(1− σS))s−tσSnSs
]
, (3.3.9)
s.t.
bSt+1 = Qtk
S
t+1 − nSt , (Balance Sheet Constraint)
ψ
(
nSt + ωb
S
t+1
) ≤ βEt [σSnSt+1 + (1− σS)ψ (nSt+1 + ωbSt+2)] , (IC)
kSt+1, b
S
t+1 ≥ 0,
with net worth given by 3.3.5 for incumbent banks and by 3.3.6 for new
shadow banks. Finally, we define leverage as the market value of assets
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over equity, i.e.
φSt ≡
Qtk
S
t+1
nSt
.
Retail Banks
Retail banks consume cRt , invest in capital k
R
t+1, take deposits from hou-
seholds dRt+1, and lend money to shadow banks on the wholesale funding
market bRt+1. Their utility function is given by
Et
{ ∞∑
s=t
{[
β(1− σR)]s−t [σRnRs + (1− σR)cRs ]}
}
. (3.3.10)
In period t, incumbent retail banks obtain a gross return on capital, RKt k
R
t ,
and a gross return from lending to shadow banks, RBt b
R
t . They return R
D
t d
R
t
to households for their deposits. The retail bank’s net worth in period t is
given by
nRt = R
K
t k
R
t +R
B
t b
R
t −RDt dRt . (3.3.11)
The net worth of newly entering retail banks is given by
n˜Rt =
υRKt
σR
. (3.3.12)
The balance sheet of retail banks states that assets equal liabilities plus
equity:
(Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + b
R
t+1 = d
R
t+1 + n
R
t − cRt . (3.3.13)
We again focus on the case of zero consumption of continuing banks, which
is optimal whenever
Qt + f
R
t < βEt
[
V Rt+1
nRt+1
RKt+1
]
.
Since retail banks lend on the wholesale funding markets and refinance
themselves exclusively through deposits and equity, their payoff from di-
version is
ψ
[
(Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1
]
.
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Their incentive constraint states that
ψ
[
(Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1
] ≤ βEt [V Rt+1] . (3.3.14)
Further, define the leverage ratio of retail banks as
φRt ≡
(Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1
nRt
. (3.3.15)
This leverage ratio describes how retail banks can lever up their net worth
by using deposits. This leverage ratio excludes a fraction (1 − γ)bRt+1 of
wholesale loans, because this fraction is non-divertable and can therefore
be completely financed with deposits. The fraction of equity financing
used by retail banks is given by 1
φRt
. With this formulation, the incentive
constraint for retail bank pins down the leverage ratio:
ψφRt n
R
t ≤ βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
. (3.3.16)
In this sense, the incentive constraint can be interpreted as a market im-
posed leverage constraint.
3.3.3 Capital Regulation
The regulator can impose a capital requirement on depository institutions,
which stipulates that the bank’s equity cannot be less than a fraction of
its assets. Importantly, we assume that whether a bank is regulated de-
pends on whether the bank uses deposits or not and not on the type of
bank per se. We make this assumption to avoid situations where house-
holds will shift deposits from regulated retail banks to unregulated shadow
banks. This assumption can be justified, because the ability to issue de-
posits requires participation in a deposit insurance scheme, like the FDIC
in the U.S., which is usually attached to stringent oversight requirements.
In equilibrium, the regulated banks will be the retail banks. We assume
that the regulator weighs assets in the same way as the market. That is, a
fraction 1− γ of wholesale loans can be financed completely with deposits
and does not count towards assets in the capital requirement. Accordingly,
the capital requirement can be formulated as
1
φRt
≥ 1
φ¯t
, (3.3.17)
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where φ¯t is the maximum leverage ratio the regulator allows.
Recall that there are two classes of assets on the retail bank’s balance
sheet: capital holdings,
(
Qt + f
R
t
)
kRt+1 and wholesale lending, b
R
t+1. The
interpretation of 3.3.17 is that the retail bank can finance at most 1 − 1
φ¯t
share of its capital holdings and at most 1− γ
φ¯t
share of its wholesale lending
with deposits. In other words, with γ < 1, at least a share 1
φ¯t
of capital
holding, but only a share γ
φ¯t
of wholesale lending has to be financed by
retail banks’ own equity.
The problem of the retail bank in the presence of a regulatory capital
requirement can be summarized as
V Rt = max{kRs+1,bRs+1,dRs+1}∞s=t
Et
{
σR
∞∑
s=t
[
β(1− σR)]s−t nRs
}
, (3.3.18)
s.t.
(Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + b
R
t+1 = d
R
t+1 + n
R
t , (Balance Sheet Constraint)
(Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1 ≤ φ¯tnRt , (Regulatory Capital Requirement)
ψ
[
(Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1
] ≤
βEt
{
σRnRt+1 + (1− σR)ψ
[
(Qt+1 + f
R
t+1)k
R
t+2 + γb
R
t+2
]}
, (IC)
kRt+1, d
R
t+1, b
R
t+1 ≥ 0,
with nRt given by Equation 3.3.11 for incumbent retail banks and 3.3.12 for
new retail banks. We refer to the economy in which the regulatory bank
capital requirement is so low that retail bank leverage is always determined
by the incentive constraint of the retail banker as the baseline economy.
3.3.4 Production
Final Goods Producers
Final goods are produced using a Cobb-Douglas production technology that
takes labor and capital as input:
Yt = ZtF (Kt, Lt) = ZtK
α
t L
1−α
t . (3.3.19)
The price of the final good is normalized to one. Productivity Zt follows
an AR(1) process:
ln(Zt) = (1− ρZ)µZ + ρZ ln(Zt−1) + t, (3.3.20)
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where |ρZ | < 1 and t ∼ N(0, σZ).
The final goods producers hire labor from households and borrow capital
from households, retail banks and shadow banks to produce final goods.
They take the prices of the production inputs and output as given and
make zero profits.13 They maximize profits taking the aggregate wage Wt
and the rental rate of capital rKt as given:
max
Lt,Kt
Πt = ZtK
α
t L
1−α
t −WtLt − rKt Kt.
The first order conditions of the final goods producers’ problem determine
the wage and rental rate of capital in equilibrium:
Wt = (1− α)ZtKαt L−αt , (3.3.21)
rKt = αZtK
α−1
t L
1−α
t . (3.3.22)
Capital Producers
Capital producers use a technology which transforms one unit of final goods
into one unit of capital goods:
Y Kt = F
K(It) = It, (3.3.23)
where Y Kt is the amount of capital produced in period t and It is the
amount of consumption goods used for the production. Adjustment to the
production of capital goods is costly. The capital adjustment cost takes
the form
θ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt, (3.3.24)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. This form of capital adjustment
cost implies that whenever the investment rate differs from the depreciation
rate, a positive proportional adjustment cost is incurred. Therefore, the
relative price of capital goods is endogenous. Importantly, the adjustment
cost is scaled by the aggregate capital stock Kt, which the capital producers
take as given.
Due to the capital adjustment cost, the profit function of the capital
producer is concave. Therefore the capital producers may earn a non-zero
13Since the final goods producers make zero profits, it does not matter who owns the
them.
80
profit. We assume that the capital producers are owned by the households
and any profits or losses are transferred to the households each period.
The capital producers’ problem can be summarized as:
max
It
ΠQt = QtIt − It −
θ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt. (3.3.25)
The first order condition of the capital producer yields an expression for
the capital price:
Qt = 1 + θ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
. (3.3.26)
3.3.5 Aggregation and Equilibrium
Aggregation
Since the policy functions of an individual banker are linear in net worth,
we will characterize the equilibrium in terms of a representative household
and the aggregate decisions of the banking sectors. The aggregate net
worth of the retail and shadow banking sector is given by the sum of the
net worth of incumbent and newly entering banks:
NRt =
(
RKt K
R
t +R
B
t Bt −RDt Dt
)
(1− σR) + υRKt,
NSt =
(
RKt K
S
t −RBt Bt
)
(1− σS) + υSKt.
Aggregate output is given by production net of the capital holding costs:
Yt = ZtK
α
t + υ
RKt + υ
SKt − η
H
2
(
KHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt − η
R
2
(
KRt+1
Kt
)2
Kt.
(3.3.27)
We define as aggregate gross investment I˜t as the total expenditure neces-
sary to change the capital stock from Kt to Kt+1. Therefore, our measure
of aggregate investment includes the capital adjustment costs: Define It as
net investment excluding capital adjustment costs, that is
It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt.
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Then, gross investment is given by
I˜t = It +
θ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt. (3.3.28)
A similar distinction between gross investment and net investment is for
example used in Christiano et al. (2005).
Since there is a representative household, the individual consumption
and aggregate consumption are equal, cHt = C
H
t . Household consumption
can be inferred from the aggregate resource constraint:
CHt = Yt − I˜t − σR
NRt − υRKt
1− σR − σ
SN
S
t − υSKt
1− σS (3.3.29)
No-Run Equilibrium
In the absence of bank runs, we use a standard sequential equilibrium
definition. Crucially, in the no-run equilibrium, each retail bank expects
all other retail banks to roll over shadow bank debt, such that a bank run
will never arise in this equilibrium. Taking the bank capital regulation
policy φ¯t as given, the no-run equilibrium is a sequence of prices{
Qt, r
K
t , R
D
t , R
B
t ,Wt, f
R
t
}∞
t=0
and allocations for
• households, {CHt , KHt+1, DHt+1}∞t=0,
• retail banks, {CRt , KRt+1, DRt+1, BRt+1}∞t=0,
• shadow banks, {CSt , KSt+1, BSt+1}∞t=0,
• final goods producers, {Kt, Lt}∞t=0, and
• capital producers, {It}∞t=0,
that solve the respective optimization problems of all agents as defined
above, clear the markets for
• capital Kt = KHt +KRt +KSt ,
• labor Lt = 1,
• investment goods It = KHt+1 +KRt+1 +KSt+1 − (1− δ)Kt,
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• deposits DRt+1 = DHt+1,
• wholesale funding BSt+1 = BRt+1,
• and capital management services KRt+1 = K˜Rt+1,
and satisfy the aggregate resource constraint 3.3.29. In a no-run equili-
brium, the bank run condition 3.3.31, which is discussed in detail in the
next subsection, does not hold.
Shadow Bank Run Equilibrium
As in the model of Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016), retail banks
can run on shadow banks. We consider only runs on the shadow banking
sector as a whole. If such a run happens, the assets of the shadow banks
are liquidated at the liquidation price Q∗t . The retail banks recover the
assets of the shadow banks instead of their lending. Incumbent shadow
banks exit once their banks are liquidated. Define xt as the recovery rate
of retail banks:
xt = ξt
[
rKt + (1− δ)Q∗t
]
KSt
(1 + rBt )Bt
(3.3.30)
where ξt is a liquidation value shock following an iid log normal distribu-
tion with mean 0 and variance σξ. The liquidation value shock helps to
quantitatively pin down the frequency of bank runs. One interpretation for
this liquidation cost shock is that it represents a market illiquidity discount
in the collateral market due to search frictions.14 If the liquidity premium
is high, retail banks incur an additional loss on the recovery value, because
they receive illiquid capital instead of a liquid repayment of their wholesale
lending.
Runs are persistent and continue into the next period with probability
1 − pi. New shadow banks start re-entering the economy at rate σS only
once the run has ended.
Bank runs can be self-fulfilling. In that case, the market price of capital
deteriorates in anticipation of a bank run. This weakens balance sheets
of shadow banks so much that they cannot repay their liabilities. As a
consequence, it is optimal for the retail banks to run on shadow banks,
14For a microfoundation for time-varying liquidity discounts in collateral markets, see
for example He and Milbradt (2014). In their model, collateral of defaulted bonds is
sold on a search market as in Duffie et al. (2005). Liquidity is determined endogenously
by the default decision of the bond issuer.
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because if they do not run, their claim on the shadow banks becomes
worthless once the shadow banks are liquidated. However, a run will occur
only if the assets of the shadow banks, valued at the liquidation price of
capital, are insufficient to cover the liabilities of shadow banks, that is, if
xt ≤ 1. (3.3.31)
We assume that once this condition is fulfilled, a bank run will be trigge-
red. The liquidation condition in 3.3.31 states that, if a bank run happens,
i.e. shadow banks’ assets are liquidated, the retail banks suffer a loss on
their wholesale lending. If all retail banks coordinate not to run, then even
if the bank run condition holds, bank runs would never take place. Our
assumption eliminates this possibility by implying that retail banks can
never successfully coordinate. Hence in our model, bank runs do not arise
randomly as a consequence of sunspot shocks, but are closely tied to the
fundamentals of the shadow banking sector. Gorton (1988) presents evi-
dence that historically, bank runs in the United States were indeed related
to an increased fundamental riskiness of deposits, that is, the bank run
frequency was historically higher during times when expected losses on de-
posits were high. Further, the large number of retail banks in an economy
and the high competition in the retail banking business reduces the ability
of banks to coordinate absent, for example, a credible lender of last resort
(Rochet and Vives (2004)).
Since the recovery rate is strictly increasing in ξt, the probability of
a bank run happening in t can be written as a state-contingent cutoff ξ¯t,
which is defined by
ξ¯t =
(1 + rBt )Bt
[rKt + (1− δ)Q∗t ]KSt
.
The probability of a bank run in t conditional on Zt is given by
pt ≡ F (ξ¯t).
This probability is endogenous. It depends, in particular, on the liquida-
tion price of capital during a bank run: A lower liquidation price of capital
makes a bank run both more severe and more likely. While our liquida-
tion shock assumption is slightly different from the sunspot shock which
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determines the bank run probability in Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino
(2016), it also leads to a bank run probability that is decreasing in xt.
3.4 Calibration
We now outline our calibration strategy and provide evidence for the fit of
the model by comparing untargeted moments from the model to the data.
Of particular interest is the ability of the model to produce financial crises
that are similar to financial crises observed in developed economies. We
also check whether the model can generate realistic business cycle dynamics
for real and financial variables.
3.4.1 Calibration Strategy
We calibrate the model using US data from 1990 to 2007 for the model
economy. Since financial crises are relatively rare events and there are not
enough observations for a single country, we use financial crises data of
OECD countries after WWII for the calibration of bank run parameters.
The length of one period in the model is a quarter. We divide the pa-
rameters into three groups. Parameters in the first group are taken from
the literature. The second group of parameters is set to match steady state
properties of the model to the data. The third group is calibrated to match
dynamic properties of the model.
Parameters in Panel (a) of Table 3.1 are set following the literature. The
capital share of final good production and the quarterly depreciation rate
of capital are set to be 0.36 and 0.025, respectively, following Christiano
et al. (2005). The banks endowments υR and υS to yield a planning horizon
of shadow banks of about two years and retail banks of about five years,
similar to Gertler et al. (2016).15 These are the same targets for the banks
endowment as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). We set the discount rate
of households β to target an annual steady state return on deposits of 4
percent.
We set the adjustment cost parameter θ to match an elasticity of the
capital price to the investment-to-capital ratio of 0.25, which is the target
of Bernanke et al. (1999). This implies a parameter of θ = 10. 16 There
15The planning horizons are simply 1/σR and 1/σS .
16The elasticity of the capital price to investment is given by ∂Qt∂It
It
Qt
= θ 1Kt
It
1+θ( ItKt−δ)
.
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(a) Parameters from the literature
α δ υR, υS β θ
0.36 0.025 0.001 0.9902 10
Christiano et al. (2005) Gertler et al. (2016) RD = 1.04 ∂ ln(Qt)
∂ ln(It)
= 0.25
(b) Parameters set to match steady state properties
γ ηH ηR σR σS
0.6676 0.0286 0.0071 0.0521 0.1273
RK,R −RB = 0.4% RK −RK,R = 1.2% RK,R −RD = 1.2% KR/K = 0.4 KS/K = 0.4
ψ ω
0.2154 0.5130
φR = 10 φS = 20
(c) Parameters set to match dynamic properties
ρZ σZ σξ pi
0.9 0.01 0.0188 12/13
ρ(Yt, Yt−1) = 0.9 σ(Yt) = 0.025 Crisis freq. of Runs last
0.68% per quarter 3.25 yrs on avg
Table 3.1: Calibration.
is considerable variation in the choice of this parameter in the literature.
This parameter is very important for capital price dynamics, which in turn
are crucial for the possibility of bank runs, so it deserves some discussion.
Christiano and Fisher (2003) estimate an elasticity of the capital price to
the investment to capital ratio of 0.76, targeting asset price comovement
with real GDP. Gertler et al. (2007) target an elasticity of the capital
price to the investment-capital ratio of 2. In our model, these elasticities
would correspond to adjustment cost parameters of 30 and 80, respectively.
Such high adjustment costs would however lead to counterfactually smooth
investment rates.
More recent papers in the financial accelerator literature often use in-
vestment adjustment costs instead of capital adjustment costs. Using in-
vestment adjustment costs instead of capital adjustment costs would in-
troduce another endogenous state variable, which would complicate the
global solution of our non-linear model substantially. However, since these
models typically target the steady state elasticity of the price of capital
with respect to investment, we can compare their choice to our target. For
example, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) target an elasticity of investment to
Evaluated in Steady State, this expression reduces to θδ.
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the price of capital of 1.5, which would correspond to a parameter value of
60.
The business cycle literature generally uses much lower parameter values
for the quadratic capital adjustment costs. This allows them to match the
high volatility of investment relative to output in the data. Begenau and
Landvoigt (2017) use a parameter value of 2, Christensen and Dib (2008)
of 0.5. Basu and Bundick (2017) also estimate a value of around 2 for their
quadratic capital adjustment cost. By using a value of 10, we use a high
value relative to the business cycle literature, but a very conservative value
relative to the financial accelerator literature.
Parameters in Panel (b) of Table 3.1 are set to match steady state
properties of the economy. We use the same targets for these parameters
as Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016). To find data equivalents for
the steady state values, Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016) assume
that the U.S. economy was in steady state in the years before the financial
crisis of 2007-2009. We use leverage ratios of 10 and 20 for retail banks and
shadow banks, respectively, to calibrate the diversion parameters ψ and
ω. We choose the remaining diversion parameter γ to match an average
annualized spread between the return on retail lending and the return on
wholesale funding of 0.4 percent. We set the exit shock probabilities σR and
σS such that the share of assets intermediated by retail banks and shadow
banks in steady state are respectively 40 percent. These values correspond
to the respective share of intermediated assets in the data between 2003
and 2007.17 For the capital holding cost parameters ηH and ηR, we target
spreads between the return on shadow bank lending and retail bank lending
and between the return on retail bank lending and the deposit rate of 1.2
percent in annualized terms, respectively.
Parameters in Panel (c) of Table 3.1 are calibrated to match dynamic
properties of the model. We choose ρZ and σZ to match the conditional
volatility and the autocorrelation of detrended GDP for the United States.
Two key parameters for the welfare cost of bank runs are the volatility of
the liquidation cost shock σξ and the persistence of the run pi. We choose
the persistence of financial crises such that the average length of a financial
crisis is 3.25 years. We calibrate the volatility of the liquidation cost σξ
17According to Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016), assets intermediated by re-
tail banks comprise equity of non-financial firms, bonds, commercial paper, household
and non-financial firm loans, mortgages and consumer credit. For shadow banks, inter-
mediated assets comprise equity of non-financial firms, mortgages and consumer credit.
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to match an annual frequency of bank runs of 2.7 percent or one bank run
every 36.76 years.
We use data of historical banking crises between 1970-2011 from Table
A1 in Laeven and Valencia (2012), where the authors provide a compre-
hensive database on systemic banking crises during 1970-2011. They clas-
sify a time period as a systemic financial crisis if it exhibits ”[s]ignificant
signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant
bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations).” and
”[s]ignificant banking policy intervention measures in response to signifi-
cant losses in the banking system.” (Laeven and Valencia (2012), p. 228)
This definition corresponds well to a crisis in our model, which is characte-
rized by a shadow bank run, liquidation of the shadow banking sector and
losses on both capital holdings and wholesale lending for the retail banking
sector.
We calculate the frequency of a financial crises per country and quarter
by dividing the number of financial crises which occurred during the period
1970-2011 in the OECD countries by the number of countries (i.e. 35) and
the length of the period in quarters. We sum up the length of all financial
crises which happened in the OECD countries during this time18 and divide
the number by the number of financial crises to get the average length of
financial crises.
3.4.2 Numerical Solution and Simulation Procedure
We solve the model nonlinearly with a polynomial projection method on a
sparse (Smolyak) grid, using the toolbox of Judd et al. (2014). Details of
the solution algorithm are in Appendix 3.D.
The model has three shocks: The productivity shock t, the liquidation
cost shock ξt and the re-entry-shock pit. We simulate N = 5000 economies
for T = 1000 periods. We discard the first 200 periods to eliminate the
effects of initial conditions. One issue in simulating the model is that
the net worth NRt and N
S
t and the price of capital Qt are simultaneously
determined by a nonlinear equation. Therefore, we guess an initial path
for
{
Qdt
}T
t=1
, use this path to update the optimal policies and compute{
NR,d+1t
}T
t=1
and
{
NS,d+1t
}T
t=1
and use these new sequences of net worth
18The banking crises started in 2008 in many countries do not have specific ending
date in this table. In this case we set a uniform ending date of 2012.
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to compute the updated sequence
{
Qd+1t
}T
t=1
. We iterate on the simulation
until the distance between
{
Qdt
}T
t=1
and
{
Qd+1t
}T
t=1
becomes small.
3.4.3 Untargeted Moments
Financial Crises
In this section, we show that the model is able to generate financial cri-
ses which are quantitatively similar to the crises we observe in the data.
Schularick and Taylor (2012) use an event study approach to measure the
cumulative change in real and financial aggregate variables caused by a
financial crisis relative to the pre-crisis trend. Their empirical definition of
a financial crisis follows Laeven and Valencia (2012). The dataset they use
covers 14 economies spanning the years 1870 to 2008. For the comparison,
we use their post-WW2 results, which are comparable to our calibrated
model using the post-WW2 US and OECD data.
Schularick and Taylor (2012) Model
0 yr 0-1yr 0-2yr 0 yr 0-1yr 0-2yr
real GDP -2.02% -4.46% -6.3% -1.89% -1.46% -1.16%
real Investment -3.45% -12.45% -19.9% -8.32% -6.15% -4.69%
Bank Assets -1.89% -6.98% -7.7% -3.69% -2.89% -2.21%
Table 3.2: Untargeted financial crisis moments.
Table 3.2 reports the results. Using the same data and method as in
Schularick and Taylor (2012), we calculate the average cumulative percen-
tage change in real GDP, real investment, and bank assets after a systemic
banking crisis.19 We distinguish three time intervals: the first year, the
first two years, and the first three years after the start of the crisis.
Our measure of bank assets in the model is given by (Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t+1 +
QtK
S
t+1. Real GDP is Yt as defined in equation 3.3.27 and real investment
is I˜t as defined in equation 3.3.28. For instance, in the case of the first three
years after the systemic crisis, given that a bank run starts in period t, we
19In Table 2 in Schularick and Taylor (2012), the authors report the cumulative per-
centage change 0-5 years after the start of the banking crises. According to our model
calibration however, a systemic bank run lasts on average 3 years. Therefore we recal-
culate the Table 2 results for the 0-2 (instead of 0-5) year cumulative effects of banking
crises using their data and method to make it comparable to the simulation results of
our model. We consolidate both banking sectors for the comparison.
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compute the log change in the variables of interest between period t and
period t+ 11. Using the same method as Schularick and Taylor (2012) on
our simulated data, we estimate the average change of the real and financial
variables for each period between t and t+ 11 by the panel regression:
d.log(Xi,t) = αi +
11∑
s=0
βs+1runi,t−s + εi,t
where Xi,t ∈
{
Yi,t, I˜i,t, (Qi,t + f
R
i,t)K
R
i,t+1 +Qi,tK
S
i,t+1
}
and runi,t−s is a
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a run happens in period t−s.
αi is the unconditional growth rate of Xi in country i, βs+1 is the growth
rate s periods after the start of a financial crisis. We then add up the
coefficients of the dummy variables to get the cumulative effect of banking
crises on the variables of interest 0-2 years after the crises happened.
As shown in Table 3.2, the immediate effect of systemic banking crises
on real GDP from the model matches quite closely with that in the data.
In general, our model economy reacts stronger in the first year after the
crisis and recovers faster afterwards from the recession compared to the
data, in which a banking crisis has a more persistent negative effect on the
economy.
Business Cycle Statistics
The model should also be consistent with the business cycles in the U.S.
to lend additional confidence to the ability of the model to account for
fluctuations. The data are from the NIPA and the Flow of Funds between
1986Q1 and 2010Q4. For the wholesale funding rate we only have data
from 2001Q1 onwards. We stop in 2010, because afterwards there has been
a secular decline in wholesale funding of the shadow banking sector. We
describe the data in Appendix 3.A. A notable deviation from the business
cycle literature is that instead of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, we det-
rend the data using the routine proposed by Hamilton (2017), which avoids
the spurious correlations that can arise with HP-filtered time series.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.3 report unconditional standard devi-
ations of variables relative to output for the data and the model.20 We
calibrate the model such that output volatility roughly matches that in the
data. Consumption is less volatile than output both in the model and the
20In the first row we report the standard deviation of output instead.
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σ(X)/σ(Y ) ρ(X, Y ) ρ(Xt, Xt−1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Output (Yt) 0.027 0.029 1.000 1.000 0.898 0.931
Consumption (CHt ) 0.929 0.527 0.916 0.864 0.887 0.961
Investment (I˜t) 4.368 1.632 0.943 0.966 0.886 0.905
Deposits (Dt+1) 2.449 1.657 0.759 0.895 0.891 0.946
Wholesale Lending (Bt+1) 10.379 9.606 0.187 0.625 0.853 0.963
Deposit Rate (RDt+1) 0.648 0.104 0.431 -0.494 0.900 0.898
Wholesale Funding Rate (RBt+1) 0.532 0.136 0.249 -0.665 0.599 0.889
Return on Equity (RKt /Qt−1) 6.385 1.089 0.379 0.184 0.829 0.445
Table 3.3: Untargeted business cycle moments.
data. Investment is more volatile. The volatility of deposits and the vola-
tility of wholesale lending match the data quite well. In terms of interest
rates, the volatility of the deposit interest rate, the wholesale funding rate
and the return on equity is a bit low relative to the data, which is not
surprising given that we use a simple log utility function.
Columns (3) and (4) report the contemporaneous correlations of all va-
riables with output. As in the data, consumption, investment and deposits
are strongly pro-cyclical. The most problematic statistic is the correlation
between wholesale lending and output, which is positive in the model, but
only weakly positive in the data. This seems puzzling, since one of the
stylized facts of the financial crises is a contraction in wholesale lending.
There is a clear trend break in the data around the year 2002 for wholesale
lending, which is not properly picked up by either the HP-filter or the Ha-
milton filter. This trend break may be responsible for our counter-intuitive
observation of acyclical wholesale lending. The deposit rate is fairly acycli-
cal both in the model and in the data, and the return on equity is weakly
pro-cyclical.
Finally, columns (5) and (6) show that the model can roughly match
the autocorrelations in the data, with the exception of the return on capital
being too weakly autocorrelated in the model.
3.5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how a regulator can improve financial stability
through retail bank capital regulation. We will also discuss the steady state
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effects of bank capital regulation, in which capital requirements reduce
financial intermediation. This leads to the trade-off between the frequency
of bank runs and financial intermediation that is central to our results. We
determine the quantitative importance of this trade-off in section 3.6.
3.5.1 How Can Bank Capital Regulation Increase Wel-
fare?
There are two key inefficiencies in the model which retail bank capital re-
quirements can address: First, retail banks do not internalize the effect of
their leverage and asset allocation decisions on the probability of bank runs.
We call this the run externality. Naturally, this externality arises only in
models with endogenous bank runs. Second, there is a feedback loop bet-
ween the incentive constraints of the banks and the price of capital, which
is also not internalized by the retail banks. This feedback loop increases the
frequency and severity of both bank runs and business cycle fluctuations.
We call this the capital price externality. Bank capital requirements can
address these inefficiencies in two ways: First, bank capital requirements
force retail banks to reduce leverage. Since they cannot issue equity to hou-
seholds, they will instead intermediate fewer funds to the shadow banking
sector. Second, if retail banks build up higher capital buffers during normal
times, they can absorb the liquidated capital of the shadow banking sector
during a bank run more easily and therefore stabilize the liquidation price
of capital.
The Run Externality
At first glance, it might appear to be odd that retail banks do not inter-
nalize the impact of their leverage choice on bank runs. After all it is the
retail banks which initiate the run. We consider only systemic bank runs,
in which the whole retail banking sector runs on the whole shadow banking
sector. The probability of such a systemic bank run depends only on aggre-
gate equilibrium prices and quantities and not on bank-specific variables.
Hence, from the perspective of an individual retail bank, the probability
of bank runs is exogenous. As we show below, while retail banks charge a
premium on wholesale lending for the expected loss in a bank run, they do
not internalize that by increasing leverage and thereby increasing lending
to the shadow banking sector, they increase the probability of a bank run
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in the next period.
The equilibrium choices kRt+1, b
R
t+1 and d
R
t+1 of the retail bank are deter-
mined by either the incentive constraint 3.3.14 or the capital requirement
3.3.17, the balance sheet constraint 3.3.13 and one first order condition.
Define ΩRt+1 = V
R
t+1/n
R
t+1. This expression corresponds to the average, and,
due to the linearity of the banks problem in net worth, marginal value
of an additional unit of net worth. Substituting the incentive constraint
and the balance sheet constraint into equation 3.3.18 for kRt+1 and d
R
t+1 and
differentiating with respect to bRt+1, we get that
Et
[
(1− pt+1) ΩRt+1
(
RKt+1
Qt + fRt
−RDt+1
)
+
∫ ξ¯t+1
0
ΩR∗t+1
(
RK∗t+1
Qt + fRt
−RDt+1
)
dF (ξ)
]
=
1
γ
Et
[
(1− pt+1) ΩRt+1(RBt+1 −RDt+1) +
∫ ξ¯t+1
0
ΩR∗t+1(xt+1R
B
t+1 −RDt+1)dF (ξ)
]
.
(3.5.1)
We derive this condition in Appendix 3.C.2. It essentially states that retail
banks must be indifferent between lending on the wholesale market and
holding capital. The return on wholesale lending is lower than the return on
capital holdings, because the retail bank can use more leverage to finance
wholesale lending, i.e. since γ < 1. Both the ex post return on capital
holdings and the ex post return on wholesale lending are lower if a run
occurs in the next period: The return on capital holdings is lower, because
those capital holdings are valued at the liquidation price if a bank run
occurs, since
RKt+1 = r
K
t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1 > rKt+1 + (1− δ)Q∗t+1 = RK∗t+1.
The return on wholesale lending is lower, because retail banks will not
recover the full amount when a bank run occurs, since xt+1 < 1 by definition
of the bank run equilibrium. Rearranging the first order condition 3.5.1
yields the following expression for the ex ante (safe) return on retail bank
93
lending:
RBt+1 = γEt
[
(1− pt+1) ΩRt+1
RKt+1
Qt + fRt
+
∫ ξ¯t+1
0
ΩR∗t+1
RK∗t+1
Qt + fRt
dF (ξ)
]
+ (1− γ)RDt+1Et
[
(1− pt+1) ΩRt+1 +
∫ ξ¯t+1
0
ΩR∗t+1dF (ξ)
]
×
(
Et
[
(1− pt+1) ΩRt+1 +
∫ ξ¯t+1
0
ΩR∗t+1xt+1dF (ξ)
])−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Liquidation Loss Premium
(3.5.2)
Consider first the case in which bank runs are unanticipated, i.e. Et [pt+1] =
0. In this case, the ex-post return on wholesale lending is safe. Then,
equation 3.5.2 reduces to
RBt+1 = γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1
RKt+1
Qt+fRt
]
Et
[
ΩRt+1
] + (1− γ)RDt+1.
The fraction γ of wholesale lending is financed in the same way as capital
holdings and must yield a return equal to the expected return on capital.
The fraction 1 − γ of wholesale lending is non-divertable and can there-
fore be fully financed with deposits. Since retail banks are competitive,
this fraction must therefore yield a return which corresponds to the return
on deposits. The full equation 3.5.2 essentially includes an additional pre-
mium for the liquidation loss in the denominator plus an adjustment to the
marginal value of an additional unit of equity, ΩRt+1, which varies between
bank run and no-run states. Importantly, however, retail banks do not
incorporate how their decisions change the probability of a bank run, that
is, in their eyes Et
[
∂pt+1/∂φ
R
t
]
= 0. Therefore, when leveraging up and
expanding their balance sheet, retail banks invest too much in wholesale
lending from a social welfare perspective.
Effects of a Static Capital Requirement on the Bank Run Proba-
bility
Figure 3.3 shows that a constant retail bank capital requirement can sub-
stantially increase the probability of a bank run in the next period. It is
therefore not an appropriate policy to address the bank run externality.
In this figure, we plot the next period bank run probability Et[pt+1] and
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Figure 3.3: General equilibrium effects of a constant retail bank capital
requirement on the bank run probability.
the two components of the bank run condition 3.3.30 as a function of φ¯Rt .
We set KHt , K
R
t , K
S
t , Bt, Dt, R
D
t and R
B
t at the steady state level and
report results for two values of Zt, one unconditional standard deviation
above and below the unconditional mean, respectively. We fix a level of
φ¯Rt , recompute the general equilibrium given this fixed level of φ¯
R
t and then
compute the statistics of interest.
First, in Panel (a), we report the bank run probability as a function of
φ¯Rt . The solid line depicts the bank run probability if productivity is one
standard deviation below the mean, the dotted line if productivity is one
standard deviation above the mean. We mark the policies the retail banks
choose in the absence of regulation by the thin vertical solid and dashed
lines, respectively. Note that the market-imposed leverage ratio of retail
banks φRt is counter -cyclical, because during an expansion, retail banks
will increase wholesale lending relative to capital holdings. Since wholesale
lending enters leverage only with weight γ, this shift in the composition of
assets reduces the leverage of retail banks.
As we can see in Panel (a) of Figure 3.3, imposing a higher capital re-
quirement can increase the future probability of a bank run. By increasing
the capital requirement from 0 to about 20 percent, the probability of a
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bank run increases from 2.5 percent to around 3 percent per quarter in a
recession, and from 0.6 percent to about 1.1 percent in an expansion. For
low values of 1/φ¯Rt , there is no effect, since the capital requirement is never
binding. There is a small effect even before the capital requirement starts
binding in the current period, since it will already bind in some states of
the world in the next period.
To see through which channels the capital requirements impact the
run probability, we decompose the bank run condition given by equation
3.3.30 into two components. The first component, RK∗t+1/R
B
t+1, is the spread
between asset and liability returns for shadow banks during a bank run.
We show in Panel (b) that increasing the capital requirement reduces this
spread, meaning that it is less likely that shadow banks can repay their
liabilities. This effect is mostly due to a lower liquidation price of capital.
The second component, KSt+1/Bt+1, is the assets-to-debt ratio of the shadow
banks. This ratio is inversely related to the tightness of the incentive
constraint of shadow banks. The higher the leverage of shadow banks, the
is lower the ratio of assets to liabilities. A higher leverage ratio of retail
banks hence tightens the incentive constraint of shadow banks. We can
see in Panel (c) that the reduction in the first component less than one
for one offset by an increase in the second component. Because of this
under-adjustment, the probability of a bank run increases as the capital
ratio of retail banks decreases. The reason for the strong increase in the
bank run probability is that the regulator imposes a less counter-cyclical
capital requirement than the market. This forces retail banks to delever
more during a bank run compared to the case of no regulation, which in
turn lowers the future liquidation price of capital and hence increases the
bank run probability. Therefore, the regulator should optimally relax the
capital requirement as much as possible ex post during a bank run to reduce
the probability of a bank run ex ante.
Whether the bank run probability increases or decreases depends the-
oretically on whether KSt+1/B
S
t+1 increases more or less than R
K∗
t+1/R
B
t+1
increases. This in turn depends on how much the incentive constraint of
the shadow bank tightens in response to an reduction in the future net
worth of the shadow bank. However note that the capital to debt ratio is
determined one period in advance by the incentive constraint. Hence, it
takes the expectation of creditors over no-run and run states into account,
while the profitability during a run is determined in the period of the run.
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Therefore, there will likely be an under-adjustment of the capital to debt
ratio ex ante such that the profitability effect dominates ex post.
Effects of a Dynamic Capital Requirement on the Bank Run Pro-
bability
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Figure 3.4: General equilibrium effects of a run-contingent retail bank ca-
pital requirement on the bank run probability.
We show the effects of a policy that imposes a capital requirement only
during the no-run equilibrium in Figure 3.4. This policy is successful in eli-
minating bank runs: Panel (a) shows that imposing a capital requirement
of 20 percent can eliminate bank runs both in recession and in expansion
states. Panel (b) shows that the lower bank run probability is due to a
higher spread between the returns on assets and liabilities of shadow banks
during a bank run. This effect is primarily driven by a higher liquidation
price of capital: As the capital requirement is relaxed during a run, retail
banks can increase leverage and will hence expand their capital holdings,
the only asset they have access to in the case of a bank run. This hig-
her investment demand will increase the liquidation price of capital. From
Panel (c), we can see that this policy increases shadow bank leverage initi-
ally, because a lower bank run probability relaxes the incentive constraint
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of shadow banks by raising their continuation value, allowing them to use
more leverage and hence a lower ratio of assets to liabilities. However,
leverage also decreases for capital requirements higher than 12 percent.
This reversal occurs because for a small enough bank run probability, a
reduction in the bank run probability only relaxes the incentive constraint
little. In addition, a higher capital requirement still tightens the incentive
constraint of shadow banks during normal times.
In summary, agents fail to internalize the effects of their decision on
the probability of a bank run. In particular, the probability of a bank
run is very sensitive to the capital ratio of retail banks, especially if the
economy is in a recession. Therefore, retail bank capital requirements can
be an effective way of reducing shadow bank runs, but only if the regulator
relaxes them during a bank run.
The Capital Price Externality
Due to the incentive constraints 3.3.8 and 3.3.14, the extent to which banks
can leverage their equity depends on the aggregate capital price. A low
capital price lowers the maximum leverage ratio of shadow banks, since the
value of diverting assets today decreases less than the continuation value.
Therefore, banks have to deleverage, which lowers their desired level of
investment. This lower level of investment in turn leads to a lower capital
price. The model therefore exhibits a feedback loop, the classical financial
accelerator effect, which operates through the endogenous capital price and
the incentive constraints.21
An inefficiency arises, because banks do not internalize the effects of
their current borrowing decisions on the future aggregate price of capital.
By borrowing less during times of high capital prices, banks could reduce
the co-movement between the tightness of the incentive constraint and the
price of capital and thereby reduce the strength of this feedback loop.22
This feedback loop is especially prominent in the economy with bank runs,
because bank runs are more likely to occur and more severe if the capital
price is more volatile.
A regulatory policy that is designed to restrict deposit lending during
21The financial accelerator effect was first introduced in the business cycle literature
by Bernanke et al. (1999).
22This mechanism is well known in the literature, see for example Lorenzoni (2008)
for theoretical work and Bianchi (2011) for numerical work that studies this pecuniary
externality.
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good economic conditions and ease deposit lending during bad economic
conditions can increase welfare by mitigating the feedback loop and redu-
cing the frequency and severity of bank runs. In contrast, a policy that
restricts lending in all states of the world equally may actually reduce wel-
fare, because such a policy acts as a tighter borrowing constraint and makes
the feedback loop more severe.
To see this, compare the incentive constraint 3.3.14 of the retail banks
to the case of a constant capital requirement 3.3.17. We get:
ψ
[
(Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1
] ≤ βEt [V Rt+1]
ψ
[
(Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1
] ≤ φ¯nRt
While the left hand sides are identical, the right hand sides differ. The
incentive constraint has the continuation value of the retail bank on the
right-hand side, while the capital requirement has the current net worth
times some constant on the right-hand side. In particular, rewriting the
incentive constraint slightly, we get
ψ((Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1) ≤ βEt
[
ΩRt+1
nRt+1
nRt
]
nRt .
Using that both the marginal value of net worth ΩRt+1 and the net worth
growth rate nRt+1/n
R
t are independent from n
R
t , which we show in Appendix
3.C.2, we can state that the derivative of the right hand side of the incentive
constraint with respect to nRt is given by βEt
[
ΩRt+1
nRt+1
nRt
]
, which in our
calibration is counter -cyclical. The derivative of the right hand side of the
capital requirement with respect to nRt is φ¯, which is constant. Hence, the
market imposed leverage partially offsets fluctuations in net worth of the
retail bank, which reduces the pro-cyclicality of the retail bank balance
sheet. The constant regulatory capital requirement does not do this.
Effects of a Static Capital Requirement on the Capital Price
In Figure 3.5, we illustrate that a higher constant retail bank capital re-
quirement 1/φ¯Rt reduces both the expected future capital price and the
expected future liquidation price of capital. We follow the same procedure
to compute these statistics as in Figure 3.3. The expected future capital
price Et [Qt+1] in Panel (a) incorporates the probability that a bank run
may occur in the next period.
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Figure 3.5: General equilibrium effects of a constant capital requirement
on the future capital price.
The thick, solid line in the left panel of Figure 3.5 is the expected future
capital price as a function of φ¯Rt if productivity Zt today is one unconditi-
onal standard deviation below the mean. The thin, solid line denotes the
level of φRt that retail banks actually choose in equilibrium. We report the
expected capital price relative to the expected capital price under the ac-
tually chosen policy, which in a recession implies a capital ratio of around 9
percent. Imposing a capital requirement 1/φ¯Rt of 20 percent decreases the
future capital price by more than 5 percent. The unconditional quarterly
standard deviation of the capital price in the simulated model is about 0.6
percent, so this is a large change. The reason for this effect is that the re-
gulator tightens the financial constraint of the retail banking sector, which
forces them to deleverage, reducing both lending to final goods producers
and shadow banks. Retail banks and shadow banks are forced to contract
their balance sheets, which reduces investment and the price of capital.
The thick, dashed line in the left panel of Figure 3.5 is the same function,
except when productivity is one standard deviation above the mean. In this
case, retail banks choose a higher capital ratio, which is shown by the thin,
dashed line. Increasing the capital ratio has a weaker effect on the future
price of capital. Imposing a capital requirement of 20 percent reduces the
capital price by only 4 percent. Looking at the right panel, we see that
imposing a constant capital requirement has a similar effect on the future
liquidation price of capital.
Effects of a Dynamic Capital Requirement on the Capital Price
In Figure 3.6, we show the effects of a capital requirement that is imposed
during the no-run equilibrium, but relaxed to zero during a bank run. This
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Figure 3.6: General equilibrium effects of a run-contingent retail bank ca-
pital requirement on the future capital price.
policy has a weaker negative effect on the expected future capital price,
because it has a strong positive effect on the future liquidation price of
capital. In addition, this policy reduces the frequency of bank runs, which
in turn lowers the probability that assets are valued at the liquidation price
of capital, increasing the capital price even further. Contrasting Panels (a)
of Figures 3.5 and 3.6, we can see that by setting a capital requirement of
20 percent that is relaxed during a bank run, the regulator still reduces the
capital price, but by only 4 instead of more than 5 percent if he does not
relax the capital requirement during a run. Panel (b) shows that a higher
capital requirement now strongly increases the liquidation price of capital,
both in recessions and expansions: Imposing a capital requirement of 20
percent increases the liquidation price of capital by 1.5 percent relative to
the model without regulation. This is because by restricting lending today,
the regulator increases the capital buffer of retail banks during a bank run,
which increases their ability to increase leverage and therefore their capital
holdings during a bank run. As a consequence, the liquidation price is
higher compared to the baseline model.
In summary, the retail bank capital ratio can affect future capital pri-
ces substantially, so a policy aimed at influencing this retail bank capital
ratio can mitigate the financial accelerator effect. In particular, the regu-
lator should tighten the capital requirement during expansions and relax
it during recessions and bank runs to stabilize the capital price and reduce
both the financial accelerator effect during normal business cycles and the
probability of large bank runs.
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3.5.2 The Steady State Effect of Retail Bank Capital
Requirements
In this section, we explore the steady state implications of retail bank ca-
pital requirements. We characterize the non-stochastic steady state equili-
brium absent of bank runs in Appendix 3.B. In the steady state, the capital
adjustment cost is zero, therefore the price of capital Q equals 1. We denote
steady state variables without time subscript.
In the following subsections, we conduct comparative statics analysis
of the impact of varying bank capital regulation on retail banks, i.e. the
consequence of changing the policy parameter 1
φ¯R
while keeping other pa-
rameters constant.
Capital Allocation and the Aggregate Capital Stock
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Figure 3.7: Steady state effect of a retail bank capital requirement on the
capital allocation and the aggregate capital stock.
Other things being equal, under a tighter capital requirement, retail
banks are faced with a higher financing cost as they have to use more
costly capital and less relatively cheap deposit from the households. This
higher financing cost is further passed on by the retail banks to the shadow
banks. Therefore, the required return for capital investment from the ban-
king sector increases. On the other hand, the required return for capital
investment for households remains the same. As a result, the share of capi-
tal held by households increases. The first order condition regarding KHt+1
in steady state is given by (B.5 in the appendix):
RK =
1
β
(
1 + ηH
KH
K
)
.
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Hence the return on capital, RK , increases as the households hold a
larger share of the capital stock. As investment becomes more costly, the
aggregate capital stock and aggregate output decrease.
Figure 3.7 shows the comparative statics for the distribution of capital
among households, retail banks and shadow banks in Panel (a) and the
aggregate capital stock in Panel (b). We vary the minimum capital requi-
rement between 0 and 100 percent. The solid line is the share of capital
held by households, the dotted line is the share of retail bank capital hol-
dings and the dashed line is the share of shadow bank capital holdings.
For a retail bank capital requirement below 10 percent, indicated by the
left vertical line, the capital requirement is not binding and the retail bank
leverage ratio is determined by its incentive constraint.
For a retail bank capital requirement between 10 and 25 percent, the ca-
pital requirement is binding and retail banks will invest in both capital and
wholesale lending. As the capital requirement increases in this range, retail
banks substitute away from capital lending to wholesale lending. This is
because an additional unit of capital lending requires 1/φ¯ units of equity fi-
nance, while an additional unit of wholesale lending only requires γ/φ¯ units
of equity finance. If the regulator tightens the retail bank capital requi-
rement, wholesale lending will therefore become relatively more attractive
for retail banks. Hence, direct capital holdings by retail banks decrease,
and capital holdings by shadow banks increase in this range.
For a capital requirement of above 25 percent, indicated by the right
vertical line, retail banks will only invest into wholesale lending. If the
regulator increases the capital requirement in this range, retail banks can
no longer substitute away from capital holdings and therefore can only
reduce wholesale lending. Consequently, both retail and shadow banks will
reduce their assets in this range.
In Panel (b), we plot the aggregate capital stock relative to the unregu-
lated economy as a function of the capital requirement. The capital stock
is very sensitive to the capital requirement: If retail banks were required to
finance themselves using 100 percent equity, the capital stock would reduce
by more than 40 percent. The reason for this strong effect is that banks in
this economy cannot raise outside equity from households. Hence, a higher
capital requirement forces retail banks to sharply cut the asset side of their
balance sheet, which in turn forces the shadow banks to reduce their assets
as well. If banks could issue equity to households, their required return on
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equity would not increase monotonically with a higher capital requirement,
which would imply a lower bound on the aggregate capital stock.
Leverage and the Coverage Ratio of Shadow Banks
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Figure 3.8: Steady state effect of a retail bank capital requirement on
leverage and the coverage ratio.
In Figure 3.8, we report how leverage of retail and shadow banks and
the coverage ratio of shadow banks change with the capital requirement.
We define the steady state coverage ratio of shadow banks as the ratio of
beginning of period assets over liabilities by shadow banks, i.e. as
RKKS
RBBS
=
RK
RB
φS
φS − 1 .
The coverage ratio is an interesting statistic, because it indicates how run-
prone the shadow banking sector is. While it does not exactly correspond
to the recovery rate of wholesale lending by the retail banks after a bank
run, a given fall in the liquidation price of capital can ceteris paribus trigger
a bank run more often if the coverage ratio is low.
Mechanically, an increase in the retail bank capital requirement lowers
the leverage ratio of retail banks. For shadow banks, there are two cases.
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As long as retail banks can substitute away from capital holdings towards
wholesale lending, higher retail bank capital requirements increase the le-
verage ratio of shadow banks. When retail banks lend only on the wholesale
market, regulating retail banks reduces shadow bank leverage.
The coverage ratio decreases as soon as the retail bank capital requi-
rement becomes binding and increases as soon as retail banks exclusively
lend on the wholesale funding market. This has a significant effect on the
bank run probability: In the baseline model, the economy could sustain
a drop in the liquidation price of capital of at most 5.5 percent without
a bank run being triggered. With fully equity-financed retail banks, the
economy could sustain a drop in the liquidation price of capital of more
than 8.5 percent without a self-fulfilling bank run being triggered.23
The coverage ratio is decreasing in the leverage of shadow banks and
increasing in the excess return RK − RB. Looking at the right upper and
lower panel of Figure 3.8, we find that the increase in the coverage ratio
is primarily driven by the lower leverage ratio of shadow banks, because
RK −RB is decreasing in the capital requirement throughout.
Consumption and Welfare
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Figure 3.9: Steady state effect of a retail bank capital requirements on
consumption.
Figure 3.9 shows how retail bank capital requirements affect consump-
tion and hence welfare of agents in steady state. Households consume less
in a regime with a higher capital requirement. For households this is be-
cause they can save less through deposits and make more inefficient direct
23The formula to calculate this threshold price is Q∗ =
(
RBB
KS
− rK
)
1
1−δ .
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investment. Also, aggregate output decreases strongly due to the decrease
in the aggregate capital stock, which lowers wages.
Retail banks and shadow banks, on the other hand, enjoy higher con-
sumption under a higher capital requirement. This is because competitive
retail banks do not internalize that by lending less to final goods produ-
cers they can increase the returns on their assets, RK/(Q + fR) and RB,
relative to the return on their liabilities, RD, and thereby increase their
net worth. Shadow banks receive a consumption gain as long as they can
increase leverage, and a decrease in consumption once retail banks can no
longer substitute from direct lending to wholesale lending.
Overall, because in our calibration consumption of retail and shadow
banks is very small relative to household consumption, higher retail bank
capital requirements lead to a welfare loss. However, by reducing the co-
verage ratio of shadow banks, retail bank capital requirements can reduce
the susceptibility of the economy to shadow bank runs.
3.6 Counterfactuals
We conduct two experiments in this section. First, we compute the wel-
fare cost of bank runs from the perspective of households, retail banks and
shadow banks. This experiment gives us an upper bound on the positive
effect of a policy designed to reduce bank runs. Second, we consider diffe-
rent rules for capital requirements, both in an economy with and without
shadow bank runs.
3.6.1 Welfare Computation
We compute welfare in consumption equivalent terms. We use the reali-
zed consumption sequences to compute welfare. For households, welfare
computation is straightforward. For the banks, we include both incumbent
and newly entering banks into our welfare measure. Since they have linear
utility, the regulator can then simply consider the welfare of each of the
banking sectors as a whole. The utility of banking sector J , J ∈ {R, S},
as a whole if net worth is constant over time is given by
UJ = σJ
NJ − υJK
1− σJ + β(1− σ
J)UJ , (3.6.1)
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Baseline, No Runs Baseline, With Runs % ∆
CH 0.824 0.822 0.203
CR 0.576 0.570 1.055
CS 0.205 0.189 8.467
Table 3.4: Agents’ willingness to pay to avoid bank runs in the baseline
model.
with consumption given by CJ = σJ N
J−υJK
1−σJ . The consumption equivalent
welfare of banking sector J is therefore
CJequiv =
[
1− β(1− σJ)]UJ . (3.6.2)
3.6.2 The Welfare Cost of Bank Runs
Before investigating the welfare effects of bank capital requirements, we
want to know how costly bank runs are in our calibrated model. For this
purpose, we conduct the following experiment: We first simulate the model
with the liquidation cost shock. We compute the permanent consumption
equivalent of welfare for each type of agent in this economy. Next, we
simulate a model without bank runs by setting the liquidation value shock
to a large enough number. We then calculate the permanent consumption
equivalent for each type of agent in this economy without bank runs. The
difference between the two consumption equivalents is the welfare gain if
bank runs are completely eliminated, expressed in permanent consumption
equivalent units.
Table 3.4 shows how much households, retail banks and shadow banks
are willing to pay to avoid bank runs. We report the results as percentage
change in the consumption equivalent of welfare from eliminating bank
runs. If welfare in consumption equivalent terms is given by CJ , the per-
centage change in welfare for agent J is
CJNo Runs − CJRuns
CJRuns
.
Shadow banks gain the most from eliminating bank runs and would be
willing accept an 8.5 percent permanent decrease in consumption to avoid
bank runs. Bank runs are also very costly for retail banks, who would
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pay 1.1 percent of their permanent consumption to eliminate bank runs.
Households gain about 0.2 percent in quarterly consumption equivalent
terms from the elimination of bank runs.
To compare our results to the literature, Chatterjee and Corbae (2007)
estimate a consumption equivalent welfare gain from eliminating the like-
lihood of economic crises to be around 0.97 percent.24 Their estimated
contribution of a reduction in consumption volatility to this welfare gain is
around 0.196 percent in consumption equivalent terms, which is compara-
ble to the welfare gain of households in our model. Their depression state
has a similar frequency and similar output effects to a financial crisis in our
model: The unconditional probability of a depression state in their model
is 9.75 percent, whereas the unconditional probability of a financial crisis
state in our model is around 8 percent, which is also comparable. They
assume however a constant relative risk aversion of 3, which is much higher
than the value of 1 that we use.
Barro (2009) estimates a welfare gain of 4% in output equivalent terms
for a representative household with log utility from eliminating consump-
tion disasters like World War II. In his case, disasters however have an
output cost of almost 30 percent on average, which is one order of magni-
tude larger than the output loss from a bank run in our model. Overall,
we conclude that the welfare gain from eliminating bank runs is sizable for
all agents in the economy.
3.6.3 Policy Experiments
We discuss two different rules for setting the capital requirement 1
φ¯t
. First,
we consider the simple case of a constant capital requirement:
1
φ¯t
=
1
φ¯
. (3.6.3)
Second, we look at the case where the regulator can condition the capital
requirement on whether or not the economy is in a run equilibrium. Denote
as 1Runt an indicator variable that is 1 if the economy experiences a run in
period t and 0 otherwise. Then, we can write a capital requirement that
24Chatterjee and Corbae (2007) define economic crises as depressions of the same
magnitude of the Great Depression in terms of increase in unemployment.
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conditions on the no-run state as
1
φ¯t
=
1
φ¯
(1− 1Runt ). (3.6.4)
Such a requirement has the advantage that the regulator can impose higher
equity buffers of retail banks during normal times, which can be used to
absorb the liquidated capital from shadow banks during a run, thereby
pushing up the liquidation price of capital. In this sense, the more access
to deposits retail banks have during a banking crisis, the higher the fire
sale price of the capital will be ex post, and the less likely bank runs would
happen ex ante. Therefore, the optimal capital requirement in face of a
bank run is its lower bound, i.e. zero. In what follows we focus on this
specific run-contingent capital requirement.
For each policy experiment, we are interested in two questions. i) How
effective is the policy in reducing bank runs? ii) What is the welfare effect
of the policy?
Constant Capital Requirements
First, we discuss the case of a constant capital requirement. Panel (a) of
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Figure 3.10: Probability of bank runs with a constant minimum capital
requirement.
Figure 3.10 shows that the frequency of bank runs increases as the minimum
capital requirement increases. The reason is that net worth of retail banks
decreases during a bank run, which lowers their leverage capacity under a
binding capital requirement and hence their ability to absorb the liquidated
capital of the shadow banking sector. Therefore, this capital requirement
has a negative effect on the liquidation price of capital, as shown in panel
109
0.05 0.1 0.15
-6
-4
-2
0
2
%
 
 
vs
 B
as
el
in
e
(a) Welfare, HH
With Runs
No Runs
Steady State
0.05 0.1 0.15
-20
0
20
40
60
%
 
 
vs
 B
as
el
in
e
(b) Welfare, RB
0.05 0.1 0.15
-2
0
2
4
6
8
%
 
 
vs
 B
as
el
in
e
(c) Welfare, SB
0.05 0.1 0.15
-30
-20
-10
0
10
%
 
 
vs
 B
as
el
in
e
(d) Utilitarian Welfare Function
Figure 3.11: Welfare with a constant minimum capital requirement.
(b). Since the higher constant capital requirement implies that the capital
price is more volatile, as shown in panel (c), bank runs become more likely.
In Figure 3.11, we show the welfare effects of a constant capital require-
ment. Welfare in panels (a) to (c) is measured in consumption-equivalent
units. The utilitarian welfare function in panel (d) is expressed in utility.
On the x-axis, we vary the capital requirement between 0 percent and 20
percent. On the y-axis, we show the percentage change in welfare relative
to the capital requirement of 0 percent, which is never binding. We report
the percentage change in welfare relative to the model without regulation
for each type of agents as well as for the sum of utilities, which corresponds
to a utilitarian welfare function. We show the results for three different
versions of the model. The dashed line is the steady state equilibrium.
The dotted line is the model without bank runs and the solid line is the
model with bank runs. The purpose of including the steady state is to
illustrate the strong steady state effect, and the purpose of including the
No Runs case is to illustrate the isolated effect of the capital requirement
on the capital price externality that is also present in the model without
runs.
First, we can see that in steady state, a higher capital requirement
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reduces the welfare of households, but increases the welfare of retail and
shadow banks. Overall, measured in consumption equivalent units, capital
requirements are welfare reducing in steady state. Retail and shadow banks
gain in welfare terms, because the return on their assets increases more than
the return on their liabilities, which increases the net worth of incumbent
banks.
Second, we can see that a constant capital requirement reduces welfare
more in the dynamic model without bank runs relative to the steady state.
This is because this constant capital requirement amplifies the effect of the
pecuniary externality, as discussed in section 3.5.1.
Third, we can see that a constant capital requirement reduces welfare
even more in the dynamic model with bank runs compared to the dynamic
model without bank runs. The reason is that, as can be seen in Figure 3.10,
in addition to amplifying the effect of the pecuniary externality, a higher
capital requirement increases the frequency and severity of bank runs. To
summarize the results: From a macro-prudential perspective, constant ca-
pital requirements not only distort the allocation of capital, which leads to
a steady state welfare loss, but they also amplify the effects of the pecuniary
externality during normal times and increase the frequency and severity of
bank runs. While constant capital requirements may be beneficial at the
microprudential level, our results indicate that macroprudential regulation
of the retail banking sector should not use constant capital requirements.
Run-Contingent Capital Requirements
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Figure 3.12: Probability of bank runs with a run-contingent capital requi-
rement.
In Figures 3.12 and 3.13, we show the effects of a capital requirement
that is only imposed if the economy is in the no-run equilibrium. First, we
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can see in Panel (a) in Figure 3.12 that by implementing a run-contingent
capital requirement, the regulator can reduce the probability of bank runs
substantially. As we show in Panels (b) and (c), the main channel through
which the regulator achieves this effect is through a higher liquidation price
of capital: Increasing the capital requirement to 20 percent increases the li-
quidation price of capital by more than 2 percent. While the run-contingent
capital requirement also increases the volatility of the liquidation price of
capital, this effect is more than offset by the higher mean of the liquidation
price. Nevertheless, a policy which is designed to offset cyclical fluctuations
in the price of capital may lead to superior welfare outcomes.
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Figure 3.13: Welfare with a run-contingent capital requirement.
The welfare results for the steady state case and the case without bank
runs are the same as in Figure 3.11. As in Figure 3.11, welfare in panels (a)
to (c) is measured in consumption equivalent units. The welfare function
in panel (d) is measured in utility. Focusing on the welfare results for
the model with bank runs, we can see that a run-contingent capital requi-
rement can undo the negative externality of capital requirements on the
probability of bank runs. In fact, welfare of shadow banks increases more
in the model with runs compared to the model without runs. However, the
capital requirements are still overall welfare reducing, and more so in the
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dynamic model with runs than in the steady state. This is because the
run-contingent capital requirement still increases the pro-cyclicality of the
retail bank balance sheet constraint during normal times, which amplifies
the pecuniary externality from the capital price and therefore the welfare
cost of business cycles.
The intuition for the better performance of the run-contingent capital
requirement relative to the constant capital requirement is as follows: A
higher capital requirement increases the net worth of retail banks, which
in turn increases the continuation value of the retail banks. This means
that the incentive constraint and hence the market imposed borrowing
constraint is relaxed. If the regulator now removes the capital requirement
during a shadow bank run, the retail banks can increase leverage relative
to the case without regulation. Hence, they can absorb the liquidated
capital of the shadow banks more easily, which increases the liquidation
price of capital. Finally, a higher liquidation price of capital reduces the
ex post cost of realized bank runs and reduces the ex ante probability of
bank runs. The success of this policy is illustrated by a relatively higher
welfare gain from regulation in the model with bank runs for all agents
compared to the steady state model. However, the steady state cost of
bank capital regulation is still dominant, such that capital regulation overall
lowers welfare. This high cost relies on the extreme assumption that banks
can never raise outside equity from households, no even in the long run.
Removing this constraint may yield a significantly less pessimistic cost of
bank capital requirements.
3.7 Conclusion
We study the macroeconomic effects of retail bank capital regulation in
a quantitative model with regulated retail banks and unregulated shadow
banks. In our model, financial crises occur in the form of runs on shadow
banks. There is a role for regulation in the model because banks do not
internalize that their decisions affect the likelihood of financial crises, which
leads to over-borrowing during normal times.
From the regulators’ perspective, the trade-off that determines the op-
timal capital requirement is: On the one hand, higher capital requirements
increase the ability of retail banks to absorb liquidation losses during a
shadow bank run, thereby reducing the frequency and severity of bank runs.
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For this effect, it is crucial that capital requirements are relaxed during a
bank run. A higher constant capital requirement instead leads to more
bank runs. On the other hand, tightening capital requirements reduces the
steady state capital stock and output due to less financial intermediation.
We conclude that capital requirements on depository institutions are an
effective policy instrument to reduce banking crises and increase financial
stability. However, they can also create substantial costs for the economy,
especially when capital accumulation is endogenous and equity issuance
is very costly for banks. Therefore, the optimal capital requirement in a
model with endogenous capital accumulation should be substantially lower
than that in a model with exogenous capital.
An interesting extension of our model would be to include sticky prices
and nominal debt. A bank run could then result in a Fisherian debt de-
flation spiral: The initial effects of the run depresses goods prices, which
worsens the real debt burden of banks, which in turn depresses investment,
and so on. Bank runs can then lead to episodes that cause the economy
to be at the lower bound for the nominal policy interest rate. In this case,
the possibility of bank runs will also affect how monetary policy should be
conducted.
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3.A Data
We measure output Y using real GDP, investment I˜ using real gross pri-
vate domestic investment and household consumption CH using personal
consumption expenditures from the U.S. National Income and Product Ac-
counts.
For the deposit rate RD, we use the real effective federal funds rate, pro-
vided by the Federal Reserve Board, minus a four quarter moving average
of the annualized inflation rate. We use the U.S. GDP deflator to con-
struct the inflation rate. For the wholesale funding market rate RB, we
follow Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016), who use the 90 day as-
set backed commercial paper rate, which is also provided by the Federal
Reserve Board, minus a four quarter moving average of the annualized in-
flation rate. For the return on capital RKt /Qt−1, we use the Wilshire 5000
index, a return index, which we also deflate with the GDP deflator.
For the construction of wholesale lending B and deposit lending D, we
follow the procedure in Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016). We take
the data from the financial accounts of the U.S., provided by the Federal
Reserve Board. We calculate deposits as the sum of the asset holdings of
households and nonfinancial business of
1. checkable deposits and currency,
2. total time and savings deposits,
3. money market mutual fund shares, and
4. mutual fund shares.
The shadow banking sector comprises the following groups:
1. GSEs and federally related mortgage pools
2. Funding corporations
3. Finance companies
4. Security brokers and dealers
5. Issuers of asset-backed securities
6. Holding companies
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We compute B as the net liability position of these groups in the following
short-term asset classes:
1. Commercial Paper
2. Security repurchase agreements
We deflate the resulting time series using the GDP deflator. We detrend
the time series for Y , I˜, CH , D and B with the filter proposed in Hamilton
(2017). We do not use the Hodrick-Prescott filter, since Hamilton (2017)
reports that the Hodrick-Prescott filter can lead to spurious correlations
and distorts the properties of the filtered series at the beginning and the end
of the series. We plot the detrended time series in Figure 3.14. We detrend
quantities in logs and interest rates in levels. The Hamilton filter leads
to substantially different detrended time series compared to the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. In particular, the Hamilton-filtered time series displays a
much stronger recession in 2007-2009 in terms of output, investment and
consumption.
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3.B Steady State
We focus on the case of the model under a binding capital requirement.
Our approach is to first characterize the steady state allocation of capital
for a given aggregate capital stock K. We then explain how the aggregate
capital stock is determined. Given K, we can compute the gross return on
capital and the wage as
RKSS = αK
α−1
SS + 1− δ (3.B.1)
WSS = (1− α)ZKαSS (3.B.2)
Steady state interest rates are determined by the first order conditions with
respect to DHt+1, and B
R
t+1:
RDSS =
1
β
(3.B.3)
RBSS = γ
RKSS
1 + fRSS
+ (1− γ)RDS S (3.B.4)
Given RK , KH is determined by the euler equation of the household with
respect to KH
RKSS =
1
β
(
1 + ηH
KHSS
KSS
)
(3.B.5)
KH
K
=
1
ηH
(
βRK − 1) (3.B.6)
We can now characterize the steady state allocation for the shadow banks:
First, from the balance sheet constraint of shadow banks follows
BSS = K
S
SS −NSSS (3.B.7)
Plugging this into the law of motion for aggregate net worth, we can write
net worth as
NS =
υSKSS
1−
[
(RK −RB) KS
NS
+RB
]
(1− σS)
. (3.B.8)
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From the incentive constraint, we then get a quadratic condition forKS/NS:
ψ
[
ω
KS
NS
+ (1− ω)
]
(3.B.9)
= β
[
σS + (1− σS)ψ
[
ω
KS
NS
+ (1− ω)
]]
1
1− σS
(
1− υS K
NS
)
= β
[
σS + (1− σS)ψ
[
ω
KS
NS
+ (1− ω)
]]((
RK −RB) KS
NS
+RB
)
(3.B.10)
We then can infer KS = KS/NSNS. The fraction of capital holdings of
retail banks are given by the market clearing condition for capital goods:
KRSS
KSS
= 1− K
H
SS
KSS
− K
S
SS
KSS
. (3.B.11)
From the balance sheet of the retail banking sector, we get
D =
(
1 + ηR
KR
K
)
KR +B −NR. (3.B.12)
This allows us to substitute out D in the law of motion for aggregate net
worth:
NR = (RKKR +RBB −RDD)(1− σR) + υRK
=
(
RKKR +RBB
−RD
((
1 + ηR
KR
K
)
KR +B −NR
))
(1− σR) + υRK
=
((
RK −
(
1 + ηR
KR
K
)
RD
)
KR
NR
+
(
RB −RD) B
NR
+RD
)
NR(1− σR) + υRK
Hence,
NR =
υRK
1− (1− σR)
((
RK −
(
1 + ηRK
R
K
)
RD
)
KR
NR
+ (RB −RD) B
NR
+RD
) .
(3.B.13)
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Finally, from the capital requirement, we get(
1 + ηR
KR
K
)
KR + γB
= φ¯
υRK
1− (1− σR)
((
RK −
(
1 + ηRK
R
K
)
RD
)
KR
NR
+ (RB −RD) B
NR
+RD
)
(3.B.14)
Substituting in the solutions for B from equation 3.B.7, NR from equation
3.B.13 and KR/K, from equation 3.B.11 this is a complicated nonlinear
equation in K only.
Some additional variables of interest can be calculated residually. Total
output is given by:
YSS = ZK
α
SS + υ
RK + υSK − ηH
(
KH
K
)2
K − ηR
(
KR
K
)2
K. (3.B.15)
Then, household consumption is characterized by the aggregate budget
constraint:
CHSS = Y − δK − σR
NR − υRK
1− σR − σ
SN
S − υSK
1− σS . (3.B.16)
3.C Equilibrium Conditions in the Dynamic
Model
3.C.1 Households
The first-order conditions of the households’ problem with respect to capital
holding KHt+1 and deposit D
H
t+1 are given by:
FOC(KHt+1) :
1
CHt
(Qt + η
HK
H
t+1
Kt
) = βEt
(
1
CHt+1
RKt+1
)
(3.C.1)
FOC(DHt+1) :
1
CHt
= βEt
(
1
CHt+1
RDt+1
)
(3.C.2)
The interpretation of these first-order conditions is standard. In the first
expression, the left-hand side and the right-hand side are the marginal cost
and marginal benefit of capital holding, respectively. The marginal cost
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of capital holding has two components. One is the price the households
have to pay for purchasing the capital goods, and the second is the capital
holding cost due to households’ low investment skills.
In addition, the households decide how much capital to hold through
the retail banking sector. The first order condition with respect to KRt+1
yields a first order condition which pins down fRt :
fRt = η
R
(
KRt+1
Kt
)
.
Aggregate consumption of the household sector can be inferred from
the resource constraint of the economy. Therefore, we do not have to track
the net worth of households as a state variable.
CHt = ZtK
α
t + υ
RKt + υ
SKt − η
H
2
(
KHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt − η
R
2
(
KRt+1
Kt
)2
Kt
− It − θ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt − σRN
R
t − υRKt
1− σR − σ
SN
S
t − υSKt
1− σS
3.C.2 Banks
Shadow Banks
The incentive constraint of the shadow bank is given by
ψ(nSt + ωb
S
t+1) = βEt
[
V St+1
]
. (3.C.3)
The balance sheet constraint of the shadow bank reads
Qtk
S
t+1 = n
S
t + b
S
t+1 (3.C.4)
The net worth of an incumbent shadow bank is
nSt = R
K
t k
S
t −RBt bSt (3.C.5)
The value of the shadow bank before the realization of the exit shock is
given by
V St = σ
SnSt + (1− σS)βEt
[
V St+1
]
= σSnSt + (1− σS)ψ(nSt + ωbSt+1),
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where the second line uses the binding incentive constraint to substitute
out the continuation value. Plugging this expression into 3.C.3 yields the
following characterization for the shadow banks choices for kSt+1 and b
S
t+1:
ψ(nSt + ωb
S
t+1) = βEt
[
(σS + (1− σS)ψ)nSt+1 + ψω(1− σS)bSt+2
]
(3.C.6)
Qtk
S
t+1 = n
S
t + b
S
t+1 (3.C.7)
nSt = R
K
t k
S
t −RBt bSt (3.C.8)
We now conjecture and verify that the policy functions for bSt+1 and k
S
t+1
are linear in net worth, such that it is sufficient to characterize the optimal
choices of the shadow banking sector as a whole in equilibrium.
Theorem 3.C.1 (Linearity of Policy Functions). The policy functions for
bSt+1 and k
S
t+1 which solve the problem of the shadow bank given by equations
3.C.6 to 3.C.8 are linear in net worth.
Proof. Suppose that the policy functions are given by bSt+1 = A
S
b n
S
t and
kSt+1 = A
S
kn
S
t , respectively. Then, it follows from equation 3.C.8 that
nSt+1 = R
K
t+1k
S
t+1 −RBt+1bSt+1
= (RKt+1A
S
k −RBt+1ASb )nSt
= ASnn
S
t .
From equation 3.C.7 follows that
QtA
S
kn
S
t = n
S
t + A
S
b n
S
t
ASk =
1 + ASb
Qt
.
Finally, from 3.C.6 follows that
ψ(1 + ωASb )n
S
t = βEt
[
(σS + (1− σS)ψ(1 + ωASb ))nSt+1
]
= βEt
[
(σS + (1− σS)ψ(1 + ωASb ))ASn
]
nSt
= βEt
[
(σS + (1− σS)ψ(1 + ωASb ))(RKt+1
1 + ASb
Qt
−RBt+1ASb )
]
nSt
This equation yields a solution for ASb that is independent of n
S
t .
25 Conse-
25Specifically, the solution is given by ASb = −p +
√
p2 + q, with p =
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quently, ASk and A
S
n are also independent of n
S
t .
Given the linearity of policy functions, it is sufficient to characterize
the policies KSt+1 and B
S
t+1 of the aggregate shadow banking sector. These
choices are the solutions to
ψ(NSt + ωB
S
t+1) = βEt
[
(σS + (1− σS)ψ)N
S
t+1 − υSKSt+1
1− σS + ψω(1− σ
S)BSt+2
]
QtK
S
t+1 = N
S
t +B
S
t+1
NSt = (R
K
t K
S
t −RBt BSt )(1− σS) + υRKSt .
Retail Banks, No Regulation
We characterize the problem of a retail banks under a non-binding and
a binding capital requirement. First, we consider the problem of a retail
bank where the incentive constraint is binding. The incentive constraint is
given by
ψ((Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1) = βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
. (3.C.9)
The balance sheet constraint reads:
(Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + b
R
t+1 = n
R
t + d
R
t . (3.C.10)
Net worth is determined according to
nRt = R
K
t k
R
t +R
B
t b
R
t −RDt dRt . (3.C.11)
− 12
(1/β−Et[RKt+1/Qt])−Et[RKt+1/Qt−RBt+1]
ωEt[RKt+1/Qt−RBt+1]
and q =
1/β−Et[(σS+(1−σS)ψ)RKt+1/Qt]
ωEt[RKt+1/Qt−RBt+1]
. When
Et
[
RKt+1/Qt −RBt+1
]
> 0 and Et
[
RBt+1 − 1/β
]
> 0, this solution is unique.
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These three equations pin down kRt+1, d
R
t+1 and n
R
t . b
R
t+1 is determined by a
first order condition of the retail banks problem:
max
{kRs+1,bRs+1,dRs+1}∞s=t
βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
s.t.
V Rt = σ
RnRt + (1− σR)ψ((Qt + fRt )kRt+1 + γbRt+1)
nRt + d
R
t+1 = (Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + b
R
t+1
ψ((Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1) = βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
nRt = R
K
t k
R
t +R
B
t b
R
t −RDt dRt
kRt+1, d
R
t+1, b
R
t+1 ≥ 0.
We conjecture, as in the shadow banking problem, that the policy functions
for kRt+1, b
R
t+1 and d
R
t+1 are linear in net worth n
R
t :
kRt+1 = A
R
k n
R
t
bRt+1 = A
R
b n
R
t
dRt+1 = A
R
d n
R
t
Plugging in the conjectured policy functions, we can rewrite the maximi-
zation problem as
max
{kRs+1,bRs+1}∞s=t
βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
s.t.
V Rt+1 = (σ
R + (1− σR)ψ((Qt+1 + fRt+1)ARk + γARb ))nRt+1
ψ((Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1) = βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
nRt+1 = R
K
t+1k
R
t+1 +R
B
t+1b
R
t+1 −RDt+1((Qt + fRt )kRt+1 + bRt+1 − nRt )
kRt+1, d
R
t+1, b
R
t+1 ≥ 0.
Defining ΩRt+1 ≡ V Rt+1/nRt+1 = (σR + (1 − σR)ψ((Qt+1 + fRt+1)ARk + γARb )),
the Lagrangian for this problem is given by
L = βEt
[
ΩRt+1(R
K
t+1k
R
t+1 +R
B
t+1b
R
t+1 −RDt+1((Qt + fRt )kRt+1 + bRt+1 − nRt ))
]
+ λ
[
ψ((Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1)
−βEt
[
ΩRt+1(R
K
t+1k
R
t+1 +R
B
t+1b
R
t+1 −RDt+1((Qt + fRt )kRt+1 + bRt+1 − nRt ))
]]
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This yields the following first order conditions:
∂L
∂kRt+1
= βEt
[
ΩRt+1(R
K
t+1 −RDt+1(Qt + fRt ))
]
(1− λ) + λψ(Qt + fRt ) = 0
∂L
∂bRt+1
= βEt
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1 −RDt+1)
]
(1− λ) + λψγ = 0
Combining these two equations and rearranging, we arrive at the condition
Et
[
ΩRt+1
(
RKt+1
Qt + fRt
−RDt+1
)]
=
1
γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1 −RDt+1)
]
.
This is basically a condition that ensures that the retail bank is indifferent
between lending a marginal unit of funds to final goods producers or on
the wholesale funding market.
Showing the linearity of policy functions works in the same way as in the
shadow bank problem. Then, in equilibrium, it is sufficient to characterize
the choices KRt+1, B
R
t+1 and D
R
t+1 of the retail banking sector as a whole.
These choices are characterized by the following system of equations:
ψ((Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t+1 + γB
R
t+1) = βEt
[
ΩRt+1
NRt+1 − υRKRt+1
1− σR
]
(Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t+1 +B
R
t+1 = N
R
t +D
R
t
Et
[
ΩRt+1
(
RKt+1
Qt + fRt
−RDt+1
)]
=
F1
γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1 −RDt+1)
]
NRt = (R
K
t K
R
t +R
B
t B
R
t −RDt DRt )(1− σR) + υRKRt
Retail Banks, With Regulation
Under a binding regulatory capital requirement, the incentive constraint of
the retail bank is replaced by the capital requirement:
φ¯tn
R
t = (Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t + γb
R
t+1
Otherwise, the model is unchanged. In particular, the linearity of policy
functions is preserved. Therefore, the choices of the aggregate retail ban-
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king sector are given by
φ¯tN
R
t = (Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t + γB
R
t+1
(Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t+1 +B
R
t+1 = N
R
t +D
R
t
Et
[
ΩRt+1
(
RKt+1
Qt + fRt
−RDt+1
)]
=
1
γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1 −RDt+1)
]
NRt = (R
K
t K
R
t +R
B
t B
R
t −RDt DRt )(1− σR) + υRKRt
3.C.3 Production
From the problem of the capital producer follows
Qt = 1 + θ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
.
The first order conditions of the final goods producer yield
rKt = αZtK
α−1
t
Wt = (1− α)ZtKαt .
3.C.4 Full Statement of the Equilibrium Conditions
No Run Equilibrium
• Household:
1
CHt
(
Qt + η
HK
H
t+1
Kt
)
= βEt
(
1
CHt+1
RKt+1
)
1
CHt
= βEt
(
1
CHt+1
RDt+1
)
fRt = η
RK
R
t+1
Kt
CHt = ZtK
α
t + υ
RKt + υ
SKt − η
H
2
(
KHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt − η
R
2
(
KRt+1
Kt
)2
Kt
− It − θ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt − σRN
R
t − υRKt
1− σR − σ
SN
S
t − υSKt
1− σS
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• Shadow Bank:
ψ(NSt + ωB
S
t+1) = βEt
[
(σS + (1− σS)ψ)N
S
t+1 − υSKSt+1
1− σS + ψω(1− σ
S)BSt+2
]
QtK
S
t+1 = N
S
t +B
S
t+1
NSt = (R
K
t K
S
t −RBt BSt )(1− σS) + υRKSt .
• Retail Bank:
φ¯tN
R
t = (Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t+1 + γB
R
t+1
(Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t+1 +B
R
t+1 = N
R
t +D
R
t
Et
[
ΩRt+1
(
RKt+1
Qt + fRt
−RDt+1
)]
=
1
γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1 −RDt+1)
]
ΩRt =
(
σR + (1− σR)ψ
(
(Qt + f
R
t )
KRt+1
N˜Rt
+
BRt+1
N˜Rt
))
NRt = (R
K
t K
R
t +R
B
t B
R
t −RDt DRt )(1− σR) + υRKRt
N˜Rt =
NRt − υRKRt
1− σR
• Firms:
Qt = 1 + θ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
RKt = αZtK
α−1
t + (1− δ)Qt
Wt = (1− α)ZtKαt
• Laws of Motion:
KHt+1 +K
R
t+1 +K
S
t+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It
ln(Zt) = (1− ρZ)µZ + ρZ ln(Zt−1) + t
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Run Equilibrium
• Household:
1
CH,∗t
(
Q∗t + η
HK
H,∗
t+1
Kt
)
= βEt
[
(1− pi) 1
CHt+1
RKt+1 + pi
1
CH,∗t+1
RK,∗t+1
]
1
CH,∗t
= βEt
[
(1− pi) 1
CHt+1
RDt+1 + pi
1
CH,∗t+1
RDt+1
]
fR,∗t = η
RK
R,∗
t+1
Kt
CH,∗t = ZtK
α
t + υ
RKt − η
H
2
(
KH,∗t+1
Kt
)2
Kt − η
R
2
(
KR,∗t+1
Kt
)2
Kt
− I∗t −
θ
2
(
I∗t
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt − σRN
R,∗
t − υRKt
1− σR
• Shadow Bank:
CS,∗t = 0
NS,∗t = 0
B∗t+1 = 0
KS,∗t+1 = 0
• Retail Bank:
φ¯tN
R,∗
t = (Qt + f
R
t )K
R,∗
t+1
(Q∗t + f
R,∗
t )K
R,∗
t+1 = N
R,∗
t +D
R,∗
t+1
ΩRt =
(
σR + (1− σR)ψ
(
(Q∗t + f
R,∗
t )
KR,∗t+1
N˜R,∗t
))
NR,∗t = (R
K,∗
t K
R
t + ξtR
K,∗
t K
S
t −RDt DRt )(1− σR) + υRKRt
N˜R,∗t =
NR,∗t − υRKt
1− σR
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• Firms:
Q∗t = 1 + θ
(
I∗t
Kt
− δ
)
RK,∗t = αZtK
α−1
t + (1− δ)Q∗t
Wt = (1− α)ZtKαt
• Laws of Motion:
KH,∗t+1 +K
R,∗
t+1 = (1− δ)Kt + I∗t
ln(Zt) = (1− ρZ)µZ + ρZ ln(Zt−1) + t
3.D Computation
We solve the model nonlinearly using a time iteration algorithm. Solving
the model nonlinearly is important, because bank runs can lead to large
deviations from steady state, where perturbation algorithms are inaccurate.
The state space of the model is S = (NR, NS, K, Z) in the ”no bank
run” equilibrium and S∗ = (NR,∗, K, Z) in the ”bank run” equilibrium. We
approximate the consumption policy functions CH(S), V R(S), V S(S), CH,∗(S∗)
and V R,∗(S∗) and the capital prices Q(S) and Q∗(S∗) using fourth order
polynomials. We compute the polynomial coefficients by imposing that the
polynomial approximations must be equal to the original functions on the
grid. Specifically, denoting the polynomial coefficients by α and the poly-
nomials by Π(S), we impose for example for the consumption of households
Π(Si)αCH = CH(Si) i = 1, . . . , N. (3.D.1)
for all N grid points. We use a Smolyak grid with order µ = 4 for the
endogenous states and µ = 3 for the exogenous states. We compute the
Smolyak grid and polynomials using the toolbox by Judd, Maliar, Maliar,
and Valero (2014).
One slight complication of the model is that the future net worth values
NR and NS, depends on Q(S). This implies that, for example, the house-
hold net worth for a given function Q(.) must be computed as a solution
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to the nonlinear function
NR,
′
=
[
(rK + (1− δ)Q(NR,′ , NS,′ , K ′, Z ′))KR,′+
RB,
′
B′ −RD,′D′
]
(1− σR) + υRK. (3.D.2)
With this in mind, we will now outline our solution algorithm for the
”no bank run” equilibrium. Suppose we are in iteration k and have initial
guesses for the no-run consumption policy functions CH(k)(S), V R(k)(S), and
V S(k)(S) and the capital price function Q(k)(S) as well as values for the future
net worth NR,
′
(k) and N
S,′
(k).
1. Given the value functions and the future net worth, compute the
future value functions and capital prices as
Q′(k) = .
2. Compute the new values for (KH,
′
, KR,
′
, KS,
′
, D′, B′, RD,
′
, RB,
′
, Q) for
all grid points i = 1, . . . , N using the first order conditions 3.C.1,
3.C.2, 3.C.9, 3.C.10, 3.C.3, 3.3.26 and the leverage constraints 3.3.14
and 3.3.8. Compute the future net worth where necessary according
to
N˜R,
′
(k+1) =
[
(rK,
′
+ (1− δ)Q(k)(NR,′(k) , NS,
′
(k), K
′, Z ′))KH,
′
+RB,
′
B′ −RD,′D′
]
(1− σR) + υRK ′. (3.D.3)
We compute expectations using Gauss-Hermite quadrature. Note
that for each quadrature node Z ′, a different value of N˜R,
′
(k+1) must be
computed.
3. Using the new policies and prices, update the consumption function
of the household using equation 3.3.29, and the value functions for
the retail and shadow banks using equations 3.3.9 and 3.3.18.
4. Update the next period net worth values using 3.D.3, with some
attenuation: NR,
′
(k+1) = (1− ι)NR,
′
(k) + ιN˜
R,′
(k+1), with ι = 0.5.
5. Repeat until the errors in the consumption, capital price and net
worth values on the grid are small. We iterate until the maximum
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error in consumption is smaller than 1e-5 and the maximum error in
the net worth is smaller than 1e-5.
If bank runs are unanticipated, we can first solve for the ”no bank run”
equilibrium and then afterwards for the ”bank run” equilibrium. Impor-
tantly, expectations during a bank run are taken over the future ”bank run”
and ”no bank run” states. It is therefore necessary to keep track of two
sets of net worth values, NR,
′
(k) and N
R,′,∗
(k) . Otherwise, the algorithm works
in the same way as for the ”no bank run” equilibrium. For the anticipated
run case, we use the unanticipated run case as initial guess and solve jointly
for the ”no bank run” and ”bank run” policy functions.
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